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COPYRIGHT DEPOSm 



THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 



By Ulysses G. B. Pierce, Ph.D. 

THE SOUL OF THE BIBLE 

Selections from the Old and New Testa- 
ments and the Apocrypha. Synthetically ar- 
ranged and edited. 

Tenth edition. Cloth, i2mo., 532 pages, 
$1.25 net. Thin paper edition, bound in leather, 
i6mo., $1.60 net. 

THE BEACON PRESS, BOSTON 



THE 
CREED OF EPICTETUS 

AS CONTAINED IN THE 

DISCOURSES, MANUAL AND 

FRAGMENTS 

SYNTHETICALLY ARRANGED 
AND EDITED BY 

ULYSSES G. B. PIERCE, Ph.D. 



WITH AN INTRODUCTORY STUDY . 

THE FAITH OF A STOIC 



BOSTON 

THE BEACON PRESS 

25 BEACON STREET 



*v 



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Copyright, 1916, by 
The Beacon Press, Inc. 



All Rights Reserved 



id 



DEC 25 1916 



VA1L-BALLOU COMPANY 

BIN6HAMT0N AND NEW YORK 



©CI.A453240 



OTHE GREAT BENEFACTOR WHO 
POINTS OUT THE WAY! TO TRIP- 
TOLEMUS ALL MEN HAVE ERECTED 
TEMPLES AND ALTARS, BECAUSE HE 
GAVE US FOOD BY CULTIVATION; BUT 
TO HIM WHO DISCOVERED TRUTH AND 
BROUGHT IT TO LIGHT AND COMMUNI- 
CATED IT TO ALL, NOT THE TRUTH 
WHICH SHOWS US HOW TO LIVE, BUT 
HOW TO LIVE WELL, WHO OF YOU FOR 
THIS REASON HAS BUILT AN ALTAR 
OR A TEMPLE, OR HAS DEDICATED A 
STATUE, OR WHO WORSHIPS GOD FOR 
THIS? BECAUSE THE GODS HAVE GIVEN 
THE VINE, OR WHEAT, WE SACRIFICE 
TO THEM: BUT BECAUSE THEY HAVE 
PRODUCED IN THE HUMAN MIND THAT 
FRUIT BY WHICH THEY DESIGNED TO 
SHOW US THE TRUTH WHICH RELATES 
TO HAPPINESS — SHALL WE NOT THANK 
GOD FOR THIS? 

DISCOURSES, I. Iv. 



PREFACE 

This volume is the outcome of a thesis pre- 
sented to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of the 
George Washington University in part satisfac- 
tion of the requirements for the degree of Doctor 
of Philosophy. The writer has been led to think 
that others might be interested in the results of a 
study which for many years has been an unfailing 
source of help and inspiration. And it is with 
the hope that this assurance from others may not 
be without some grounds that the book is sent 
forth. 

Ulysses G. B. Pierce. 

Washington, D. C. 



Vll 





CONTENTS 






CHAPTER 


PAGE 




Preface 


, vii 




Introduction — The Faith of i 




Stoic 


. xvii 




PART ONE— THE STOIC 






Book One 






THE INDWELLING GOD 




I 


Imitators of God .... 


• 7 


II 


In His Image 


• 8 

. IO 

. II 


III 




IV 


The All-Seeing .... 


V 


The Essence of Religion 


■ J 3 


VI 


Divination, False and True . 


15 


VII 




16 


VIII 


The Great Vocation . 


17 


IX 


Man the Masterpiece . 




. 19 


X 


The Divine Providence 




, 20 


XI 


The World Spectacle 




22 


XII 


Doxology 




23 



Book Two 
THE PATH OF PHILOSOPHY 

I Class Room and Clinic ... 27 
II Entered Apprentice . . . .29 
III The Beginner's Personal Appear- 
ance .31 

ix 



x CONTENTS 

CHAPTER 

IV The Shorter Catechism . 
V Man's Invincible Nature . 
VI The Workman and His Mate- 
rials 

VII Learning the Rules . 

VIII Child and Man 

IX The Aim of Instruction . 

X The Sphere of Philosophy . 

XI The Fruit of Philosophy 

XII The Test of Culture 

XIII Thfj Divine Contest . 

XIV What the World Cannot Give 



PAGE 



Book Three 

THE KINGDOM OF THE WILL 

I The Adornment of the Will 

II The Primacy of the Will 

III Things and Their Use 

IV The Heart and Its Treasure 
V The Friendship of Virtue 

VI The Domain of the Will 

VII Passwords 

VIII The Way to the Heights 

IX The Secret of Tranquillity 

X What Every Man Seeks 

XI True Freedom . 

XII Freedom and Servitude 

XIII The Freeman 

XIV The Only Way . . . 
XV Proclamation of Emancipation 





CONTENTS 


xi 




Book Four 






LEARNING AND DOING 




CHAPTER 


PAGE 


I 


Signs of Progress .... 


■ 79 


II 


Seeming and Being 


. 80 


III 


The Marks of a Philosopher 


. 82 


IV 


Pedant or Scholar 


. 84 


V 


For Use in Emergency 


. 86 


VI 


The Citadel of the Mind 


. 88 


VII 


The Power of Reason 


90 


VIII 


The Rod of Hermes . 


9i 


IX 


The Champion 


■ 93 


X 


The Discipline of the Senses 


94 


XI 


Use and Disuse 


95 


XII 


The Blade and the Ear . 


96 


XIII 


The Acceptable Time 


98 


XIV 


The Whole Duty of Man . 


99 


XV 


The True Stoic 


100 



Book Five 

THE PHILOSOPHER IN THE WORLD 

I Duties and Their Measurement . 105 
II The World Citizen . . . .106 

III The Sacred Vocation of Teach- 

ing 108 

IV Affection, Counterfeit and Real iio 
V Society in Solitude . . . .112 

VI As It Appears to Others . . .113 

VII Self-Persuasion 115 

VIII The Royal Road 117 

IX The Two Handles . . . .119 



xii 


CONTENTS 




CHAPTER 


PAGE 


X 


The Compassionate Soul 


119 


XI 


The Valiant Soul . . . 


121 


XII 


The Peaceable Soul . 


. 123 


XIII 


The Contented Soul . 


■ 125 


XIV 


The Stoic and the State 


126 


XV 


The Chief End of Man . . 

Book Six 
REWARDS AND PENALTIES 


128 


I 


The Law Divine .... 


133 


II 


Ruin and Recovery 


134 


III 


What Makes and Unmakes j 


i 




Man 


136 


IV 


Promise and Fulfilment . 


138 


V 


The Deceitfulness of Riches 


139 


VI 


The Purchase Price . 


141 


VII 


For What Will You Sell These 


? 142 


VIII 


Thersites or Agamemnon . 


143 


IX 


Holding One's Own 


145 


X 


The Unfailing Law . 


146 


XI 


The Ample Recompense . 


148 


XII 


Statutes and Ordinances 


150 



Book Seven 
THE GREAT CHANGE 

I Death and the Order of Nature 155 
II Deliverance from the Fear of 

Death 156 

III The Ordinance of Death . .157 

IV Act Well Thy Part . . . .158 



CONTENTS xiii 

CHAPTER PAGE 

V Under Orders 160 

VI Safe Passage 161 

VII The Good Warfare . . . .163 

VIII Nunc Dimittis 164 

IX Valedictory 166 





PART TWO— THE CYNIC 






Book One 






THE WAY OF THE CYNIC 




I 


The Character of the Cynic . 


173 


II 


The Call of the Cynic . 


i75 


III 


The Cynic and His Body 


176 


IV 


The Long-suffering of the Cynic 


177 


V 


The Office of the Cynic 


179 


VI 


The Commission of the Cynic . 


181 


VII 


The Burden of the Cynic . 


182 


/III 


The Cynic and the World . 


184 




Bibliography 


187 




Index .,.,.., 


195 



INTRODUCTION 
THE FAITH OF A STOIC 



INTRODUCTION 
THE FAITH OF A STOIC 

THE saying that great men commonly have 
short biographies finds ample warrant and 
abundant illustration in the case of Epictetus. 
For of this noble soul, whose words of wisdom 
have afforded strength and inspiration to the 
choice spirits of many generations, we know 
neither the year of birth nor that of death. Even 
his parentage is unknown to us. Indeed, it is by 
no means certain that his real name has not been 
supplanted by what looks like a sort of nickname. 
Of the outward life of Epictetus little more 
is known than that he was born of obscure 
parents at Hierapolis. While the year of his 
birth can only be inferred, the fact that he was 
teaching in the reign of Domitian makes it prob- 
able that he was born about the middle of the first 
century. In the reign of Nero Epictetus was 
taken to Rome as the slave of Epaphroditus. By 
his master — say rather his owner — Epictetus 
was given an education: perhaps because he was 
not strong enough for manual labor, perhaps be- 
cause the youth showed signs of unusual promise, 
or it may be, as is most likely, simply because 
his owner, like many of his day, was taken with 



xviii INTRODUCTION 

the fancy and fashion of possessing an accom- 
plished slave. But, however that may be, edu- 
cated he was. Epaphroditus sent the young man 
to the philosophical lectures of C. Musonius 
Rufus, the eminent and leading Stoic expounder 
in Rome. 

And most fortunate Epictetus was in coming 
under the teaching and influence of so able a 
philosopher and so wise a teacher. And happily 
we are not without some intimation of the high 
regard that Epictetus felt for his teacher. Rufus 
must have been a Stoic of no mean ability and 
amply endowed with the power of teaching and 
inspiring his pupils. For Epictetus pays his 
master this high tribute : " He used to speak in 
such a way that every one of us sitting there 
supposed that some one had accused him before 
Rufus: he so touched on what was doing, he so 
placed before the eyes every man's faults." * 

Upon the death of Epaphroditus, Epictetus, it 
would seem, obtained his freedom. For we find 
Epictetus teaching philosophy in Rome, and there 
bringing to his work the same rare gifts that he 
had so warmly praised in Rufus. Upon the 
banishment of the philosophers by Domitian, 
Epictetus betook himself to Nicopolis, where he 
became the acknowledged leader of the Stoic 
school, continuing his labors until his death at a 
good old age. 

So far as is known, Epictetus wrote nothing; 
at least no writing of his has been preserved. 

1 Discourses, III. xxiii. 



THE FAITH OF A STOIC xix 

His discourses have come down to us through 
the reports of one of his pupils. For if Socrates 
had his Plato, Epictetus had his Arrianus. Fla- 
vius Arrianus, not unknown for his public serv- 
ices as senator and consul and for his literary 
attainments as historian of Alexander the Great, 
was an admiring and devoted disciple of Epic- 
tetus. And it is to the amplification and publica- 
tion of his lecture notes that we are indebted for 
what we have of the discourses of Epictetus. 
We say, for what we have; for unfortunately 
half of these reports has been lost, four books 
only being preserved to us. 

As these reports have come down to us, they 
are the amplified notes of a zealous and faithful 
student rather than the formal and accurate 
transcript of philosophical lectures. As a matter 
of fact, they were not prepared with a view to 
publication, but were made solely for the student's 
own use. So Arrian confesses : " I neither com- 
posed the Discourses of Epictetus in such a man- 
ner as things of this nature are commonly com- 
posed, nor did I myself produce them to pub- 
lic view any more than I composed them. But 
whatever sentiments I heard from his own 
mouth, the very same I endeavored to set down 
in the very same words, as far as possible, and 
preserve as memorials, for my own use, of his 
manner of thinking and freedom of speech. 
These discourses are such as one person would 
naturally deliver from his own thoughts, ex- 
tempore, to another ; not such as he would prepare 



xx INTRODUCTION 

to be read by numbers afterwards. Yet, not- 
withstanding this, I cannot tell how, without 
either my consent or knowledge, they have fallen 
into the hands of the public." 2 

It is thus evident that Arrian did not publish 
his notes of the lectures of Epictetus as a finished 
literary product; and they ought not so to be 
judged. They are rather the intimate and per- 
sonal records made by an apt and admiring 
disciple. One compensation is that it is likely 
that thus we get more of the style and spirit of 
Epictetus than would be the case if the notes had 
been carefully revised. As it is, the discourses 
are free and vigorous, and seem to throb with 
life. 

And yet after this is said, it is no disparage- 
ment to add that Arrian was more faithful in 
recording than he was skillful in arranging the 
discourses of his teacher. 3 These reports, natur- 
ally enough, abound in repetitions and redun- 
dances. Nor is any order to be detected in the 
arrangement of the subject-matter. The sublime 
and the commonplace often lie side by side and 
the most diverse themes are sometimes considered 
in the same chapter. What Apollo said of 
Daphne's unkempt tresses is true here : " If so 
charming in disorder, what would they be if 
arranged ! " 

Of all this Arrian himself was doubtless quite 
as sensible as his modern critic. Indeed it was 



2 Arrian to Lucius Gellius. 

3 So Davidson : " According to modern notions, Arrian 
would not be regarded as a good editor." Stoic Creed, p. 29. 



THE FAITH OF A STOIC xxi 

presumably to correct these defects and to call 
order out of chaos that Arrian later prepared 
the now familiar Encheiridion or Manual. This 
is an abridgment or condensation of the Dis- 
courses, bringing within the compass of half a 
hundred short sections the main features of the 
teaching and philosophy of Epictetus. The style 
of the Manual is somewhat formal and ponder- 
ous, though well suited to its purpose. As com- 
pared with the reports of which this is an abstract, 
the Manual lacks spontaneity and inspiration. 
It is Law rather than Gospel. Nevertheless its 
brevity and its more systematic arrangement have 
done much to popularize the noble thoughts of 
which it is the depository. For generations the 
Manual has been regarded as a sort of Vade 
Mecum. More than one choice spirit has, so to 
speak, slept with the little book under his pillow. 
Translated into a score of languages, the Manual 
has enjoyed an immense vogue and it is still a 
great power for those seeking leading and light. 
/ It is, however, to be feared that with not a few 
their knowledge of Epictetus is limited to the 
reading of the Manual, while the vast and varied 
stores of wisdom contained in the Discourses are 
overlooked. This is to be regretted not only be- 
cause it narrows the field of thought, but also 
because it distorts the ideas of Epictetus. The 
Manual needs a certain perspective in order to be 
of the highest service; it presupposes the back- 
ground furnished by the Discourses. Without 
this, the Manual, brave and noble as it is, seems 



xxii INTRODUCTION 

harsh and arid. It is as if one should commit 
to memory the Epistle of James, and leave the 
Gospels unread. 

To others Epictetus is known only through 
fragmentary selections from the Discourses and 
the Manual. Indeed it is not unlikely that many 
admirers of the great Stoic know Epictetus only 
through these selections. While these are often 
chosen with good judgment and are more or less 
representative of the wisdom and genius of 
Epictetus, they nevertheless fail to give to the 
reader an adequate idea of the scope, variety and 
continuity of his thought. 

For these reasons it is certain that Epictetus 
has not yet come to his own. Nor will he take 
his rightful place among the world's spiritual 
benefactors and deliver to his readers his full 
message, until a twofold service is rendered to 
the reports of his discourses as they have come 
down to us. 

In the first place, there is much in the teaching 
of every sage that is necessarily local and of but 
passing interest and concern. In his criticism 
of Wordsworth, Matthew Arnold says : " To be 
recognized far and wide as a great poet, to be 
possible and receivable as a classic, Wordsworth 
needs to be relieved of a great deal of the poetical 
baggage which now encumbers him. To ad- 
minister this relief is indispensable, unless he is 
to continue to be a poet for the few only, a poet 
valued far below his real worth by the world." 4 

4 Essays in Criticism. 



THE FAITH OF A STOIC xxiii 

In a measure true of most teachers, this observa- 
tion applies with special force to the works of 
Epictetus as we have them. For in his discourses 
there are many allusions and references that have 
little interest for the modern reader. The effect 
of these is to confuse, if not to discourage, the 
reader and to distract his attention from what 
was really uppermost in the mind of Epictetus. 
His message will be found to gain immensely 
when thus relieved of irrelevancies and allowed 
to reach the reader with the least possible resist- 
ance. 

In the second place, his teaching needs to be 
arranged in a natural and orderly way, that step 
by step the reader may ascend to the summit 
of his thought. Not otherwise can we fully com- 
prehend his thought with all its grounds, its many 
implications, and its logical conclusions. 

It is to this twofold task of elimination and 
systematization, an undertaking as delicate as it 
is difficult, that the present work addresses itself. 
The aim is not to gather a volume of selections, 
but so to organize, and present his thought that 
Epictetus may communicate to his readers "the 
truth which relates to happiness." 5 

The method employed toward this desired end 
is somewhat different from any hitherto adopted. 
Ignoring Arrian's division of the material into 
the Discourses and the Manual, as also his ar- 
rangement of the Discourses in books and chap- 
ters, the entire subject-matter has been resolved 

5 Discourses, I. iv. 



xxiv INTRODUCTION 

into its thought elements. Thus analyzed, the 
material has in turn been organized and assembled 
by its own power of attraction. It is hoped that 
by this means some contribution may be made 
towards enabling Epictetus to give plain, coher- 
ent, and adequate utterance to his faith. 

And what is that faith? What are its quali- 
ties? What is its value to us? Without at- 
tempting to formulate dogmatic answers to these 
questions, it is fitting to lay before the reader 
such material as shall enable him to reach his 
own conclusions. 

At the outset it should be observed that the 
teaching of Epictetus recognizes two distinct 
grades of discipleship. He has in mind two or- 
ders, so to speak, a lay and a clerical, an outer 
and an inner circle of adherents. These two 
orders, as we have called them, are (i) the 
Stoic, and (2) the Cynic. All Cynics were Sto- 
ics, as all priests are churchmen; but not all 
Stoics were Cynics, as not all churchmen are 
called to the priesthood. For, in the view of 
Epictetus, the Cynic is a Stoic with a special call- 
ing, fitness, and mission. 

It is of primary importance to recognize this 
division; and the failure to do so has introduced 
into the teaching of Epictetus no little confusion 
and has led to much distortion and misunder- 
standing. It is the more necessary to urge this 
distinction since it has usually been ignored. 
Even so great an authority as Zeller speaks of 
the Cynic as the ideal philosopher or Stoic ex- 



THE FAITH OF A STOIC xxv 

ample. 6 And the mistake has been repeated by 
most writers on the subject, it being assumed 
that what was said of the Cynic was applicable 
to all Stoics alike. 7 Further on we shall have 
occasion to note how this misunderstanding has 
vitiated much that has been written on the sub- 
ject; and we shall have to question some of the 
judgments based upon this misapprehension. 

What Epictetus has to say concerning the Cynic 
is practically confined to the famous twenty- 
second chapter of the third book of the Discourses 
as preserved to us by Arrian. From this it ap- 
pears that the Cynic must have a distinct call to 
that life. For he who without distinct prompt- 
ing from God aspires to so high and holy a calling 
thereby renders himself hateful to the divine 
Power. The Cynic, like the poet, is born, not 
made; or at least not self-made. He must be 
called, even foreordained. For there is the ele- 
ment of destiny in it. Desire and resolve alone 
are insufficient. The same Power that ordained 
the sun to be sun, and not satellite — that Power 
calls the Stoic to become the Cynic. Cosmic 
fate enters into the matter. The willingness to 
lead the precarious life of mendicancy, the im- 
pulse to go about reproving and exhorting, these 
in themselves are no warrant for the Cynic. He 
may become a Stoic who chooses: to become a 
Cynic is above our choice. Many may be called 
— by themselves : but few are chosen by God. 

Nor is this " call " a mere vagary. For the 

6 Phil. Greece, III. S. 752. 7 See pp. xlvi-xlviii. 



xxvi INTRODUCTION 

Cynic must be amply endowed by God for his 
high vocation. Physically, he must be able to 
live the life of self-denial and self-discipline and 
not only to survive, but to thrive. His fair 
countenance and healthful body must bear un- 
mistakable witness that God has called him. 
Mentally, the keen perceptions of the Cynic and 
his freedom from every form of prejudice and 
intellectual timidity are evidences of his divine 
calling. Morally, the Cynic must be pure and 
blameless. Not a word of blame for God or for 
man is ever to escape his lips or to sully his 
heart. Though beaten like an ass, he is to joy 
in his tribulations and to love those who persecute 
and despitefully use him. Clearer than the sun 
must be his conscience, his only fortress and 
refuge. Others may hide themselves and seek 
cover, but not so the Cynic. Not even in a glass 
house does the Cynic live : he abides in the open, 
the sky his only roof, the corners of the world 
his walls. Socially, the Cynic must be unat- 
tached. He is to love One and One only, even 
Him who called him. There is to be no attach- 
ment to things or persons, the severing of which 
would bring distraction, pain, regret, or respon- 
sibility. The Cynic therefore is to be unmarried, 
foregoing the obligations of family life for the 
prior obligations of his high calling. Likewise 
he is to be exempt from civil and military serv- 
ice, seeing that already the Cynic is occupying 
the highest possible office, to which he has been 
appointed by God. 



THE FAITH OF A STOIC xxvii 

Thus endowed and commissioned, the Cynic is 
to go about reproving and exhorting men. He is 
to fear not the face of man, but with the fearless- 
ness of a Hebrew prophet he is to denounce evil 
in low places and in high. With unerring judg- 
ment he is to show men wherein lurk the perils 
of life and wherein lies their real good. Ever 
on the alert, the Cynic, without fear or favor, is 
to point out the way to freedom, happiness, and 
prosperity. And to crown all, the Cynic is him- 
self to be a living example of all that he has said 
and counselled, that in him men may behold every 
fear banished, every appetite mastered, and every 
hope realized. 

It must be obvious that Cynicism, thus deline- 
ated by Epictetus, is not for the world, but for 
the chosen few. And it is an evidence of the 
sanity and sagacity of the great Stoic that the 
matter lay perfectly clear in his mind. It is his 
interpreters who have confused his teaching, as 
there will be occasion to note. There could be no 
world, if every one were a Cynic : this would be 
a better world, were there even a few such Cynics 
as contemplated by Epictetus. 

Passing now from the Cynic to the Stoic, we 
may examine his general teaching and give some 
consideration to the ideas that constituted the 
working faith which Epictetus labored to instill 
into the minds of all those who sought his 
guidance. 

" In the beginning God." So it might well be 
said of the leading ideas of Epictetus. This is 



xxviii INTRODUCTION 

indeed the central thought of his system, from 
which all other ideas have been thrown off, like 
planets from the sun. To ignore this or to mini- 
mize it is at the outset to misunderstand the great 
Stoic, while rightly to apprehend this is to find 
ready entrance into the mind of Epictetus. So 
he himself says : " We are first to learn that God 
is." 8 While he does not undertake to present 
in philosophical order the various " arguments " 
for the being of God, there are yet few forms 
of this argument that he fails to recognize and 
utilize. They are, however, widely scattered 
through his discourses and are presented in such 
form as would appeal to the general audience that 
he addressed. 

Naturally enough therefore Epictetus invokes 
the argumentum ad hominem. Do not words 
themselves bear witness to the existence of God? 
And does not the language of men imply a natural 
conviction of His being? Otherwise how came 
these words to be adopted into the vocabulary of 
men ? Moreover does not the customary conduct 
of men imply the belief in God? Is not life it- 
self a voyage, the great adventure? "No man 
sails from port without having sacrificed to the 
Gods and invoked their help." 9 And do not 
sowing and tilling the field involve faith in an 
underlying Law ? " Men do not sow without 
having called on Demeter." 10 And furthermore 

8 Discourses, II. xiv. 9 Discourses, III. xxi. 

10 Discourses, III. xxi. 



THE FAITH OF A STOIC xxix 

is it not generally conceded that the chief end of 
man is to follow the Gods? " But if there be no 
Gods, how can the following of the Gods be an 
end?" u Now this language and these customs 
are employed by men in general, and they have 
not seen fit to drop the language or to abolish the 
customs; they therefore constitute a witness to 
man's natural belief in the existence of God. 
Such is the argumentum ad hominem as employed 
by Epictetus, and it is embellished with fervid, if 
simple, rhetoric. 

Moreover the evidence of teleology is not over- 
looked by Epictetus. He lays stress upon the 
evidences of design in nature. " From the very 
structure of things which have attained their com- 
pletion, we are accustomed to show that the work 
is certainly the work of some artificer, and that 
it has not been constructed without a purpose. 
Does, then, each of these things demonstrate the 
workman, and do not invisible things . . . dem- 
onstrate Him? If not so, let them explain to 
us what it is that makes each several thing, or 
how it is possible that things so wonderful and 
like the contrivances of art should exist by 
chance." 12 This seems like an anticipation of 
Bacon's oft quoted words : " I had rather believe 
all the fables . . . than that this universal frame 
is without a mind. ... It is true that a little 
philosophy inclineth a man's mind to atheism; 
. . . but when it beholdeth the chain of them, 

11 Discourses, I. xii. 12 Discourses, I. xvi. 



xxx INTRODUCTION 

confederate and linked together, it must needs fly- 
to Providence and Deity." 13 

Then, again, the visible world with its many 
and various effects demands an adequate cause. 
Something from nothing is bad mathematics and 
worse philosophy. Do not nature's laws neces- 
sitate a Lawgiver? Is nature automatic, self- 
moved? Or is there a Prime Mover? God is: 
He is the Force and the Power within and behind 
visible nature. " For how else do plants, as if 
at the command of God, when He bids them, 
flower in due season ? And how else at the wax- 
ing and waning of the moon, and the approach 
and withdrawal of the sun, do we behold such a 
change and reversal in earthly things ? " 14 

Nor did the argument from analogy escape 
Epictetus. Bishop Butler might have found in 
the great Stoic many ideas kindred to his own. 
Is not the universe a great and teeming city? 
" Has it no Governor ? And how is it possible 
that a city or a family cannot continue to exist, 
not even for the shortest time, without an ad- 
ministrator and guardian, and that so great and 
beautiful a system should be administered with 
such order and yet without a purpose and by 
chance? There is, then, an Administrator." 15 
And that Administrator is none other than God. 
With satire as keen as it is delicate Epictetus 
likens those who fail or refuse to perceive this 



13 Essay XVI. Compare Cicero, De Natura Deorum, II. 
xxxiv. 

14 Discourses, I. xiv. 15 Discourses, II. xiv. 



THE FAITH OF A STOIC xxxi 

unto the behavior of people at a country fair. 
Most of the visitors are content to wander about 
and admire the cattle and to inquire the price of 
fodder: while the discerning ones meditate upon 
the purpose of the exhibit and admire the execu- 
tive ability rendering the exposition possible. 16 
Even so is the world: many observe only the 
phenomena ; some few penetrate into the meaning 
of phenomena and thereby find God. 

But Epictetus does not stop here. The su- 
preme witness to the being of God is found, not 
in the laws and phenomena of external nature, 
but in the mind and constitution of man. For 
into man God has put a portion of Himself. 
" You are a fragment of God, you have in yourr 
self something that is a part of Him." 17 The 
moral nature of man testifies to the being of God. 
That moral nature man did not make: it the 
rather makes him. 

For man is endowed with the sense of loyalty 
to the Good : he willingly acknowledges the obli- 
gation, and adopts the word ought. Just what 
particular thing it may be his duty to do or to 
forego is a matter to be determined by education 
and experience; that being an intellectual ques- 
tion, in no wise affecting the prior sense of ob- 
ligation. Epictetus states the matter thus : " He 
has done well, he has not done well; he is un- 
just, he is just; . . . who does not use these 
names? Who among us defers the use of them 
till he has learned them, as he defers the use of 



16 Discourses, II. xiv. 17 Discourses, II. viii. 



xxxii INTRODUCTION 

the words about lines or sounds ? And the cause 
of this is that we come into the world already 
taught as it were by nature some things on this 
matter, and proceeding from these, we have 
added to them self-conceit. For why, a man 
says, do I not know the beautiful and the ugly? 
Have I not the notion of it? You have. Do 
I not adapt it to particulars? You do. Do I 
not, then, adapt it properly? In that lies the 
whole question. . . . For if men possessed this 
power of adaptation . . . what would hinder 
them from being perfect?" 18 In other words, 
the moral nature of man functions through the 
organ of his intellect; and that intellect must be 
trained: howbeit, that moral nature which thus 
functions is itself the presence of God in the soul 
of man. Thus Epictetus anticipates modern 
thought; and the words of Martineau seem an 
echo of the thought of the great Stoic : " The 
revelation of authority, this knowledge of the 
better, this inward conscience, this moral ideality 
— call it what you will — is the presence of God 
in man." 19 Further on we shall have occasion 
to speak more fully of this and to point out some 
of its practical applications by Epictetus. 20 

But if God is, so also His Providence orders 
and directs all things. 21 For Epictetus sum- 
marily rejects the idea that God is simply the 
First Cause; he cannot rest in the thought that 
God cares only for the great things and has no 

18 Discourses, II. xi. 19 Seat of Authority, p. 105. 

20 See pp. xli-xliv. 21 Discourses, II. xiv. 



THE FAITH OF A STOIC xxxiii 

concern with the ordinary affairs of men; nor is 
he satisfied with the suggestion that God rules 
over men by impersonal general laws : Epictetus 
is satisfied with nothing less than the words of 
Homer : 

" I move not without Thy knowledge." 22 

His God must be also his Father. For the uni- 
verse, as the name implies, is one : one in author- 
ship, one in substance. One law governs and 
pervades the whole. " Is not God able to oversee 
all things, and to be present with all, and to re- 
ceive from all a certain communication? And 
is the sun able to illuminate so large a part of 
the All . . . and He who made the sun itself 
. . . being a small part of Himself compared 
with the whole, cannot He perceive all things ? " 23 
It is as if Epictetus had read the words of the 
Psalmist : 

"He that formed the eye, shall He not see?" 24 

No easy-going faith is here however. For if 
there is a Providence, the implications are 
weighty. If there is a Providence, then to blame 
God is to dethrone Him. Like Job, the Stoic 
must stalwartly refuse to " curse God." All 
judgment and criticism must be withheld. Hence 
submission and resignation have a large place in 
the teaching of Epictetus. As the educated per- 

22 Discourses, II. xii. 23 Discourses, I. iv. 

24 Psalm XCIV. 9. 



xxxiv INTRODUCTION 

son does not spell words as he happens to wish, 
but spells them as they should be spelled; so the 
man who is morally educated submits joyfully to 
Providence. " To be instructed is this, to learn 
to wish that everything may happen as it does." 25 
" Would you have anything other than what is 
best ? Is there anything better than what pleases 
God ? " 26 But this submission, while complete 
and unreserved, is not blind and servile. It in- 
volves, to be sure, self -surrender and hardship; 
but these are a part of man's moral discipline and 
are for his highest good. " For this purpose He 
leads me at one time hither, at another time sends 
me thither, shows me to men as poor, without 
authority, and sick; leads me into prison, not 
because He hates me, far from Him be such a 
meaning, for who hates the best of his servants? 
nor yet because He cares not for me, for He does 
not neglect any even of the smallest things; but 
He does this for the purpose of exercising me 
and making use of me as a witness to others." 27 
Furthermore the doctrine of Providence involves 
active co-operation upon our part. Many writ- 
ers have overlooked this, thus misconstruing the 
teaching of Epictetus. 28 He places great em- 
phasis upon submission to the will of God, and it 
is one of his favorite themes. But it should be 
observed that the will to which we are to submit 
is the will which demands active co-operation up- 
on our part in the work of the world. Thus the 

25 Discourses, I. xii. 26 Discourses, II. vii. 

27 Discourses, III. xxiv. 28 See pp. xlv-xlvi. 



THE FAITH OF A STOIC xxxv 

submission is twofold, passive and active; being 
at once resignation and co-operation. 

It must be obvious that here is no conventional 
and perfunctory faith. And it is well nigh in- 
credible that so careful a student as Dr. Bussell 
should characterize this teaching as " a vague 
and pietistic doctrine." 29 For no one can 
seriously contemplate this faith of Epictetus with- 
out recognizing that, so far from being " vague 
and pietistic," it was to him a solemn and holy 
truth, carrying with it serious implications. 

First of all, if God is, He is to be acknowledged 
and to be worshipped. And one of the most 
beautiful and appealing of all the passages in 
Epictetus is the chapter where he calls upon all 
to join in the hymn of worship and praise. 30 
Zeller seems to have missed this entirely, when 
he says : " The true worship of God, according 
to their view, consists only in the mental effort 
to know God, and in a moral and pious life." 31 
Without conceding this to be so mean a thing, it 
is but fair to say that Epictetus would have ob- 
jected to the word "only." For he taught that 
everyone should give formal expression to his 
faith in God and should take part in acts of wor- 
ship. " To make libations and to sacrifice and 
to offer first-fruits according to the custom of 
our fathers ... is a thing which belongs to all 
to do." 32 Epictetus was fully aware that with- 

29 Marcus Aurelius and the Later Stoics, p. 85. 
80 Discourses, I. xvi. 

31 Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, p. 343. 
"Manual XXXI. 



xxxvi INTRODUCTION 

out " a moral and pious life," formal acts of 
worship count for nought; but he also knew 
that the godly life craves expression in worship. 
" Had we but understanding, should we ever 
cease hymning and blessing the Divine Power, 
both openly and in secret, and telling of His 
gracious gifts? . . . and upon you, too, I call to 
join in this selfsame hymn/' 33 Yet this worship 
must be no vague nor vain thing. For it must 
kindle in man the passionate desire to become, so 
far as in him lies, like unto Him whom he wor- 
ships. "If the Deity is faithful, he too must be 
faithful; if free, beneficent, and exalted, he must 
be so; and, in all his words and actions, behave 
as an imitator of God." 34 

It is by virtue of this belief in the universal 
Providence that we have the Stoic conception of 
the World Citizen. We are to name ourselves 
after the most lordly of our dwellings, not after 
the most miserable. Therefore Epictetus com- 
mends to us the habit of Socrates who, upon be- 
ing asked what was his native place, was wont to 
claim, not Athens or Corinth, but the universe. 35 
And with Epictetus this is no mere figure of 
speech, but a truth leading to many practical con- 
clusions. For thus man is to regard himself as a 
living member of the universe, a citizen not an 
alien, a fellow-member not merely an integral 
part. 36 The world is his Fatherland, and every 

33 Discourses, I. xvi. 34 Discourses, II. xiv. 

3 * Discourses, I. ix. Compare Lowell's, The Fatherland. 

J 6 Compare Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, VII. 13. 



THE FAITH OF A STOIC xxxvii 

spot is Home. " Can any man," he asks, " cast 
me out of the universe? He cannot; but whith- 
ersoever I may go, there will be the sun, and the 
moon, and there the stars, and visions, and 
omens, and communion with the Gods." 37 And 
being members of the family universal, we are 
to hold nothing as profitable for self that does 
not contribute to the good of the whole. For 
as the foot is useless and dead save as a member 
of the body, so the individual fulfils himself only 
through this universal relationship. 38 To keep 
this kinship inviolate and to suffer nothing to 
sever this relationship must be the constant aim. 
The good man, accordingly, is he who submits 
himself to God just as the good citizen submits 
himself to the laws of the state. 39 

A direct inference from the belief in God as 
Father relates to the nobility and worth of man. 
For by origin, nature, capacity, vocation, and 
destiny man's divine ancestry is witnessed. If 
he could fully appreciate this truth, never would 
he think meanly or ignobly of himself. 40 If kin- 
ship with Caesar would exalt one, what should 
be the elation upon knowing that we are sons 
of God! And should not this avail to rescue us 
from all despondency and to set us free from all 
fear ? 41 For says he : " Think you that God in- 
tended His own son to be enslaved? " 42 

With this faith, clearly perceived and vigor- 

37 Discourses, III. xxii. 40 Discourses, I. iii. 

38 Discourses, II. x. 41 Discourses, I. ix. 
89 Discourses, I. xii. 42 Discourses, I. xix. 



xxxviii INTRODUCTION 

ously held, it was inevitable that Epictetus should 
condemn human bondage. Here again the 
learned Zeller is mistaken when he says that the 
Stoics never condemned slavery. 43 On the con- 
trary Dr. Rolleston is more nearly correct, when 
he credits Epictetus with being the first Pagan 
thinker to condemn slavery. 44 But the great 
Stoic could do no otherwise, believing as he did 
in the fatherhood of God and its corollary the 
brotherhood of man. " How then shall a man 
endure such persons as this slave? Slave your- 
self, will you not bear with your own brother, 
who has Zeus for his progenitor, and is like a 
son from the same seeds and of the same descent 
from above? But if you have been put in any 
such high place, will you immediately make your- 
self a tyrant? Will you not remember who you 
are, and whom you rule? that they are kinsmen, 
brethren by nature, that they are the offspring 
of Zeus? But, you say, I have purchased them, 
and they have not purchased me. Do you see 
in what direction you are looking, that it is to- 
wards the earth, towards the pit, that it is to- 
wards these wretched laws of dead men? but to- 
wards the laws of the Gods you are not look- 
ing." 45 And again the same high, clear note 
is sounded, when he says : " As he who is in 
health would not choose to be served by the sick, 
nor for those who dwell with him to be sick; so 
neither would a free man endure to be served 



43 Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, p. 329. 

44 Teaching of Epictetus, p. 205. 45 Discourses, I. xiii. 



THE FAITH OF A STOIC xxxix 

by slaves or for those who live with him to be 
slaves." 46 And still again Epictetus states it 
thus logically : " What you avoid suffering, do 
not attempt to make others suffer. You avoid 
slavery: take care that others are not your slaves. 
For if you endure to have a slave, you appear 
to be a slave yourself first. For vice has no com- 
munity with virtue, nor freedom with slavery." 47 
It will be observed that these are not mere 
rhetorical outbursts, but the deliberate convictions 
of one who believed in God and feared not to 
face the logic of his faith. 

What at first may appear to be a lapse from 
this faith in the dignity and worth of man is 
found in the Stoic doctrine of the " Open Door." 
This is, of course, a euphemism for suicide. 
And from the rather smooth recitals of Zeller 
and others one might infer that it was the custom 
of Stoics to end their lives upon the slightest 
provocation. So Zeller says : " Zeno, in old age, 
hung himself, because he had broken his finger; 
Cleanthes, for a still less cause, continued his 
abstinence till he died of starvation." 48 Such 
recitals have been repeated by many writers until 
they have gained considerable credence. But the 
matter is not so simple as these instances would 
make it appear. For if suicide was a part of the 
Stoic program, why should Zeno have delayed 
his exit until his ninety-eighth year? And why 
should Cleanthes have waited until four score 



* 6 Fragment, XLIII. * Fragment, XLII. 

48 Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, p. 336. 



xl INTRODUCTION 

years had rolled over his head before availing 
himself of so easy an escape? 

While it is true that the general opinion of 
that time condoned, if it did not counsel, under 
certain conditions, self -emancipation from the 
flesh, it is also true that the weight of Stoic 
teaching and example was against the practice. 49 
Marcus Aurelius, notwithstanding some trouble- 
some allusions to the subject, refused to pass 
through the " Open Door," even when the smoke 
in his cabin was most dense. 50 And so far as 
Epictetus is concerned, we are not left to sur- 
mise what his views were; for this very ques- 
tion came up in his class room. One of the stu- 
dents is represented as saying : " Epictetus, we 
can no longer endure being bound to this poor 
body . . . and for the sake of the body com- 
plying with the wishes of these and of those. 
. . . Allow us to be released at last from these 
bonds by which we are bound and weighed 
down." 51 To this Epictetus answers : " Friends, 
wait for God: when He shall give the signal 
and release you from this service, then go to 
Him; but for the present endure to dwell in 
this place where He has put you. Short indeed 
is this time of your dwelling here, and easy 
to bear for those who are so disposed. . . . 

49 So Merivale : " Nothing would be more erroneous 
than to suppose that this was a principle of the Stoics or 
was a distinguishing practice of the sect." History of the 
Romans under the Empire. Vol. VII. Ch. lxiv. 

50 " The cabin is full of smoke, and I quit it." Medita- 
tions, V. 29. 51 Discourses, I. ix. 



THE FAITH OF A STOIC xli 

Wait then, do not depart without a reason." 51 
And upon another similar occasion he says : " For, 
on the other hand, God does not wish it to be 
done, and He has need of such a world and such 
inhabitants in it." 52 And the teaching of 
Epictetus was amply seconded by his life and 
example. So far from seeking release from the 
toils and cares of life, he rescued a waif exposed 
for death, and took it into his humble abode 
where he reared the child as his own — his sole 
descendant. The noble Stoic endured to the end, 
remaining like a sentinel at his post until dis- 
missed by his Commander. 

It must now be evident that to Epictetus the 
being of God and man's kinship with Him were 
no sentimental vagaries. One cannot fail there- 
fore to be surprised that Bussell should regard 
this relationship between God and man as little 
more than " a verbal kinship between the soul 
and its Maker." 53 Certainly Epictetus felt the 
need of something other than that. To him, in- 
deed, the relationship is void, " if there be no 
communication to men, yea, even to mine own 
self." 54 

But does man, in fact, possess any organ for 
such communication? Specifically, then, we may 
ask, How does God function in man? To this 
question Epictetus has his own plain and definite 
answer. Man by nature has two elements 

52 Discourses, I. xxix. 

53 Marcus Aurelius and the Later Stoics, p. 33. 

54 Discourses, I. xii. 



xlii INTRODUCTION 

blended in his constitution: he is physical in 
common with the brutes ; he is also rational, thus 
being set apart from the brute creation and allied 
consciously to the Divine. 55 The universal Rea- 
son thus functions through the reason of the in- 
dividual. So Epictetus represents God as saying 
to him : " Had it been possible, Epictetus, I would 
have made both that body of thine and thy pos- 
sessions free and unimpeded, but as it is, be not 
deceived: it is not thine own; it is but finely 
tempered clay. Since then this I could not do, 
I have given thee a portion of Myself, in the 
power of desiring and declining and of pursuing 
and avoiding, and, in a word, in the power of 
dealing with the things of sense." 56 

This thought is fundamental with Epictetus. 
The Ruling Faculty, of which he speaks so often, 
is that God-given power whereby we deliver 
moral judgments. This moral sentiment, divine- 
ly implanted in man, is the organ of communi- 
cation between God and the soul. Epictetus 
states it thus : " God hath placed at every man's 
side a Guardian, the genius of each man, who is 
charged to watch over him, a genius that cannot 
sleep, nor be deceived. To what greater and 
more watchful guardian could He have com- 
mitted us? So when ye have shut the doors 
and made darkness in the house, remember never 
to say that ye are alone; for ye are not alone, 

55 " Certainly man is of kin to the beasts by his body ; 
and if he be not of kin to God by his spirit, he is a base 
and ignoble creature." Bacon, Essay XVI. 

66 Discourses, I. i. 



THE FAITH OF A STOIC xliii 

but God is there, and your genius is there; and 
what need have these of light to mark what ye 
are doing? " 57 

This inborn moral sentiment is called by many 
names, the Ruling Faculty being the common 
term. It is also identified with the conscience, 
as when Epictetus says : " When we are children 
our parents deliver us to a pedagogue to take care 
on all occasions that we suffer no harm. But 
when we are become men, God delivers us to our 
innate conscience, to take care of us." 58 Again, 
this God-given faculty is called a Prophet or 
Diviner ; as when he asks : " Have I not within 
me a Diviner who has told me the nature of good 
and of evil ? " 59 At other times this organ is 
identified with the power of Choice and with 
the Will. But whatever expression is used, what 
Epictetus has in mind is that faculty by which 
we translate sense impressions into their moral 
value. " For wine and oil give thanks to God, 
but remember that He has given you something 
else better — the power of using them, proving 
them, and estimating the value of each." 60 

57 Discourses, I. xiv. Compare Marcus Aurelius : " Zeus 
hath given to every man for his guardian and guide a por- 
tion of Himself." Meditations, V. 27. 

58 Fragment, XCVII. Compare Cicero: "The judge 
will bear in mind that he has God for a witness, that is, as I 
think, his own conscience." De Officiis, III. x. Compare 
also Milton, Paradise Lost, III. 194-7: 

" And I will place within them as a guide 
My umpire Conscience ; whom if they will hear, 
Light after light well used they shall attain, 
And to the end persisting safe arrive." 
59 Discourses, II. vii. 60 Discourses, III. xxiii. 



xliv INTRODUCTION 

Thus, in a word, God communicates with the 
soul of man through the Conscience, this being 
the Ruling Faculty, whose office it is to render 
man " capable of using conformably to nature the 
appearances presented." 60 

This at once introduces us to the formula, To 
live according to nature. But what is the nature 
in accordance with which we are to live? With 
the elder Cynics the phrase meant the return to 
the unrestrained life of those who recognized no 
civil obligations. But with the Stoic school it 
was quite otherwise. In their view, to live ac- 
cording to nature is to live according to human 
nature ; and to live according to human nature is 
to live according to that nature at its best; and 
that nature is at its best when it is virtuous : hence 
to live according to nature is to live according to 
virtue. Thus Zeno, the founder of the Stoic 
school, says : " To live according to nature is to 
live according to virtue, for nature leads us to 
this point." 61 Similarly Epictetus says : " What 
is a man's nature? To bite, to kick, to throw 
into prison and behead? No! but to do good, 
to co-operate with others, to wish them well. ,, 62 
Here is no idealization of the brute forces of 
nature or longing for a return to the fancied 
freedom of primitive life. On the contrary, the 
nature in accordance with which we are to aspire 
to live is the moral and social nature of man at its 
highest. " It is enough," Epictetus says, " for 
the brutes to eat and to drink, and to do all the 

«i Diogenes Laertius, VII. liii 62 Discourses, IV. 1. 



THE FAITH OF A STOIC xlv 

other things which they severally do. But for 
us, to whom God has given also the intellectual 
faculty, these things are not sufficient; for unless 
we act in a proper and orderly manner, and con- 
formably to the nature and constitution of each 
thing, we shall never attain our true end. . . . 
But God has introduced man to be a spectator of 
God and of His works ; and not only a spectator 
of them, but an interpreter. For this reason it is 
shameful for man to begin and to end where 
irrational animals do; but rather he ought to be- 
gin where they begin, and to end where nature 
ends in us ; and nature ends in contemplation and 
understanding, and in a way of life conformable 
to nature." 63 

This passage should be sufficient refutation of 
the charge that with Epictetus " Man no more 
acts; he only contemplates. And this is his 
highest pleasure; and therefore his highest 
duty." 64 At least one cannot help admiring the 
ingenuity that enables a writer in so few words 
so thoroughly to misrepresent the teaching of 
Epictetus. The criticism is a remarkably suc- 
cinct statement of what the great Stoic did not 
teach. For so far from encouraging men to rest 
in passive contemplation, he was constantly urg- 
ing men "to do good and to co-operate with 
others." 62 Therefore he says : " I ought not to 

63 Discourses, I. vi. Compare the lines of Matthew 
Arnold : 

11 Know, man hath all which Nature hath, but more, 
And in that more lie all his hopes of good." 

64 Marcus Aurelius and the Later Stoics, p. 108. 



xlvi INTRODUCTION 

be free from affections like a statue, but I ought to 
maintain the relations both natural and acquired, 
as a pious man, as a son, as a father, as a citi- 
zen." 65 

Accordingly, to live conformably to nature in- 
volves the fulfilment of our social nature; seeing 
that it is only through society and the meeting 
of these larger obligations that man realizes him- 
self. He is therefore to take his place and to 
discharge his duties as a friend, neighbor, citizen, 
parent. Here again the statement of Zeller 66 
that Epictetus dissuaded from matrimony is a 
curious inversion of the facts. He palpably mis- 
understands the single passage cited as his au- 
thority for such a conclusion. The words he 
quotes are from the famous twenty-second chap- 
ter of the third book of the Discourses. Herein 
Epictetus says : " As the state of things now is, 
like an army prepared for battle, is it not neces- 
sary that a Cynic should be without distraction? 
. . . We do not find the affair (matrimony) 
mightily suited to the condition of a Cynic." 
Now the conclusion of Zeller is found to be quite 
without warrant, when it is remembered that in 
this passage Epictetus is not speaking of the 
Stoics in general, but of the Cynics exclusively. 
Now, as we have said, 67 the Cynic was to the 
Stoic what the Priesthood is to the Church. 



65 Discourses, III. ii. Compare Marcus Aurelius : " Not 
in passivity, but in activity lie the evil and the good of the 
rational social creature." Meditations, IX. 16. 

66 Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, p. 324. 

67 See pp. xxiv-xxvii. 



THE FAITH OF A STOIC xlvii 

And Epictetus no more taught that all Stoics 
should forego marriage than the Church teaches 
that celibacy is the condition for all its members. 
Detached from the world, and with uncompromis- 
ing devotion to the moral ideal, the Cynic is to 
regard himself as the father and brother of all 
men, justifying this by his teaching and exempli- 
fying it in his character and conduct. Only those 
are called to be Cynics who, foregoing the or- 
dinary relationships of life, are by circumstances, 
physical fitness, mental endowments, and moral 
insight and courage, qualified to endure its aus- 
terities and to exemplify its stern ethics. Zeller 
is not the only critic of Epictetus who has utterly 
misapprehended this matter. 

In confirmation of this contention, it is to be 
noted that the serious charge that Epictetus him- 
self brought against the Epicureans was precisely 
what Zeller alleges against Epictetus. Epictetus 
represents the Epicureans as saying to him : " We 
were not to marry, nor to have children, nor to 
engage in public affairs." To this Epictetus an- 
swers: "What will be the consequence of this? 
Whence are the citizens to come, &c." And such 
doctrines Epictetus deems to be " bad, subversive 
of a state, pernicious to families, and not becom- 
ing to women." 68 For, in the view of the 
teacher, the chief duties in life are: "Engaging 
in public business, marrying, the production of 
children, the worship of God, the care of our 
parents, and generally, having desires, aversions, 

68 Discourses, III. vii. 



xlviii INTRODUCTION 

pursuits of things and avoidances, in the way in 
which we ought to do these things, and according 
to our nature." 68 Thus the aim of Epictetus 
was to encourage such individual and social con- 
duct as would " keep us constant in acts which 
are conformable to nature." 68 

In brief, then, to live according to nature is, 
in the words of Epictetus himself: " To perform 
the duties of a citizen, to fill the usual offices, to 
marry and to rear children. ... To use accord- 
ing to nature the appearances that encounter thee, 
not missing what thou pursuest, nor falling into 
what thou wouldst avoid, never failing of good 
fortune, nor overtaken of ill fortune, free, un- 
hindered, uncompelled, agreeing with the admin- 
istration of Zeus, obedient unto the same, and 
well pleased therein; blaming none, charging 
none, able of thy whole soul to say: 

" Lead me, O Zeus, and Thou, O Destiny." 69 

The life according to nature is its own justi- 
fication and its own reward. It seeks not to 
have, but to be. Fidelity, modesty, piety, mag- 
nanimity, these justify themselves by every ap- 
proach toward them; while every lapse from 
virtue carries within it its own punishment. The 
teaching of Cleanthes 70 that virtue should be 
sought for its own sake, without being influenced 
by fear or hope by any external influence, was 
adopted by Epictetus and embellished with all his 

69 Discourses, II. xxiii. 70 Diogenes Laertius, VII. Hii. 



THE FAITH OF A STOIC xlix 

rhetorical power. This is the Stoic doctrine of 
equivalents, antedating by centuries Emerson's 
" Compensation." Thus the Ruling Faculty is at 
every step complete in itself, the balance being 
struck with every moral transaction. The mind 
gets all it pays for : pays for all it gets. " For 
wherever you have deviated from any of these 
rules, there is damage immediately, not from any- 
thing external, but from the action itself." 71 
Contrariwise, the highest compensation for the 
life according to nature is that " of being con- 
scious that you are obeying God, that not in word, 
but in deed you are performing the acts of a wise 
and good man. For what a thing it is for a man 
to be able to say to himself, Now whatever the 
rest may say, this I am doing; and of this Zeus 
has willed that I shall receive from myself a 
demonstration, and shall myself know if He has 
a soldier such as He ought to have, a citizen such 
as He ought to have." 72 

It may be that this doctrine of moral equiva- 
lents, or the sufficingness of virtue, is the explana- 
tion why Epictetus has so little to say about the 

71 Discourses, IV. xii. 72 Discourses, III. xxiv. 

Compare Marcus Aurelius : " Not as in a dance and in 
a play and in such like things, where the whole action is 
incomplete if anything cut it short; but in every part and 
wherever it may be stopped, the rational soul makes what 
has been set before it full and complete, so that it can 
say, I have what is mine own." Meditations, XL I. 
" When a man has done anything benevolent or in any 
other way conducive to the common interest, he has acted 
conformably to his nature, and he gets what is his own." 
Ibid., IX. 42. 



1 INTRODUCTION 

immortality of the soul. Certain it is that the 
question as it confronts us did not perplex him. 
Every day and every act being complete in itself, 
the soul's ledger always standing perfectly bal- 
anced, Epictetus was not constrained to enter into 
lengthy argument about the immortality of the 
soul. Of the future there was no need, the pres- 
ent being always complete in itself. This does 
not mean that he disbelieved in what we call the 
" future life " ; but rather that any such extension 
of human life was amply covered by his faith in 
the rationality of the universe. Accordingly he 
asks : " Is God, then, careless of His servants, 
His witnesses, whom alone He useth to show 
forth what He is, and that He governeth all 
things well, and is not careless of human things? 
and that to a good man there is no evil, neither 
in life nor in death?" 73 What Epictetus con- 
templates in this regard is not knowledge and 
certitude, but trust and loyalty. " Wherefore," 
he says, " a good man and true cares only how 
he may fill his post with due discipline and 
obedience to God. Wilt Thou that I continue to 
live? Then will I live, as one that is free and 
noble, as Thou wouldst have me. But hast Thou 
no further need of me? I thank Thee! Up to 
this hour have I stayed for Thy sake and none 
other's: and in obedience to Thee I depart, as 
Thy servant, as one whose ear is open unto what 
Thou dost enjoin, what Thou dost forbid." 74 

73 Discourses, III. xxvi. 74 Discourses, III. xxiv. 



THE FAITH OF A STOIC li 

" For," says Epictetus, " being appointed to such 
a service, do I still care about the place? and do 
I not entirely direct my thoughts to God and 
to His instructions and commands?" 74 And 
some there are who will regard this high faith 
and sublime obedience as themselves subtle and 
satisfying evidence of the life immortal. 75 But 
however that may be, Epictetus would have men 
face the future without question and without fear, 
resting in his assurance : " To nought that thou 
needest fear, wilt thou go. There is no Hades, 
no fabled rivers of Sighs, of Lamentations, or of 
fire : but all things are full of Beings spiritual and 
divine." 76 

From the foregoing it must be obvious that 
such a faith as Epictetus contemplates is not to 
be attained in a day or without great effort. Nor 
does the great Stoic so imagine. He indulges no 
illusions on the subject. The life according to 
nature must obey the universal law of growth. 
" Nothing great," he warns us, " is produced sud- 
denly, since not even the grape or the fig is. If 
you say to me now that you want a fig, I will 
answer to you that it requires time. Is then the 
fruit of a fig-tree not perfected suddenly and in 
an hour, and would you possess the fruit of a 
man's mind in so short a time and so easily ? " 77 
The path of virtue is a path of progress. For 

75 So Bernard : " When man arrives at such a conception 
... as Epictetus reached, he is well on his way to believe 
in a life to come." Great Moral Teachers, p. 130. 

76 Discourses, III. xiii. 77 Discourses, I. xv. 



Hi INTRODUCTION 

virtue not only may be taught, but it must be 
taught. The moral heights cannot be scaled, but 
are to be gained only by a long and tortuous 
ascent. Towards these moral summits the 
teacher himself leads the way, at once guide 
and companion; and Epictetus gives his follow- 
ers certain definite instructions regarding what is 
at best a long and difficult journey. 

At the outset it should be observed that 
Epictetus holds out no false and alluring hopes 
to those who seek his instruction. There is no 
royal road to philosophy. The disciple must 
come prepared to " scorn delights, and live labor- 
ious days." He must be willing to be laughed at 
and mocked. 78 Like an athlete, he must go into 
training. He should count the cost ere ever he 
enter the lists. For Epictetus wishes no half- 
hearted disciples. " You must w T atch, you must 
labor ; overcome certain desires ; quit your famil- 
iar friends, submit to be despised by your servant, 
to be held in derision by them that meet you, to 
take the lower place in all things, in office, in 
positions of authority, in courts of law. Weigh 
these things fully, and then, if you will, lay to 
your hand." 79 

Therefore the first step of progress is the laying 
aside of all self-assurance and complacency. The 
disciple must become a fool, in order that he may 
become wise : he must empty himself of all vanity 
before he can be filled with wisdom. " Wouldst 
thou be good ? " he asks ; " then first know that 

™ Manual, XXII. ™ Discourses, III. xv. 



THE FAITH OF A STOIC liii 

thou art evil." 80 Therefore the beginning of 
philosophy is the consciousness of our own weak- 
ness. 81 For the class room is a clinic, the dis- 
ciple is a patient. He is sick, though he does not 
realize how seriously. The teacher is a physician 
who is so to heal and strengthen the patient that 
he shall return to the world " with a capacity to 
endure, to be active in association with others, 
to be free from passions, free from perturbation, 
with such a provision for the journey of life that 
he shall be able to bear well the things that hap- 
pen and derive honor from them." 82 

Moreover the disciple is cautioned not to an- 
nounce the fact that he is " taking a course in 
philosophy." He is to make no proclamation of 
his new resolve, and is not to speak much of 
things philosophic. " Fruit grows thus : the 
seed must be buried for some time, hid, grow 
slowly in order that it may come to perfection. 
Let the root grow, then acquire the first joint, 
then the second, and then the third : in this way 
the fruit will naturally force itself out." 83 Ac- 
cordingly there are to be no pretences or pro- 
fessions : for may be the seed will never sprout ! 
" Strive that it be not known what you are : be 
a philosopher to yourself a short time." 83 By 
this method the good name of philosophy will 
not be endangered, and also the disciple may be 
saved some humiliation. Epictetus commends to 
his pupils the behavior of Socrates, to whom 

80 Fragment, III. 81 Discourses, II. xi. 

82 Discourses, III. xxi. 8S Discourses, IV. viii. 



liv INTRODUCTION 

people were wont to come asking an introduction 
to some philosopher ! 

Epictetus next recommends that the new re- 
solve be aided by a new mental and moral en- 
vironment. As physicians advise a change of 
climate, so the disciple should make for himself 
a new and congenial atmosphere. " Do you also 
introduce other habits than those which you 
have: fix your opinions and exercise yourself in 
them. Fly from your former habits, fly from 
the vulgar, if you intend ever to begin to be some- 
thing. ,, 84 This may involve the breaking of old 
associations and the severing of former friend- 
ships; but nothing must be suffered to stand in 
the way of the disciple's progress. " For no 
man is able to make progress, when he is waver- 
ing between opposite things; but if you have 
preferred this to all other things, if you choose 
to attend to this only, give up everything else." 85 

The law of use and disuse is also invoked by 
the teacher. By this law old manners and habits 
vanish away through disuse, and new habits are 
established by continuous practice. Here is the 
law : Darwin could have stated it no more clearly : 
" Every skill and faculty is maintained and in- 
creased by the corresponding acts ; as the faculty 
of walking by walking. And thus it is in spirit- 
ual things also. When thou art wrathful, know 
that not this single evil hath happened to thee, 
but that thou hast increased the aptness to it, and, 
as it were, poured oil upon the fire. Wouldst 

84 Discourses, III. xvi. 86 Discourses, IV. ii. 



THE FAITH OF A STOIC lv 

thou then be no longer of a wrathful temper? 
Then do not nourish the aptness to it, give it 
nothing that will increase it, be tranquil from the 
outset, and number the days when thou hast not 
been wrathful . . . but if thou hast saved thirty 
days, then sacrifice to God in thanksgiving." 86 
Thus it is that old and vicious habits may be 
extirpated and wholesome manners developed. 

Self-examination also has an important place. 
The disciple must watch himself as he would an 
enemy. He must know how the matter stands 
with himself. Epictetus commends to his fol- 
lowers the lines of Pythagoras: 

Let sleep not come upon thy languid eyes 
Before each daily action thou hast scanned; 
What's done amiss, what done, what left undone; 
From first to last examine all, and then 
Blame what is wrong, in what is right rejoice. 87 

Epictetus also avails himself of the law of 
auto-suggestion. The principles of philosophy 
are to become part of ourselves, finding lodgment 
in the subconscious and becoming a second na- 
ture; so that these principles may uphold and 
guide one even in sleep or in despondency. 88 

Furthermore the power of visualization is 
utilized. The disciple is to have always before 
him the form and type of character to which he 
aspires, the mental picture of the perfection to- 
ward which he would grow. As a sort of 

86 Discourses, I. xviii. 87 Discourses, III. x. 

88 Discourses, III. ii. 



lvi INTRODUCTION 

super-self this image must transform us into its 
own likeness. " When, therefore, thou art about 
to meet anyone, especially one of those that are 
thought high in rank, set before thy mind what 
Socrates or Zeno would do in such a case. And 
so thou wilt not fail to deal as it behoves thee 
with the occasion." 89 " For," says Epictetus, 
" though thou be no Socrates, yet as one that 
would be a Socrates it behoveth thee to live/' 90 
This recital of methods, by no means exhaus- 
tive, will suffice to show how seriously Epictetus 
regarded the matter. For what he contemplates 
is nothing less than the highest virtue of which 
man is capable and the fulfilment of the promise 
of our spiritual nature. So he admonishes us: 
" Hold thyself worthy to live as a man of full 
age and as one who is pressing forward; and let 
everything that appeareth the best be to thee as 
an inviolable law." 91 Thus the wise man and 
good is to educate and discipline his moral 
faculties until he is emancipated from the thral- 
dom of appearances and finds himself superior 
to the pressure of circumstance. Such an en- 
deavor issues in tranquillity, magnanimity, free- 
dom ; and the Stoic, " while imprisoned in this 
mortal body, makes fellowship with God his 
aim." 92 And it is one of the anomalies of liter- 
ature that the best portrait of such a Stoic as was 

89 Manual, XXXIII. Compare Marcus Aurelius, Medi- 
tations, VI. 48. 

90 Manual, L. 91 Manual, L. 
92 Discourses, II. xix. 



THE FAITH OF A STOIC lvii 

contemplated by Epictetus remained to be painted 
by a Christian poet : 

He is the freeman whom the truth makes free, 

And all are slaves beside. There's not a chain 

That hellish foes confederate for his harm 

Can wind around him, but he casts it off 

With as much ease as Samson his green withes. 

His freedom is the same in every state; 

And no condition of this changeful life, 

So manifold in cares, whose every day 

Brings its own evil with it, makes it less: 

For he has wings that neither sickness, pain, 

Nor penury can cripple or confine. 

No nook so narrow but he spreads them there 

With ease, and is at large. The oppressor holds 

His body bound, but knows not what a range 

His spirit takes, unconscious of a chain, 

And that to bind him is a vain attempt 

Whom God delights in, and in whom He dwells. 93 

After this survey of the field of his thought, 
it will be natural to give some consideration to 
the quality of the mind of Epictetus, noting cer- 
tain characteristics of his teaching and observing 
the temper of his mind. For the genius of a 
teacher is revealed quite as much by the quality 
of his thought as by its content. 

The reader of Epictetus cannot fail to be im- 
pressed with the sturdiness and robustness of his 
mind. There is the heroic in him. His words, 
as Richter said of Luther, are half battles. They 
have in them the clang of the battle-axe. They 
stir the blood like the bugle-call to arms. The 
faith of this Stoic is no easy-going, complacent, 

93 Cowper, The Task. 



lviii INTRODUCTION 

calculating creed. Over the portal of his thought 
there might well be inscribed the caution, Aban- 
don all cowardice and ease, ye who enter here. 
And as if to warn the frivolous, Epictetus says: 
" Some men, having heard a philosopher, desire 
that they also may become philosophers. Friend, 
bethink you first what it is that you would do. 
. . . Think you to be a philosopher while acting 
as you do ? Think you to go on thus eating, thus 
drinking, giving way in like manner to wrath 
and displeasure?" 94 Thus the teaching of 
Epictetus is a summons and a challenge. His 
philosophy is not an anodyne or an anaesthetic, 
but a stimulant and a caustic. " The philoso- 
pher's school," he admonishes us, "is a surgery; 
you ought not to go out of it with pleasure, but 
with pain." 95 Cowardice, effeminacy, profligacy 
— vices traceable to the softness of the moral 
tissue — these are the besetting sins against which 
Epictetus directs his sturdy and vigorous words. 
When Zeller says 96 that the Stoics made no 
protest against the prevalent profligacy, he over- 
looks the fact that a whole chapter 97 of the Dis- 
courses is devoted to the condemnation of adul- 
tery and that there are few rebukes more scathing 
than that given by Epictetus to a man of letters 
who had been found guilty of violating the sanc- 
tity of marriage. 98 The whole weight of the 
teaching of the great Stoic was against profligacy 

84 Discourses, III. xv. 95 Discourses, III. xxiii. 

96 Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, p. 308. 

97 Discourses, II. iv. 98 Page 136 of this volume. 



THE FAITH OF A STOIC lix 

and kindred vices. The man of lax and easy mor- 
als will find little consolation in Epictetus. Not 
peace, but a sword; not repose, but conflict, is 
what he offers us. " Remember," he says, " that 
God, like a gymnastic trainer, has pitted you 
against a rough antagonist. For what end? 
That you may be an Olympian conqueror." " 
Nor is the contest an unequal one. For he asks : 
" Have you not received faculties by which you 
will be able to bear all that happens in life? 
Have you not received greatness of soul? Have 
you not received manliness? Have you not re- 
ceived endurance ? " 1 " Great is the contest," 
he jubilantly exclaims, " divine the task — for 
kingship, for freedom, for prosperity, for tran- 
quillity." 2 Thus Epictetus, never mistaking 
gymnastics for ethics, teaches that the highest 
fortitude and the severest test of endurance lie 
in the utter subordination of sensual to spiritual 
impulses. It is this ethical severity that so com- 
mended Epictetus to the early Church that ver- 
sions of the Manual were prepared, substituting 
scriptural for Pagan names, and commended to 
the use of monastic bodies. 

But it must not be inferred that the faith of 
Epictetus is a grim and sombre one. There is in 
him nothing morbid and morose. His message, 
severe and unrelenting as it is, is yet a message 
of hope and of good cheer. Epictetus is no 
weeping prophet. He is no gruff and austere 

99 Discourses, I. xxiv. 

1 Discourses, I. vi. 2 Discourses, II. xviii. 



lx INTRODUCTION 

hurler of denunciations. Like Balaam, he is 
called to bless, not to curse. If he makes heavy 
demands upon us, it is because he believes that 
we are able to meet those demands, seeing that 
man is " naturally noble, magnanimous, and 
free." 3 If he looks forward with courage and 
with hope, it is because he is persuaded that 
" Whithersoever I may go, there will be the sun, 
and the moon, and there the stars, and visions, 
and omens, and communion with the Gods." 4 
The grounds of his optimism are not physiologi- 
cal and temperamental, the mere exuberance of 
animal spirits, but spiritual and abiding. For 
the real test of a teacher's optimism is to be found, 
not in the assertions he makes, but in the temper 
of mind he induces. Judged thus, few readers 
will recognize in Epictetus that " devout, though 
despairing, Theism " with which he is charged, 5 
when they recall what courage he induces and 
what lofty purposes he encourages. The reader 
of Epictetus will agree rather with Dr. Hicks: 
" Not more firm is the conviction of the Hebrew 
Psalmist that all things must go well, since the 
Lord reigneth." 6 

And this suggests another quality of the mind 
of Epictetus, namely, his religious fervor. We 
shall do him scant justice if we see in him only 
the eloquent lecturer and the sturdy moralist. 
For no one can read the discourses of Epictetus 
with understanding and with sympathy without 

8 Discourses, IV. vii. 4 Discourses, III, xxiii. 

5 Marcus Aurelius and the Later Stoics, p. 28. 

6 Stoic and Epicurean, p. 18. 



THE FAITH OF A STOIC lxi 

becoming aware that he is in the presence of one 
to whom God is very near and to whom religion 
is an everlasting reality. We feel indeed that 
his lips have been touched with a coal from the 
altar; and his words seem to carry with them a 
sort of scriptural authority. Many passages 
suggest the inspiration of the prophet: they sing 
and soar. What could be more strong and 
tender, what words breathe a freer and more 
divine air than these : " Seeing that most of you 
are blinded, should there not be someone to fill 
this place, and sing the hymn to God on behalf 
of all men? What else can I, that am lame and 
old, do but sing to God ? Were I a nightingale, 
I should do after the manner of a nightingale. 
Were I a swan, I should do after the manner of a 
swan. But now, since I am a reasonable being, 
I must sing to God : that is my work : I do it, nor 
will I desert this my post, as long as it is granted 
me to hold it; and upon you, too, I call to join 
in this selfsame hymn." 7 Thus Epictetus sum- 
mons us to a devotion that is as earnest as it is 
reasonable. With its ethical sturdiness and its 
spiritual tenderness, the mind of Epictetus sug- 
gests the Gothic : and it is no mean or small com- 
pany that from generation to generation has 
found strength and beauty in the sanctuary of his 
thought. 

It should furthermore be observed that sim- 
plicity marks the thought of Epictetus; a sim- 
plicity characterizing alike the substance and the 

7 Discourses, I. xvi. 



Ixii INTRODUCTION 

form of his discourse. The character of his 
audience doubtless did much to shape his thought 
and to encourage forms of speech readily under- 
stood. Moreover Epictetus appears tempera- 
mentally averse to abstract forms of thought and 
impatient of verbal refinements. " Let the fol- 
lowers of Pyrrho and the Academics," he says, 
" come and make their objections. For I, as to 
my part, have no leisure for these disputes, nor 
am I able to undertake the defense of common 
consent. If I had a dispute about a bit of land, 
I would call in another to defend my interests. 
With what evidence, then, am I satisfied? With 
that which belongs to the matter in hand. How 
indeed perception is effected, whether through 
the whole body or any part, perhaps I cannot ex- 
plain: for both opinions perplex me. But that 
you and I are not the same, I know with perfect 
certainty. How do you know it? When I in- 
tend to swallow anything, I never carry it to your 
mouth, but to my own." 8 Thus the appeal he 
makes is to individual and to common experience. 
To that also he addresses himself. The result 
is that he uses homely and vivid figures of speech, 
clothing his thought in language which, while 
not always non-philosophic, is simple and directed 
to the average mind. His thought and speech, 
therefore, are not those of the Academy, but of 
the Porch : they are the words of one who speaks 
in the open and whose concern is for the throngs 
in the highway of life. 

8 Discourses, I. xxvii. 



THE FAITH OF A STOIC lxiii 

It remains to call attention to the eminently 
practical character of the mind of Epictetus. 
Here is no dreamer of dreams, no propounder of 
riddles. He indulges in no mystical vagaries or 
transcendental refinements. He plants his feet 
firmly on the solid earth, that he may stand 
squarely and lift the more. When asked how 
one may eat acceptably to God, his answer is with 
the directness of an arrow : " If he can eat justly 
and contentedly, and with equanimity, and tem- 
perately, and orderly, will it not be also accept- 
ably to the Gods ? " 9 Nor shall any sophistical 
questions turn him from his course. " What do 
I care," he says, " whether all things are com- 
posed of atoms or of similar parts, or of fire 
and earth ? Is it not enough to know the nature 
of the good and the evil, and the measures of the 
desires and the aversions, and also the movements 
towards things and from them; and using these 
as rules to administer the affairs of life, but not 
to trouble ourselves about the things beyond us? 
For these things are perhaps incomprehensible 
to the human mind; and if any man should even 
suppose them to be in the highest degree com- 
prehensible, what then is the profit of them? " 10 
Epictetus is obviously no theorist. " What is 
philosophy ? " he asks, only to answer, " Is it not 
a preparation against events which may hap- 
pen?" ll One's progress in philosophy is there- 
fore to be measured, not by his ability to discuss 

9 Discourses, I. xiii. i<> Fragment, CLXXV. 

11 Discourses, III. x. 



lxiv INTRODUCTION 

theorems, to dissolve syllogisms, or to propound 
and answer hypothetical questions, but by his 
capacity for endurance and for moral discipline. 
" Is it for this," he asks, " that young men shall 
leave their country and their parents, that they 
may come to this place and hear you explain 
words ? Ought they not to return with a capacity 
to endure, to be active in association with others, 
free from passions, free from perturbation, with 
such a provision for the journey of life as shall 
enable them to bear well the things that happen 
and derive honor from them? The carpenter 
does not come and say, Hear me talk about the 
carpenter's art; but having undertaken to build 
a house, he makes it, and thereby proves that he 
knows the art. You also ought to do something 
of the kind; eat like a man, drink like a man, 
marry, rear children, do the office of a citizen, 
endure abuse, bear with an unreasonable brother, 
bear with your father, bear with your son, neigh- 
bor, companion/' 12 Thus it is that Epictetus 
views the world as a man of practical affairs and 
never allows himself to be drawn aside by theo- 
retical or unsocial considerations. Steadily and 
singly he holds us to the ethical ideal, and in all 
the relations of life he demands a fidelity as 
beautiful as it is practical. 

It is these qualities of mind and heart, so 
perfectly fused that they pass undistinguished, 
that made Epictetus the great moral and spiritual 
force that he was in an age that sorely needed his 

12 Discourses, III. xxi. 



THE FAITH OF A STOIC lxv 

guidance. And it is these qualities of his teach- 
ing, reinforced by an example so noble that even 
his adversaries dared not assail it, that justify 
us in regarding Epictetus as the Evangelist of 
Stoicism. 

And for the same reasons it was inevitable 
that the teachings of Epictetus should exert a 
profound influence upon Christian civilization. 
This is recognized by Dollinger, 13 who ranks 
Epictetus as second only to Aristotle, among 
ancient thinkers, in his influence upon succeeding 
generations. Nor is this strange. For the 
teaching of Epictetus registered the high-water 
mark of the tide of Pagan religious thought at 
the time when Christianity was in its formative 
stage. And as the rising faith drew to itself con- 
verts, the new disciples brought with them many 
ideas and forms of thought that were character- 
istic of the teaching of Epictetus. Thus gradu- 
ally and unconsciously Christianity received into 
itself a Stoic strain; 14 such indeed being presup- 
posed by some of the New Testament writers. 15 



13 Gentile and Jew. Vol. ii., p. 128. 

14 "The most important of moral terms, the crowning 
triumph of ethical nomenclature, conscientia, the internal, 
absolute, supreme judge of individual action, if not struck 
in the mint of the Stoics, at all events became current 
through their influence." Bishop Lightfoot, Epistle to the 
Philippians, p. 303. See also the illuminating chapter 
(xvii.) in Arnold's Roman Stoicism. 

15 " The study of the discourses of Epictetus is an in- 
dispensable starting-point for a true understanding of the 
teaching of St. Paul. Better than any other work of an- 
tiquity they reveal to us the mind and thoughts of the 



lxvi INTRODUCTION 

Furthermore the influence of the teaching of 
Epictetus began to find expression in general 
literature, both poetry and prose, until many- 
Stoic conceptions gained a permanent place in the 
thoughts of men. Thus the influence of Epic- 
tetus became diffused, forming a part of our 
literary and religious inheritance. 

Nor is the influence of Epictetus yet spent. A 
census of his admirers and debtors would sur- 
prise us with the number and character of those 
to whom the Stoic teacher has " brought to light 
and communicated, not the truth which shows us 
how to live, but how to live well." 16 At present 
Epictetus is widely read ; and wherever he is read, 
his words become a power for the enfranchise- 
ment and ennoblement of the mind. For the 
great ideas that constitute the essence of his faith 
are precisely the convictions that are sorely 
needed by us in our moral endeavors. By urg- 
ing these thoughts and fixing these convictions in 
the mind, Epictetus still renders a service of in- 
estimable value ; while the spirit that he communi- 
cates is that which most conduces to true, lofty, 
and generous behavior. 

There are, without doubt, heights of specula- 
tion to which Epictetus is a stranger. Mazes of 
philosophical thought there are which he is utterly 
unable to penetrate. There are sublime expe- 
riences to which he cannot conduct us; as also 



social circles to which the Apostle chiefly addressed him- 
self." Hastings, Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. 
v., p. 324. 
J« Discourses, I. iv. 



THE FAITH OF A STOIC lxvii 

there are spiritual graces that he knows not of. 
But on the open plain, and on the highway of 
everyday life, Epictetus knew well the most di- 
rect path. And a good guide and companion he 
is withal. The verdict of Matthew Arnold, 
spoken of Marcus Aurelius, is even more true 
of Epictetus : " In general, the action he pre- 
scribes is action which every sound nature must 
recognize as right, and the motives he assigns are 
motives which every clear reason must recognize 
as valid. And so he remains the especial friend 
and comforter of all clear-headed and scrupulous, 
yet pure-hearted and upward-striving men, in 
those ages most especially that walk by sight, not 
by faith, but yet have no open vision. He can- 
not give such souls, perhaps, all they yearn for, 
but he gives them much ; and what he gives them, 
they can receive." 17 

17 Essays in Criticism, Marcus Aurelius. 



THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 



PART ONE — THE STOIC 



BOOK ONE 
THE INDWELLING GOD 



Explanation of References and 
Abbreviations 

The author has availed himself of Mrs. Car- 
ter's translation of the Discourses, Manual and 
Fragments of Epictetus, and of that by George 
Long, as also of the selected translations by T. 
W. Rolleston, and of the volume by Hastings 
Crossley. All selections are referred to their 
sources. References to the Discourses are by 
Book and Chapter, while passages from the 
Manual are cited by section, and the Fragments 
by number. The name of the translator follows 
the reference. 

The following abbreviations are used: 
D — Discourses ; M — Manual ; F — Frag- 
ment. 



THE INDWELLING GOD 
CHAPTER I 

IMITATORS OF GOD 

CONCERNING the Gods, there are some 
who say that a divine being does not 
exist ; and others, that it exists indeed, but is idle 
and uncaring, and hath no forethought for any- 
thing; and a third class say that there is such a 
Being, and He taketh forethought also, but only 
in respect of great and heavenly things, but of 
nothing that is on the earth; and a fourth class, 
that He taketh thought both of things in heaven 
and earth, but only in general, and not of each 
thing severally. And there is a fifth class, where- 
of are Odysseus and Socrates, who say: 

Nor can I move without Thy knowledge. 

Before all things, then, it is necessary to in- 
vestigate each of these opinions, whether it be 
justly affirmed or no. For if there be no Gods, 
how can the following of the Gods be an end? 
And if there are Gods, but such as take no care 
for anything, then also how can the following 
of them be truly an end? And how, again, if 
the Gods both exist and take care for things, yet 

7 



8 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

if there be no communication from them to men, 
yea, and even to mine own self ? * 

Therefore the philosophers say that we are 
first to learn that there is a God, and that His 
providence directs the whole; and that it is im- 
possible to conceal from Him, not only our ac- 
tions, but even our thoughts and emotions. We 
are next to learn what the Gods are: for such 
as they are found to be, such must he, who would 
please and obey them to the utmost of his power, 
endeavor to be. If the Deity is faithful, he too 
must be faithful; if free, beneficent, and exalted, 
he must be free, beneficent, and exalted likewise; 
and, in all his words and actions, behave as an 
imitator of God. 2 



iD. I. xii. Rolleston. 2D. II. xiv. Carter. 

CHAPTER II 

IN HIS IMAGE 

WHY art thou ignorant of thine high ances- 
try? Why knowest thou not whence 
thou earnest? Wilt thou not remember, in thine 
eating, who it is that eats, and whom thou dost 
nourish? Unhappy man! thou bearest about 
with thee a God, and knowest it not! Thinkest 
thou I speak of some god of gold and silver, and 
external to thee? Nay, but in thyself thou bear- 
est Him, and seest not that thou defilest Him 
with thine impure thoughts and filthy deeds. In 



THE INDWELLING GOD 9 

the presence even of an image of God thou hadst 
not dared to do one of those things which thou 
doest. But in the presence of God Himself with- 
in thee, who seeth and heareth all things, thou 
art not ashamed of the things thou dost both 
desire and do, O thou unwitting of thine own 
nature ! 

But wert thou a statue of Phidias, an Athena 
or Zeus, then wert thou mindful both of thyself 
and of the artist; and if thou hadst any con- 
sciousness, thou wouldst strive to do nothing un- 
worthy of thy maker nor of thyself. But now 
that Zeus hath made thee, thou carest therefore 
nothing what kind of creature thou showest thy- 
self for? Wilt thou dishonor such a Maker, 
whose work thou art? Nay, not only did He 
make thee, but to thee alone did He trust and 
commit thyself. Wilt thou not remember this, 
too, or wilt thou dishonor thy charge? But if 
God had committed some orphan child to thee, 
wouldst thou have neglected it? Now He hath 
given thee to thyself, and saith, I had none more 
worthy of trust than thee; keep this man such 
as he was made by nature — reverent, faithful, 
high, unterrified, unshaken of passions, un- 
troubled. 1 And wilt thou not preserve him 
such? 2 



1 D. II. viii. Rolleston. 2 D. II. viii. Carter. 



io THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 
CHAPTER III 

BODY AND SOUL 

IF a man could be thoroughly penetrated, as he 
ought, with this thought, that we are all in an 
especial manner sprung from God, full surely he 
would never conceive aught ignoble or base of 
himself. Whereas if Caesar were to adopt you, 
your haughty looks would be intolerable; will 
you not be elated at knowing that you are the son 
of God? Now however it is not so with us: but 
seeing that in our birth these two things are com- 
mingled — the body which we share with the 
animals, and the Reason and Thought which we 
share with the Gods, many decline towards this 
unhappy kinship with the dead, few rise to the 
blessed kinship with the Divine. Since then 
every one must deal with each thing according 
to the view which he forms about it, those few 
who hold that they are born for fidelity, modesty, 
and unerring sureness in dealing with the things 
of sense, never conceive aught base or ignoble of 
themselves: but the multitude the contrary. 
Why, what am I? — A wretched human crea- 
ture; with this miserable flesh of mine. Miser- 
able indeed! but you have something better than 
that paltry flesh of yours. 1 

What saith God? Had it been possible, 
Epictetus, I would have made both that body of 
thine and thy possessions free and unimpeded, 



THE INDWELLING GOD n 

but as it is, be not deceived: — it is not thine 
own; it is but finely tempered clay. Since then 
this I could not do, I have given thee a portion 
of Myself, in the power of desiring and declining 
and of pursuing and avoiding, and in a word the 
power of dealing with the things of sense. And 
if thou neglect not this, but place all that thou 
hast therein, thou shalt never be let or hindered; 
thou shalt never lament ; thou shalt not blame or 
flatter any. 2 

Well, do these seem to you small matters? I 
hope not. Be content with them, and pray to the 
Gods. 3 



*D. I. iii. Crossley. 3 D. I. i. Long. 

2 D. I. i. Crossley. 



CHAPTER IV 

THE ALL-SEEING 

A CERTAIN man having inquired how one 
could be persuaded that every one of his 
actions is observed by God, Doth it not appear 
to you, said Epictetus, that all things are united 
in One? What then? Think you not that a 
sympathy exists between heavenly and earthly 
things? For how else do plants, as if at the 
command of God, when He bids them, flower in 
due season? And how else at the waxing and 
waning of the moon, and the approach and with- 
drawal of the sun, do we behold such a change 
and reversal in earthly things? But are the 



12 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

plants and our bodies so bound up in the whole, 
and have sympathy with it, and our spirits not 
much more so ? And our souls being thus bound 
up and in touch with God, seeing, indeed, that 
they are portions and fragments of Him, shall 
not every movement of them, inasmuch as it is 
something inward and akin to God, be perceived 
by Him? 

But you are able to meditate upon the divine 
government, and upon all divine and human 
affairs. And shall not God have the power to 
overlook all things, and be present with all, and 
have a certain communication with all? But is 
the sun able to illuminate so great a part of 
the All, and to leave so little without light, — 
that part, namely, which is filled with the shadow 
of the earth — and shall He who made the sun, 
and guideth it in its sphere — a small part of 
Him beside the Whole — shall not He be capable 
of perceiving all things? 

Moreover God hath placed at every man's side 
a Guardian, the genius of each man, who is 
charged to watch over him, a genius that can- 
not sleep, nor be deceived. To what greater and 
more watchful guardian could He have com- 
mitted us? So, when ye have shut the doors, 
and made darkness in the house, remember never 
to say that ye are alone ; for ye are not alone, but 
God is there, and your genius is there ; and what 
need have these of light to mark what ye are do- 
ing? 1 

If thou rememberest that God standeth by to 



THE INDWELLING GOD 13 

behold and visit all that thou doest, whether in 
the body or in the soul, thou surely wilt not err 
in any prayer or deed; and thou shalt have God 
to dwell with thee. 2 



1 D. I. xiv. Rolleston. 2 F. CXX. Crossley. 

CHAPTER V 

THE ESSENCE OF RELIGION 

OF religion toward the Gods, know that the 
chief element is to have right opinions con- 
cerning them, as existing and governing the whole 
in fair order and justice; and then to set thy- 
self to obey them, and to yield to them in each 
event, and submit to it willingly, as accomplished 
under the highest counsels. For so shalt thou 
never blame the Gods, nor accuse them, as being 
neglectful of thee. 

But this may come to pass in no other way 
than by placing Good and Evil in the things that 
are in our own power, and withdrawing them 
from those that are not ; for if thou take any of 
these things to be good or evil, then when thou 
shalt miss thy desire, or fall into what thou de- 
sirest not, it is altogether necessary that thou 
blame and hate those who caused thee to do so. 

For every living thing was so framed by Na- 
ture as to flee and turn from things, and the 
causes of things, that appear hurtful, and to fol- 
low and admire things, and the causes of things, 
that appear serviceable. For it is impossible that 



14 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

one who thinketh himself harmed should delight 
in that which seemeth to harm him, even as he 
cannot delight in the very harm itself. 

And thus it comes that a father is reviled by 
his son when he will not give him of the things 
that appear to be good. 1 When, then, the Gods 
appear to hinder us in this, we revile even 
them, and overthrow their images and burn their 
temples; as Alexander, when his friend died, 
commanded to burn the temples of ^sculapius. 

Therefore if a man place in the same thing 
both profit and holiness, and the beautiful and 
fatherland, and parents and friends, all these 
things shall be saved; but if he place profit in 
one thing, and friends and fatherland and kins- 
folk, yea, and righteousness itself some other 
where, all these things shall perish, for profit 
shall outweigh them. 2 For where advantage is, 
there also is religion. 

Thus he who is careful to pursue and to avoid 
as he ought, is careful, at the same time, of re- 
ligion. 1 But to make libations and to sacrifice 
and to offer first-fruits according to the custom 
of our fathers, purely and not meanly nor care- 
lessly nor scantily nor above our ability, is a thing 
which belongs to all to do. 3 

iM. XXXI. Rolleston. »M. XXXI. Long. 

2D. II. xxii. Rolleston. 



THE INDWELLING GOD 15 

CHAPTER VI 

DIVINATION, FALSE AND TRUE 

THROUGH an unreasonable regard to di- 
vination many of us omit many duties. 
For if I must expose myself to danger for a 
friend, and if it is my duty even to die for him, 
what need have I then for divination? Have I 
not within me a Diviner, who has told me the 
nature of good and evil, and has explained to me 
the signs of both? What need have I, then, to 
consult the viscera of victims or the flight of 
birds. 1 

Wherefore, when we ought to share a friend's 
danger or that of our country, we must not con- 
sult the diviner whether we ought to share it. 
For even if the diviner shall tell you that the 
signs of the victims are unlucky, yet reason pre- 
vails that even with these risks we should share 
the dangers of our friend and of our country. 
Therefore attend to the greater diviner, the 
Pythian God, who ejected from the temple him 
who did not assist his friend when he was being 
murdered. 2 The woman therefore, who intended 
to send by a vessel a month's provisions to a friend 
in banishment, made a good answer to him who 
said that Domitian would seize what she sent. 
For she replied, I would rather that Domitian 
should seize all than that I should fail to send it. 

Thus we should come to God as to a guide : as 
a traveller inquires the road of the person he 



16 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

meets, without any desire for that which turns to 
the right hand more than for that which turns to 
the left; for he wishes for neither of these, but 
for that only which leads him properly. So we 
make use of our eyes, not persuading them to 
show us one object rather than another, but re- 
ceiving such as they present to us. For would 
you have anything other than what is best? Is 
there anything better than what pleases God ? * 

* D. II. vii. Long. *M. XXXII. Long. 



CHAPTER VII 

THE KINSHIP OF GOD AND MAN 

IF those things are true which are said by phil- 
osophers concerning the kinship of God and 
men, what else remains for men to do than after 
Socrates' way, who never, when men inquired 
of him what was his native country, replied 
Athens or Corinth, but the universe. For wilt 
thou say that thou art an Athenian, and not rather 
name thyself from that nook alone into which 
thy wretched body was cast at birth? Is it not 
plainly from the lordlier place, and that which 
contains not only that nook and all thy household, 
but also the whole land whence the race of thine 
ancestors hath come down even to thee, that thou 
callest thyself Athenian or Corinthian? 1 

He that hath grasped the administration of the 
World, who hath learned that this Community, 



THE INDWELLING GOD 17 

which consists of God and men, is the foremost 
and mightiest and most comprehensive of all: — 
that from God have descended the germs of life, 
not to my father only and father's father, but to 
all things that are born and grow upon the earth, 
and in an especial manner to those endowed with 
Reason (for those only are by their nature fitted 
to hold communion with God, being by means of 
Reason conjoined with Him) — why should not 
such an one call himself a citizen of the world? 
Why not a son of God? Why should he fear 
aught that comes to pass among men? Shall 
kinship with Caesar, or any other of the great at 
Rome, be enough to hedge men around with 
safety and consideration, without a thought of 
apprehension : while to have God for our Maker, 
and Father, and Kinsman, shall not this set us 
free from sorrows and fears ? 2 How was So- 
crates affected by these things? As it became 
one persuaded of his being truly a kinsman of 
God. 3 



1 D. I. ix. Rolleston. s D. I. ix. Carter. 

2 D. I. ix. Crossley. 



CHAPTER VIII 

THE GREAT VOCATION 

SHALL we not remember what we have heard 
from the philosophers? For they say that 
the universe is one Polity, and one is the sub- 
stance out of which it is made; and that all things 



1 8 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

are full of love, first of the Gods, then of men, 
that are by nature made to have affection towards 
each other. And man, they say, is magnanimous 
by nature, and hath also this quality, not to be 
rooted to one spot, nor grown into the earth, but 
able to go from place to place, like Hercules, 
who went about the whole earth — 

All disorders of men and orderly rule to see, 

casting out and purging the one, and bringing 
in the other in its place. 

And how many friends, think you, he had in 
Thebes? how many in Argos? how many in 
Athens? and how many did he gain in his jour- 
neyings? And he left not his family as orphans; 
for he knew that no man is an orphan, but that 
there is an Eternal Father who careth continu- 
ally for all. For not of report alone had he 
heard that Zeus is the Father of men, whom also 
he thought to be his own Father, and called Him 
so, and all that he did, he did looking unto Him. 1 

But who would Hercules have been if he had 
sat at home? But nothing was dearer to him 
than God; and for this reason he was believed 
to be the son of God, yea, and was the son of 
God. And trusting in God, he went about purg- 
ing away lawlessness and wrong. But thou art 
no Hercules, and canst not purge away evils not 
thine own? nor yet Theseus, who cleared Attica 
of evil things? Then clear away thine own. 
From thy breast, from thy mind, cast out, instead 
of Procrustes and Sciron, grief, fear, covetous- 



THE INDWELLING GOD 19 

ness, envy, malice, avarice, effeminacy, profligacy. 
And these things cannot otherwise be cast out 
than by looking to God only, being affected only 
by Him, and consecrated to His commands. 2 

1 D. III. xxiv. Rolleston. 2 D. II. xvi. Rolleston. 



CHAPTER IX 

MAN THE MASTERPIECE 

IS it possible that no man should be able to 
learn, from reason and demonstration, that 
God made all things in the world and the world 
itself, unrestrained and perfect, and all its parts 
for the use of the whole? All other creatures 
are indeed excluded from the power of compre- 
hending the administration of the world; but a 
reasonable being hath abilities for the consid- 
eration of all these things, both that itself is a 
part, and what part. 1 

For it is enough for the animals to eat and 
drink, and rest and breed, and do whatever else 
each of them performs, but to us, to whom the 
faculty of observing and studying hath also been 
given, these things are not enough ; but unless we 
act after a certain manner and ordinance, and 
conformably to the nature of man, we shall never 
attain the end of our being. For God hath con- 
stituted every other animal, one to be eaten, an- 
other to serve for tilling the land, another to yield 
cheese, another to some kindred use; for which 



20 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

things what need is there of the observing and 
studying of appearances, and the ability to make 
distinctions in them? 

But man He hath brought in to be a spectator 
of God and of His works, and not a spectator 
alone, but an interpreter of them. Wherefore it 
is shameful for a man to begin and to end where 
creatures do that are without Reason; but rather 
should he begin where they begin, and end where 
Nature ends in ourselves. But she ends in con- 
templation, in observing and studying, in a man- 
ner of life that is in harmony with Nature. See 
to it, then, that ye die not without having been 
spectators of these things. 2 

*D. IV. vii. Carter. 2 D. I. vi. Rolleston. 



CHAPTER X 

THE DIVINE PROVIDENCE 

FROM everything which is or happens in the 
world, it is easy to praise Providence, if a 
man possesses these two qualities: the faculty of 
seeing what belongs and happens to all persons and 
things, and a grateful disposition. If he does not 
possess these two qualities, one man will not see 
the use of things which are and which happen; 
another will not be thankful for them, even if he 
does know them. 

If God had made colors, but had not made the 
faculty of seeing them, what would have been 



THE INDWELLING GOD 21 

their use? On the other hand, if He had made 
the faculty of vision, but had not made objects 
such as to fall under the faculty, what in that 
case also would have been the use of it? Who 
is it, then, who has fitted this to that and that to 
this? From the very structure of things which 
have attained their completion, we are accus- 
tomed to show that the work is certainly the act 
of some artificer, and that it has not been con- 
structed without a purpose. And do not visible 
things, and the faculty of seeing and light, dem- 
onstrate Him? 

You take a journey to Olympia to see the work 
of Phidias, and all of you think it a misfortune 
to die without having seen such things. But 
when there is no need to take a journey, and 
where a man is, there he has the works of God 
before him, will you not desire to see and under- 
stand them ? Will you not perceive, either, what 
you are, or what you were born for, or what this 
is for which you have received the faculty of 
sight ? * And yet there is no one thing in the 
frame of Nature but would give, at least to a 
reverent and grateful spirit, enough for the per- 
ceiving of the Providence of God. 2 

X D. I. vi. Long. 2 D. I. xvi. Rolleston. 



22 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 
CHAPTER XI 

THE WORLD SPECTACLE 

OUR way of life resembles a fair. The 
flocks and herds are passing along to be 
sold, and the greater part of the crowd to buy 
and sell. But there are some few who come only 
to look at the fair, to inquire how and why it 
is being held, upon what authority and with what 
object. So, too, it is in this great Fair of life, 
some, like the cattle, trouble themselves about 
nothing but the fodder. Know all of you, who 
are busied about land, slaves, and public posts, 
that these are nothing but fodder. Some few 
there are attending the Fair, who love to con- 
template what the world is, what He that admin- 
isters it. Can there be no Administrator? is it 
possible, that while neither city nor household 
could endure for a moment without one to ad- 
minister and see to its welfare, this Fabric, so 
fair, so vast, should be administered in order so 
harmonious, without a purpose and by blind 
chance? There is therefore an Administrator. 
What is His nature and how does He adminis- 
ter? And who are we that are His children and 
what work were we born to perform? Have 
we any close connection or relation with Him or 
not? 

Such are the impressions of the few of whom 
I speak. And further, they apply themselves 
solely to considering and examining the great as- 



THE INDWELLING GOD 23 

sembly before they depart. Well, they are de- 
rided by the multitude. So are the lookers-on 
by the traders: aye, and if the beasts had any 
sense they would deride those who thought much 
of anything but fodder ! x Conversing among 
such men, therefore, thus confused and thus ig- 
norant, it is worth while to ask one's self con- 
tinually, Am I, too, one of these? What do I 
imagine myself to be? How do I conduct my- 
self? 2 



*D. II. xiv. Crossley. 2 D. II. xxi. Carter. 

CHAPTER XII 

DOXOLOGY 

WHAT words suffice to praise or to set forth 
the works of God? Had we but under- 
standing, should we ever cease hymning and bless- 
ing the Divine Power, both openly and in secret, 
and telling of His gracious gifts? Whether dig- 
ging or ploughing or eating, should we not sing 
the hymn to God : 

Great is God, for that He hath given us such instru- 
ments to till the ground withal: 

Great is God, for that He hath given us hands, and 
the power of swallowing and digesting; 
of unconsciously growing and breath- 
ing while we sleep! 

Thus should we ever have sung: yea, and this, 
the grandest and divinest hymn of all: 



24 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

Great is God, for that He hath given us a mind to 
apprehend these things, and duly to use 
them! 

What then! seeing that most of you are 
blinded, should there not be someone to fill this 
place, and sing the hymn to God on behalf of all 
men? What else can I, that am lame and old, 
do but sing to God? Were I a nightingale, I 
should do after the manner of a nightingale. 
Were I a swan, I should do after the manner of 
a swan. But now, since I am a reasonable being, 
I must sing to God: that is my work: I do it, 
nor will I desert this my post, as long as it is 
granted me to hold it; and upon you too I call 
to join in this selfsame hymn. 1 

1 D. I. xvi. Crossley. 



BOOK TWO 
THE PATH OF PHILOSOPHY 



THE PATH OF PHILOSOPHY 
CHAPTER I 

CLASS ROOM AND CLINIC 

A CERTAIN Roman having entered with 
his son and listened to one lecture, This, 
said Epictetus, is the manner of teaching; and he 
was silent. But when the other prayed him to 
continue, Epictetus spake as follows: 

It is hateful to be confuted, for a man now 
old, and one who, perhaps, hath served his three 
campaigns. And I too know this. For you have 
come to me now as one who lacketh nothing. 
And what could you suppose to be lacking to you ? 
Wealth have you, and children, and it may be a 
wife, and many servants; Caesar knows you, you 
have won many friends in Rome, you give every 
man his due, you reward with good him that 
doeth good to you, and with evil him that doeth 
evil. What still is lacking to you? 

If, now, I shall show you that you lack the 
greatest and most necessary things for happiness, 
and that to this day you have cared for every- 
thing rather than for what behoved you: and if 
I crown all and say that you know not what God 
is nor what man is, nor Good nor Evil; — and 
what I say of other things is perhaps endurable, 
but if I say that you know not your own self, how 

*7 



28 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

can you endure me? And yet what evil have I 
done you? Unless the mirror doth evil to the 
ill-favored man, when it shows him to himself 
such as he is, and unless the physician is thought 
to affront the sick man when he may say to him, 
Man, dost thou think thou ailest nothing ? Thou 
hast a fever: fast to-day and drink water. And 
none saith, What an affront. But if one shall 
say to a man, Thy pursuits are inflamed, thine 
avoidances are mean, thy purposes are lawless, 
thine impulses accord not with nature, thine opin- 
ions are vain and lying — straightway he goeth 
forth and saith, He affronted me. 1 

Now the philosopher's school is a surgery : pain, 
not pleasure, you should have felt therein. For 
on entering none of you is whole. One has a 
shoulder out of joint, another an abscess: a third 
suffers from an issue, a fourth from pains in the 
head. And am I then to sit down and treat you 
to pretty sentiments and empty flourishes, so that 
you may applaud me and depart, with neither 
shoulder, nor head, nor issue, nor abscess a whit 
the better for your visit ? 2 Nay, but you ought 
to return with a capacity to endure, to be active 
in association with others, to be free from pas- 
sions, free from perturbation, with such a pro- 
vision for the journey of life with which you 
shall be able to bear well the things that happen 
and derive honor from them. 3 



1 D. II. xiv. Rolleston. 3 D. III. xxi. Long. 

2 D. III. xxiii. Crossley. 



THE PATH OF PHILOSOPHY 29 
CHAPTER II 

ENTERED APPRENTICE 

IF thou set thine heart upon philosophy, prepare 
straightway to be laughed at and mocked 
by many who will say, Behold, he hath suddenly 
come back to us a philosopher; or, How earnest 
thou by that brow of scorn? Now do thou cher- 
ish no scorn, but hold to those things that seem 
to thee the best, as one set by God in that place. 
Remember, too, that if thou abide in that way, 
those that first mocked thee, the same shall after- 
wards reverence thee; but if thou yield to them, 
thou shalt receive double mockery. 1 

If therefore thou wouldst advance, be content 
to let people think thee senseless and foolish as 
regards external things. Wish not ever to seem 
wise, and if ever thou shalt find thyself accounted 
to be somebody, then mistrust thyself. 2 And 
when someone shall say to thee, Thou knowest 
naught, and it biteth thee not, then know that 
thou hast begun the work. 3 But if it shall ever 
happen to thee to be turned to outward things 
in the desire to please some person, know that 
thou hast lost thy way of life. Let it be enough 
for thee in all things to be a philosopher. But if 
thou desire also to seem one, then seem so to thy- 
self, for this thou canst. 4 

And if one shall bear thee word that such an 
one hath spoken evil of thee, then defend not thy- 






30 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

self against his accusations, but make answer, He 
little knew my other vices, or he had not men- 
tioned only these. 5 

When thou hast adapted thy body to a frugal 
way of living, flatter not thyself on that, nor if 
thou drinkest only water, say, on every oppor- 
tunity, I drink only water. And if thou desirest 
at any time to inure thyself to labor and endur- 
ance, do it to thyself and not unto the world. 
And do not embrace the statues; but sometime 
when thou art exceeding thirsty take a mouthful 
of cold water, and spit it out, and say nothing 
about it. 6 

For the position and character of the philoso- 
pher is this: he looketh for benefit or hurt only 
to himself. He blameth none, he praiseth none, 
he accuseth none, he complaineth of none; he 
speaketh never of himself, as being somewhat, or 
as knowing aught. When he is thwarted or hin- 
dered in aught, he accuseth himself. If one 
should praise him, he laugheth at him in his 
sleeve; if one should blame him, he maketh no 
defence. If he is thought foolish or unlearned, 
he regardeth it not. In a word, he watcheth 
himself as he would a treacherous enemy. 7 

iM. XXII. Rolleston. 5 M. XXXIII. Rolleston. 

2 M. XIII. Rolleston. « M. XLVIL Rolleston. 

3 M. XL VI. Rolleston. i m. XLVIII. Rolleston. 
*M. XXIII. Rolleston. 



THE PATH OF PHILOSOPHY 31 
CHAPTER III 

THE BEGINNER'S PERSONAL APPEARANCE 

IT betokens a dull nature to be greatly occupied 
in matters that concern the body; but these 
things should be done by the way, and all atten- 
tion given to the mind. 1 Howbeit I had rather a 
young man in his first movements towards phil- 
osophy should come to me with his hair curled 
than dishevelled and foul. For a certain im- 
pression of the beautiful is to be seen in him, and 
an aim at what is becoming; and to the thing 
wherein it seemeth to him to lie, there he applies 
his art. Thenceforth it only needs to show him 
its true place, and to say, Young man, thou seek- 
est the beautiful, and thou dost well. Know, 
then, that it flourishes there where thy Reason 
is; there seek it. 

But if one come to me foul and filthy, and a 
moustache down to the knees, what have I to say 
to him? with what image or likeness can I draw 
him on ? For with what that is like unto Beauty 
hath he ever busied himself, so as I may set him 
on another course, and say, Not here is Beauty, 
but there? Will you have me tell him, Beauty 
consists not in being befouled, but in the Reason? 
For doth he even seek Beauty? hath he any im- 
pression of it in his mind? 

For we ought not even by the aspect of the 
body to scare away the multitude from philoso- 



32 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

phy; but by his body, as in all other things, a 
philosopher should show himself cheerful, and 
free from troubles. But if he have the counte- 
nance and garb of a condemned criminal, what 
God shall persuade me to approach to philosophy 
which maketh such men as this ? 2 



1 M. XLI. Rolleston. 2 D. IV. xi. Rolleston. 

CHAPTER IV 

THE SHORTER CATECHISM 

CAN you tell me to whom you have com- 
mitted the care of your horses? Was it, 
then, to any chance-comer and one inexperienced 
about horses ? By no means. 

Well then, to whom are your gold and silver 
vessels and raiment entrusted ? Neither are these 
committed to any chance person. 

And your body, have you already sought out 
one to whom to commit the care of it? And that 
also one who is experienced in training and medi- 
cine ? Assuredly. 

Are these the best things you have, or do you 
possess aught that is better than all of them? 
What thing do you mean ? That, by Zeus, which 
useth all these, and appro veth each of them and 
taketh counsel. Is it the soul, then, that you 
mean? You have conceived me rightly; it is 
even this. Truly I hold that I possess in this 
something much better than everything else. 



THE PATH OF PHILOSOPHY 33 

Can you, then, declare to us in what manner 
you have taken thought for your soul ? For it is 
not likely that a wise man like yourself would 
overlook the best thing you possess, and use no 
diligence or design about it, but leave it neglected 
and perishing ? Surely not. But do you provide 
for it yourself? and have you learned the way 
from another, or discovered it yourself? 1 For 
as, in walking, you take care not to tread upon a 
nail or turn your foot, so likewise take care not 
to hurt the ruling faculty of your mind. And if 
we were to guard against this in every action, we 
should undertake the action with the greater 
safety. 2 

1 D. II. xii. Rolleston. 2 M. XXXVIII. Carter. 



CHAPTER V 
man's invincible nature 

BELIEFS which are sound and manifestly 
true are of necessity used even by those 
who deny them. And perhaps a man might ad- 
duce this as the greatest possible proof of the 
manifest truth of anything, that those who deny 
it are compelled to make use of it. 

Thus Epicurus, when he would abolish the 
natural fellowship of men with one another, em- 
ployeth the very thing that is being abolished. 
For what saith he ? Be not deceived, O men, nor 
misguided nor mistaken — there is no natural f el- 



34 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

lowship among reasoning beings, believe me ; and 
those who speak otherwise deceive us with 
sophisms. 

What is that to thee ? let us be deceived ! Will 
it be the worse for thee if all other men are per- 
suaded that we have a natural fellowship with 
one another? Nay, but much the better and 
safer. Man, why dost thou take thought for us, 
and watch at night for our sakes? Why dost 
thou kindle thy lamp and rise early? why dost 
thou write so many books, lest any of us should be 
deceived about the Gods, in supposing that they 
cared for men? or lest anyone should take the 
essence of the Good to be any thing else than 
Pleasure? For if these things are so, then lie 
down and sleep, and live the life of a worm, 
wherefor thou hast judged thyself fit. What is 
it to thee how other men think concerning these 
matters, whether soundly or unsoundly? What 
hast thou to do with us? 

What, then, was it that roused up Epicurus 
from his sleep, and compelled him to write the 
things he wrote? What else than Nature, the 
mightiest of all powers in humanity? Nature, 
that drags the man, reluctant and groaning, to 
her will. For, saith she, since it seems to thee 
that there is no fellowship among men, write this 
down, and deliver it to others, and watch and 
wake for this, and be thyself by thine own deed 
the accuser of thine own opinions! So mighty 
and invincible a thing is man's nature. 1 

1 D. II. xx. Rolleston. 



THE PATH OF PHILOSOPHY 35 
CHAPTER VI 

THE WORKMAN AND HIS MATERIALS 

EVERY art is wearisome, in the learning of it, 
to the untaught and unskilled. Yet things 
that are made by the arts immediately declare 
their use, and in most of them is something at- 
tractive and pleasing. For if you are by where 
one is learning music, it will appear the most 
painful of all instructions ; but that which is pro- 
duced by the musical art is sweet and delightful 
to hear, even to those who are untaught in it. 

And we conceive the work of one who studies 
philosophy to be some such thing, that he must fit 
his desire to all events, so that nothing may come 
to pass against our will, nor may aught fail to 
come to pass that we wish for. Whence it re- 
sults to those who so order it, that they never fail 
to obtain what they would, nor to avoid what 
they would not, living, as regards themselves, 
without pain, fear, or trouble; and as regards 
their fellows, observing all the relations, natural 
and acquired; as son or father, or brother or 
citizen, or husband or wife, or neighbor or fel- 
low-traveller, or prince or subject. Such we con- 
ceive to be the work of one who pursues phil- 
osophy. 1 

And now, said Epictetus, I am your teacher 
and ye are being taught by me. And I have this 
aim — to perfect you, that ye be unhindered, 



36 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

uncompelled, unembarrassed, free, prosperous, 
happy, looking unto God alone in all things great 
and small. And ye are here to learn these things, 
and to do them. And wherefore do ye not finish 
the work, if ye have indeed such an aim as be- 
hoves you, and if I, besides the aim, have such 
ability as behoves me? What is here lacking? 
When I see a carpenter, and the wood lying be- 
side him, I look for some work. And now, here 
is the carpenter, here is the wood — what is yet 
lacking? Is the thing such as cannot be taught? 
It can. Is it, then, not in our power ? Yea, this 
alone of all things is. Wealth is not in our 
power, nor health, nor repute, nor any other 
thing, save only the right use of appearances. 
This alone is by nature unhindered; this alone is 
unembarrassed. Wherefore, then, will ye not 
make an end? Tell me the reason. For either 
the fault lies in me, or in you, or in the nature of 
the thing. But the thing itself is possible, and 
indeed the only thing that is in our power. It 
remains that I am to blame, or else ye are ; or, to 
speak more truly, both of us. What will ye, 
then? Let us at length begin to entertain such 
a purpose among us, and let the past be past. 
Only let us make a beginning. 2 

* D. II. xiv. Rolleston. 2 D. II. xix. Rolleston. 



THE PATH OF PHILOSOPHY 37 
CHAPTER VII 

LEARNING THE RULES 

HE did well, rightly, not rightly, he failed, he 
succeeded, he is unrighteous, he is right- 
eous — which of us spareth to use terms like 
these? Which of us will defer the use of them 
till he hath learned them, even as ignorant men 
do not use terms of geometry or music? Do I 
not, then, apply them rightly? But here lies the 
whole question. 

For now since you think you apply these things 
rightly, tell me, Whence have you this assurance ? 
Because, you say, it seems so to me. But to 
another it seems otherwise — and he, too, doth he 
not think his application right? What else doth 
a madman do, than those things that to him seem 
right ? Have you, then, aught better to show for 
your application than that it seemeth so to you ? 

Behold, the beginning of philosophy is the in- 
quiry into that which seems, whether it rightly 
seems; and the discovery of a certain rule, even 
as we have found a balance for weights, and a 
plumb line for straight and crooked. Seeming, 
then, doth not for every man answer to Being; 
for neither in weights nor measures doth the bare 
appearance content us, but for each case we have 
discovered some rule. And here, then, is there 
no rule above seeming? And how could it be 
that there were no evidence or discovery of things 



38 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

most necessary for men? There is, then, a rule. 
And wherefore do we not seek it, and find it, and, 
having found it, henceforth use it without trans- 
gression, and not so much as stretch forth a fin- 
ger without it ? For this it is, I think, that when 
it is discovered cureth of their madness those that 
mismeasure all things by seeming alone. 

What is the subject about which we shall in- 
quire? Shall it be Pleasure? Submit it to the 
rule, cast it into the scales thus: Now the Good 
must be a thing of such sort that we ought to 
trust in it. And we ought to have faith in it. 
And ought we to trust in anything which is un- 
stable? Nay. And hath Pleasure any stability? 
It hath not. Take it then, and fling it out of 
the scales, and set it far away from the place 
of the Good. Thus are things judged and 
weighed, when the rules are held in readiness. 
And the aim of philosophy is this, to examine and 
establish the rules. And to use them when they 
are known is the task of a wise and a good man. 1 

iD. II. xi. Rolleston. 



CHAPTER VIII 

CHILD AND MAN 

IT is the action of an uninstructed person to 
lay the fault of his own bad condition upon 
others; of one entering upon instruction, to lay 
the fault on himself. 1 The one says, I am un- 



THE PATH OF PHILOSOPHY 39 

done on account of my child, my brother, my 
father; but the other, if ever he be obliged to say, 
I am undone! reflects, and adds, On account of 
myself. If therefore we would always incline 
this way, and, whenever we are unsuccessful, 
would lay the fault on ourselves, I engage we 
should make some proficiency. 2 

But as it is, we have from the beginning trav- 
elled a different road. While we were still chil- 
dren, if haply we stumbled as we were gaping 
about, the nurse did not chide us, but beat the 
stone. For what had the stone done? Ought 
it to have moved out of the way for your child's 
folly? Again, if we find nothing to eat after 
coming from the bath, never doth the tutor check 
our desire, but he beats the cook. Man, we did 
not set thee to be a tutor of the cook, but of our 
child — him shall you train, him improve. And 
thus, even when full-grown, we appear as chil- 
dren. For a child in music is he who hath not 
learned music, and in letters, one who hath not 
learned letters; and in life he is a child who is 
undisciplined in philosophy. 3 

1 M. V. Carter. 3 D. III. xix. Rolleston. 

2 D. III. xix. Carter. 

CHAPTER IX 

THE AIM OF INSTRUCTION 

HE who is receiving instruction ought to 
come to be instructed with this intention: 
How shall I follow the Gods in all things ? How 



40 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

shall I be contented with the divine administra- 
tion? And how can I become free? And to 
be instructed is this, to learn to wish that every- 
thing may happen as it does. And how do 
things happen? As the Disposer has disposed 
them. 

But, you say, I would have everything result 
just as I like, and in whatever way I like. You 
are mad, you are beside yourself. For me incon- 
siderately to wish for things to happen as I incon- 
siderately like, this appears to be not only not 
noble, but even most base. For how do we pro- 
ceed in the matter of writing? Do I wish to 
write the name of Dion as I choose? No, but 
I am taught to choose to write it as it ought to 
be written. If it were not so, it would be of 
no value to know anything, if knowledge were 
adapted to every man's whim. 

Remembering, then, this disposition of things, 
we ought to go to be instructed, not that we may 
change the constitution of things, — for we have 
not the power to do it, nor is it better that we 
should have the power, — but in order that, as 
the things around us are what they are and by 
nature exist, we may maintain our minds in har- 
mony with the things which happen. For can 
we escape from men? and how is it possible? 
And if we associate with them, can we change 
them? Who gives us the power? What, then, 
remains, or what method is discovered of holding 
commerce with them? Is there such a method 
by which they shall do what seems fit to them, 



THE PATH OF PHILOSOPHY 41 

and we not the less shall be in a mood which 
is conformable to nature? x 

Seek not that the things which happen should 
happen as you wish; but wish the things which 
happen to be as they are, and you will have a 
tranquil flow of life. 2 In a word, desire nothing 
other than that which God wills. But if you 
envy and complain, and are jealous, and fear, and 
never cease for a single day complaining both 
of yourself and of the Gods, why do you still 
speak of being educated? Will you not unlearn 
all these things and begin from the beginning, 
and see that hitherto you have not even touched 
the matter? And then commencing from this 
foundation, will you not build up all that comes 
after, so that nothing may happen which you do 
not choose and nothing shall fail to happen which 
you do choose? 3 

1 D. I. xii. Long. 3 D. II. xvii. Long. 

2 M. VIII. Long. 



CHAPTER X 

THE SPHERE OF PHILOSOPHY 

YOU are sailing to Rome (you tell us) to 
obtain the post of Governor of Cnossus. 
But when did you ever take a voyage for the pur- 
pose of reviewing your principles and getting rid 
of any of them that proved unsound? Whom 
did you ever visit for that object? What time 
did you ever set yourself for that ? Did you ex- 



42 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

amine your principles when a boy ? And at what 
moment would you have endured another exam- 
ining your principles and proving that they were 
unsound ? What then am I to say to you ? Help 
me in this matter ! you cry. Ah, for that I have 
no rule. What do philosophers have rules for, 
then? Why, that whatever may betide, our rul- 
ing faculty may be as Nature would have it, and 
so remain. Think you this a small matter ? Not 
so! but the greatest thing there is. Not so, you 
think; this is only a flying visit; while we are 
hiring the ship, we can see Epictetus too ! Then 
on leaving you cry, Out on Epictetus for a worth- 
less fellow, provincial and barbarous of speech! 

Whether you will or no, you are poorer than I ! 
What then do I lack? What you have not: 
Constancy of mind, such as Nature would have 
it to be: Tranquillity. Patron or no patron, 
what care I ? but you do care. I am richer than 
you: I am not racked with anxiety as to what 
Caesar may think of me; I flatter none on that 
account. This is what I have, instead of vessels 
of gold and silver ! Your vessels may be of gold, 
but your reason, your principles, your accepted 
views, your inclinations, your desires are of 
earthenware. 

To you, all you have seems small : to me, all I 
have seems great. Your desire is insatiable, mine 
is satisfied. See children thrusting their hands 
into a narrow-necked jar, and striving to pull out 
the nuts and figs it contains: if they fill the hand, 
they cannot pull it out again, and then they fall 



THE PATH OF PHILOSOPHY 43 

to tears. Let go a few of them, and then you 
can draw out the rest. You, too, let your desire 
go! covet not many things, and you will obtain. 1 

*D. III. ix. Crossley. 



CHAPTER XI 

THE FRUIT OF PHILOSOPHY 

BE not elated in mind at any superiority that 
is not of yourself. If your horse were 
elated and should say, I am beautiful, that would 
be tolerable. But when you are elated and say, 
I have a beautiful horse, know that it is at an 
excellence in your horse that you are elated. 
What, then, is your own ? This — to make use 
of the appearances. So that when you deal ac- 
cording to Nature in the use of appearances, then 
shall you be elated, for you will then be elated 
at an excellence that is your own. 1 

When therefore some one may exalt himself in 
that he is able to understand and expound the 
works of Chrysippus, say then to thyself, If 
Chrysippus had not written obscurely, this man 
would have had nothing whereon to exalt himself. 
But I, what do I desire? Is it not to learn to 
understand Nature and to follow her ? I inquire, 
then, who can expound Nature to me, and hearing 
that Chrysippus can, I betake myself to him. But 
I do not understand his writings, therefore I seek 
an expounder for them. And so far there is 



44 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

nothing exalted. But when I have found the 
expounder, it remaineth for me to put in prac- 
tice what he declares to me, and in this alone is 
there anything exalted. But if I shall admire 
the bare exposition, what else have I made of 
myself than a grammarian instead of a philoso- 
pher, save, indeed, that the exposition is of Chry- 
sippus and not of Homer? When, therefore, 
one may ask me to lecture on the philosophy of 
Chrysippus, I shall rather blush when I am not 
able to show forth works of a like nature and 
in harmony with the words. 2 

For it is not these small arguments that are 
wanted now: the writings of the Stoics are full 
of them. What, then, is the thing that is wanted ? 
A man who shall apply them, one who by his 
acts shall bear testimony to his words. Assume, 
I intreat you, this character, that we may no 
longer use in the schools the examples of the 
ancients, but that we may have some example of 
our own. 3 



1 M. VI. Rolleston. s D. I. xxix. Long. 

2M. XLIX. Rolleston. 



CHAPTER XII 

THE TEST OF CULTURE 

THE material for the wise and good man is 
his own ruling faculty, and the body is 
the material for the physician; the land is the 



THE PATH OF PHILOSOPHY 45 

matter for the husbandman. The business of 
the wise and good man is to use appearances con- 
formably to nature: and as it is the nature of 
every soul to assent to the truth, to dissent from 
the false, and to remain in suspense as to that 
which is uncertain ; so it is its nature to be moved 
towards the desire of the good, and to aversion 
from the evil, and with respect to that which is 
neither good nor bad it feels indifferent. For 
as the banker is not allowed to reject Caesar's 
coin, but if you show the coin, whether he chooses 
or not, he must give up what is sold for the coin ; 
so it is also in the matter of the soul. When 
the good appears, it immediately attracts to it- 
self; the evil repels from itself. 1 

Turn your mind at last to these things; at- 
tend, if it be only a short time, to your own rul- 
ing faculty. Consider what this is that you pos- 
sess, and whence it came, this which uses all 
other faculties, and tries them, and selects and 
rejects. But so long as you employ yourself 
about externals, you will have the ruling faculty 
such as you choose to have it, sordid and neg- 
lected. 2 

Therefore I cannot call anyone industrious if 
I hear only that he reads or writes; nor even if 
he adds the whole night to the day do I call him 
so, unless I know to what he refers it. For if 
he does it for fame, I call him ambitious: if for 
money, avaricious; if from the desire of learn- 
ing, bookish; but not industrious. But if he 
refers his labor to his ruling faculty, in order 



46 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

to treat and regulate it conformably to nature, 
then only I call him industrious. 

If you perceive any of those things which you 
have learned and studied occurring to you in ac- 
tion, rejoice in them. If you have laid aside 
ill-nature and reviling; if you have lessened your 
harshness, indecent language, inconsiderateness, 
effeminacy; if you are not moved by the same 
things as formerly, if not in the same manner as 
formerly, you may keep a perpetual festival; to- 
day because you have behaved well in one affair; 
tomorrow, because in another. 3 



1 D. III. iii. Long. 3 d. IV. iv. Carter. 

2 D. IV. vii. Long. 



CHAPTER XIII 

THE DIVINE CONTEST 

YOU would fain be victor at the Olympic 
games, you say. Yes, but weigh the con- 
ditions, weigh the consequences. You must live 
by rule, submit to diet, abstain from dainty meats, 
exercise your body perforce at stated hours, in 
heat or in cold ; drink no cold water, nor, it may 
be, wine. In a word, you must surrender your- 
self to your trainer, as though to a physician. 
Then in the hour of contest, you will have to 
delve the ground, it may chance dislocate an arm, 
sprain an ankle, gulp down abundance of yellow 



THE PATH OF PHILOSOPHY 47 

sand, be scourged with the whip — and with all 
this sometimes lose the victory. Count the cost 
— and then, if your desire still holds, try the 
wrestler's life. 

And thus some men, having seen a philosopher 
and heard him discourse, desire that they also 
may become philosophers. Friend, bethink you 
first what it is that you would do, and then what 
your own nature is able to bear. Think you to be 
a philosopher while acting as you do? think you 
to go on thus eating, thus drinking, giving way 
in like manner to wrath and to displeasure? 
Nay, you must watch, you must labor; overcome 
certain desires; quit your familiar friends, sub- 
mit to be despised by your slave, to be held in 
derision by them that meet you, to take the lower 
place in all things, in office, in positions of author- 
ity, in courts of law. Weigh these things fully, 
and then, if you will, lay to your hand; if as the 
price of these things you would gain freedom, 
tranquillity, and passionless serenity. 1 

For the combat before us is not in wrestling, 
but the combat is for good fortune and happi- 
ness themselves. 2 Great is the contest, divine 
the task, for kingship, for freedom, for pros- 
perity, for tranquillity. Be mindful of God, call 
Him to be thy helper and defender. 3 Go to 
Socrates, and consider what a victory he at last 
found that he had gained over himself; what an 
Olympian victory; so that, in truth, one may 
justly salute him, Hail, wondrous man ! thou who 



48 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

hast conquered, not these boxers and gladiators, 
but thyself! Over such a victory as this a man 
may justly be proud. 4 

1 D. III. xv. Crossley. 3 D. II. xviii. Rolleston. 

2 D. III. xxv. Long. *D. II. xviii. Long. 



CHAPTER XIV 

WHAT THE WORLD CANNOT GIVE 

YE see now, how that Caesar seemeth to have 
given us a great peace; how there are no 
longer wars nor battles nor bands of robbers nor 
of pirates, but a man may travel at every season, 
and sail from east to west. But can Csesar give 
us peace from fever ? or from shipwreck ? or from 
fire? or from earthquake? or from lightning? aye, 
or from love? He cannot. Or from grief? 
He cannot. Or from envy? He cannot. 
Briefly, then, Caesar cannot secure us from any of 
such things. But the word of the philosophers 
doth promise us peace even from these things. 
And what saith it? If ye will hearken unto me, 
O men, wheresoever ye be, whatsoever ye do, 
ye shall not grieve, ye shall not be wroth, ye 
shall not be compelled or hindered, but ye shall 
live untroubled and free from every ill. 

Whosoever hath this peace, which Caesar never 
proclaimed (for how could he proclaim it?), but 
which God proclaimed through His word, shall 
he not suffice to himself ? For he beholdeth and 



THE PATH OF PHILOSOPHY 49 

considereth, Now can no evil happen to me; for 
me there is no robber, no earthquake; all things 
are full of peace, full of calm; for me no way, 
no city, no assembly, no neighbor, no associate 
hath any hurt. 1 Whithersoever I go, it shall be 
well with me ; for in this place it was well with me, 
not because of the place, but because of the opin- 
ions which I shall carry away with me. For 
these no man can deprive me of. Yea, these 
only are mine own, whereof I cannot be deprived, 
and they suffice for me as long as I have them, 
wherever I be, or whatever I do. 2 

1 D. III. xiii. Rolleston. 2 D. IV. vii. Rolleston. 



BOOK THREE 
THE KINGDOM OF THE WILL 



THE KINGDOM OF THE WILL 
CHAPTER I 

THE ADORNMENT OF THE WILL 

A CERTAIN young man, a rhetorician, hav- 
ing come to Epictetus with his hair dressed 
in an unusually elaborate way, and his attire much 
adorned, Tell me, said Epictetus, think you not 
that some dogs are beautiful, and some horses, 
and so of the other animals? And men too — 
are not some beautiful and some ill-favored? 
Whether, then, do we call each of these beautiful 
for the same reasons and in the same kind, or 
each for something proper to itself? You shall 
see the matter thus : Inasmuch as we observe a dog 
to be formed by nature for one end, and a horse 
for another, and, let us say, a nightingale for 
another, we may in general say, not unreasonably, 
that each of them is then beautiful when it is ex- 
cellent according to its own nature; but since the 
nature of each is different, different also, it seems 
to me, is the manner of being beautiful in each. 

What is it, then, that makes a man beautiful? 
Is it not that which, in its kind, makes also a dog 
or a horse beautiful? What, then, makes a dog 
beautiful? The presence of the virtue of a dog. 
And in a man is it not also the presence of the 

53 



54 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

virtue of a man? And, youth, if thou wouldst 
be beautiful, do thou labor to perfect this, the 
virtue of a human being. But so long as thou 
neglectest this, though thou shouldst seek out 
every device to appear beautiful, thou must of 
necessity be ugly. For thou art not flesh and 
hair, but a Will: if thou keep this beautiful, then 
wilt thou be beautiful. See what Socrates saith 
to Alcibiades, the most beautiful and blooming of 
men. And what saith he? Curl thy locks? 
Nay. But, Set thy Will in order, cast out evil 
doctrines. 1 

Young man, thou seekest the beautiful, and 
thou dost well. Know, then, that it flourishes 
there where thy Reason is ; there seek it, for this 
is what thou hast in thyself of choice and pre- 
cious. 2 Resolve at last to seek thine own com- 
mendation, to appear fair and beautiful in the 
eyes of God; desire to become pure with thine 
own pure self, and with God. 3 

1 D. III. i. Rolleston. s D. II. xviii. Rolleston. 

2D. IV. xi. Rolleston. 

CHAPTER II 

THE PRIMACY OF THE WILL 

DID God give thee eyes for nothing? And 
was it for nothing that He mingled in them 
a spirit of such might and cunning as to reach a 
long way off and receive the impression of visible 
forms — a messenger so swift and faithful? 



THE KINGDOM OF THE WILL 55 

Was it for nothing that He gave the intervening 
air such efficacy, and made it elastic, so that being 
in a manner strained, our vision should traverse 
it? Was it for nothing that He made light, 
without which there was no benefit of any other 
thing? 

Be not thou unthankful for these things, nor 
yet unmindful of better things. For seeing and 
hearing, and for life itself, and the things that 
work together to maintain it, do thou give thanks 
to God. But remember that He hath given thee 
another thing which is better than all these — 
that, namely, which useth them, which approveth 
them, which taketh account of the worth of each. 

For what is that which declareth concerning all 
these faculties how much each of them is worth? 
Is it the faculty itself? Heardst thou ever the 
faculty of vision tell aught concerning itself? 
or that of hearing? Nay, but as ministers and 
slaves are they appointed, to serve the faculty 
which useth them. How then shall any other 
faculty be greater than this, which both useth 
the others as its servants, and the same time ap- 
proveth each of them and declareth concerning 
them? 

For which of them knoweth what itself is, and 
what it is worth? Which of them knoweth when 
it behoves to make use of it, and when not? 
What is that which openeth and closeth the eyes, 
turning them away from things which they 
should not behold, and guiding them towards 
other things? Is it the faculty of vision? Nay, 



56 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

but the faculty of the Will. What is that which 
closeth and openeth the ears? — that in obedi- 
ence to which they become busy and curious, or, 
again, unmoved by what they hear? Is it the 
faculty of hearing? It is no other than that of 
the Will. Wilt thou affirm, then, that thou hast 
aught better than the Will? 

What then ? Shall any man contemn the other 
faculties ? God forbid ! — that were senseless, 
impious, thankless toward God. But to each 
thing its true worth. But if one ask me which 
is the best of existing things, what shall I say but 
that it is the faculty of the Will, when it is made 
right? For this is that which useth all the other 
faculties, both small and great. When this is 
set right, a man that was not good becomes good : 
when it is not right, the man becomes evil. This 
is that whereby we fail or prosper — whereby 
we blame others, or approve them ; the neglect of 
which is the misery, and the care of it the happi- 
ness, of mankind. 1 

1 D. II. xxiii. Rolleston. 



CHAPTER III 

THINGS AND THEIR USE 

THINGS are indifferent, but the uses of them 
are not indifferent. How, then, shall one 
preserve at once both a steadfast and tranquil 



THE KINGDOM OF THE WILL 57 

mind, and also carefulness of things, that he be 
not heedless or slovenly? If he take example of 
dice players. The numbers are indifferent, the 
dice are indifferent. How can I tell what may be 
thrown up? But carefully and skilfully to make 
use of what is thrown, that is where my proper 
business begins. 

And this is the great task of life also, to dis- 
cern things and divide them, and say, Outward 
things are not in my power; to will is in my 
power. Where shall I seek the Good, and where 
the Evil? Within me — in all that is my own. 
But of all that is alien to thee call nothing good 
nor evil nor profitable nor hurtful, nor any such 
term as these. For where there is aught that con- 
cerns me, there none can hinder or compel me; 
and in those things where I am hindered or com- 
pelled the attainment is not in my power, and is 
neither good nor evil; but my use of the event is 
either evil or good, and this is in my power. 1 

But now having one thing in our power to care 
for, and to cleave to, we rather choose to be care- 
ful of many things, and to bind ourselves to 
many things. And being thus bound to many 
things, they lie heavy on us and drag us down. 
So, if the weather be not fair for sailing, we sit 
down distraught and are ever peering forth to 
see how stands the wind. It is north. And 
what is that to us? When will the west wind 
blow ? When it shall seem good to it, friend ; or 
to 2Eo\us. For it was not thee, but ./Eolus, 
whom God made steward of the winds. 



58 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

What then ? It is right to devise how we may 
perfect the things that are our own, and to use 
the others as their nature is. And what, then, is 
their nature? As it may please God. 2 

1 D. II. v. Rolleston. 2 rj. I. i. Rolleston. 



CHAPTER IV 

THE HEART AND ITS TREASURE 

BE not deceived : nothing is so dear to any 
creature as its own profit. Whatsoever 
may seem to hinder this, be it father or child 
or friend or lover, this he will hate and abuse 
and curse. For Nature hath never so made any- 
thing as to love aught but its own profit: this 
is father and brother and kin and country and 
God. When, then, the Gods appear to hinder us 
in this, we revile even them, and overthrow their 
images and burn their temples; as Alexander, 
when his friend died, commanded to burn the 
temples of yEsculapius. 

Therefore, if a man place in the same thing 
both profit and holiness, and the beautiful and 
fatherland, and parents and friends, all these 
things shall be saved; but if he place profit in 
one thing, and friends and fatherland and kins- 
folk, yea, and righteousness itself some other 
where, all these things shall perish, for profit shall 
outweigh them. For where the / and the Mine 
are, thither, of necessity, inclineth every living 



THE KINGDOM OF THE WILL 59 

thing: if in the flesh, then the supremacy is there; 
if in the Will, it is there; if in outward things, 
it is there. If I set Myself in one place and Vir- 
tue some other where, then the word of Epicurus 
waxeth strong, which declareth that there is no 
Virtue, or, at least, that Virtue is but conceit. 
But if mine / is where my Will is, then shall I 
be the friend I should be, or the son or the fa- 
ther. For my profit then will be to cherish faith 
and piety and forbearance and continence and 
helpfulness; and to guard the bonds of relation. 1 

1 D. II. xxii. Rolleston. 



CHAPTER V 

THE FRIENDSHIP OF VIRTUE 

WHEN you see friends or brothers that 
seem to be of one mind, argue from this 
nothing concerning their friendship; nay, not if 
they swear it, not if they declare that they can- 
not be parted from each other. For in the heart 
of a worthless man there is no faith; it is un- 
stable, unaccountable, victim of one appearance 
after another. But try them, not as others do, 
if they were born of the same parents and nur- 
tured together, and under the same tutor; but by 
this alone, wherein they place their profit, whether 
in outward things or in the will. If in outward 
things, call them no more friends than faithful 
or steadfast or bold or free. For that opinion 



60 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

hath nothing of humanity that makes men bite 
each other, and revile each other, and haunt the 
wildernesses, or the public places, like the moun- 
tains, and in the courts of justice, to show forth 
the character of thieves; nor that which makes 
men drunkards and adulterers and corrupters, 
nor whatever other ills men work against each 
other through this one and only opinion that They 
and Theirs lie in matters beyond the will. 

And of you, whosoever hath longed either to 
be a friend himself or to win some other for a 
friend, let him cast out these opinions, let him 
hate them and drive them from his soul. For 
otherwise ye may do all things whatsoever, even 
as friends are wont to do, and dwell together, and 
voyage together, and be born from the same 
parents, for so are snakes; but friends, they are 
not, nor are ye, so long as ye hold these accursed 
doctrines. 

But if you hear, in sooth, that these men hold 
the Good to be there only where the Will is, 
where the right use of appearances is, then be 
not busy to inquire if they are father and son, 
or brothers or have long time companied with 
each other as comrades; but, knowing this one 
thing alone, argue confidently that they are 
friends, even as they are faithful and upright. 
For where else is friendship than where faith is, 
where piety is, where there is an interchange of 
virtue ? * 



1 D. II. xxii. Rolleston. 



THE KINGDOM OF THE WILL 61 
CHAPTER VI 

THE DOMAIN OF THE WILL 

BEING naturally noble, magnanimous, and 
free, man sees that of the things which sur- 
round him some are in his power, and the other 
things are in the power of others ; that the things 
which are free from hindrance are in the power 
of the will, and that those which are subject to 
hindrance are the things which are not in the 
power of the will. And for this reason if he 
thinks that his good and his interest be in these 
things only which are in his own power, he will 
be free, prosperous, happy, free from harm, mag- 
nanimous, pious, thankful to God for all things; 
in no matter finding fault with any of the things 
which have not been put in his power, nor blam- 
ing any of them. But if a man thinks that his 
good and his interest are in externals and in 
things which are not in the power of his will, he 
must of necessity be a slave to those who have the 
power over the things which he desires and fears ; 
and he must of necessity be impious because he 
thinks that he is harmed by God, and he must be 
unjust because he always claims more than be- 
longs to him; and he must of necessity be abject 
and mean. 1 

Remember, then, that if you hold that only to 
be your own which is so, and the alien for what 
it is, alien, then none shall ever compel you, none 



62 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

shall hinder you, you will blame no one, accuse no 
one, you will not do the least thing unwillingly, 
none shall harm you, you shall have no foe, for 
you shall suffer no injury. 2 

What hinders a man who has clearly compre- 
hended these things from living with a light heart 
and bearing easily the reins, enduring that which 
has already happened, and quietly awaiting every- 
thing which can happen ? x 

i D. IV. vii. Long. 2 m. I. Rolleston. 



CHAPTER VII 

PASSWORDS 

WHEN thou art going in to any great per- 
sonage, remember that Another also 
from above seeth what goeth on, and that thou 
oughtest to please Him rather than the other. 
He then who seeth from above asketh thee: 

In the schools what didst thou use to say about 
exile and bonds and death and disgrace? I used 
to say that they are things indifferent. 

What then dost thou say of them now? Are 
they changed at all? Art thou changed then? 
No. 

Tell Me what things are indifferent. The 
things which are independent of the will. 

Tell Me also what followeth from this. The 
things which are independent of the will are noth- 
ing to me. 



THE KINGDOM OF THE WILL 63 

Tell Me also about the Good; what was thine 
opinion? A will such as we ought to have and 
also such a use of appearances. 

And the end, what is it ? To follow Thee. 

Dost thou say this now also? I say the same 
now also. 

Then go in to the great personage boldly and 
remember these things ; and thou wilt see what a 
youth is who hath studied these things when he is 
among men who have not studied them. 1 

For why should a man be struck with awful 
admiration of those who have great possessions, 
or are placed in high rank? What will they do 
unto us? The things which they can do we do 
not regard: the things which we are concerned 
about they cannot do. Who then, after all, shall 
command a person thus disposed ? 2 

1 D. I. xxx. Long. 2 D. I. ix. Carter. 



CHAPTER VIII 

THE WAY TO THE HEIGHTS 

THE difficulties of all men are about external 
things, their helplessness is about exter- 
nals. What shall I do ? how will it be ? how will 
it turn out? will this thing happen? will that? 
All these are the words of those who are turning 
themselves to things which are not within the 
power of the will. For is not that which will 
happen independent of the will? And the na- 



64 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

ture of good and evil, is it not in the things which 
are within the power of the will? Is it not in 
your power, then, to treat according to nature 
everything which happens? Can any person 
hinder you? No longer, then, say to me, How 
will it be ? For however it may be, you will dis- 
pose of it well, and the result to you will be a 
fortunate one. 

But that this may be done, a man must bear no 
small things, nor are the things small which he 
must go without. This is the nature of the 
thing : nothing is given or had for nothing. And 
where is the wonder? In order, then, to secure 
freedom from passion, tranquillity, to sleep well 
when you do sleep, to be really awake when you 
are awake, to fear nothing, to be anxious about 
nothing, will you spend nothing and give no 
labor ? Do you expect to have for nothing things 
so great ? You cannot have both external things 
after bestowing care on them and your own ruling 
faculty: but if you would have those, give up 
this. If you do not, you will have neither this 
nor that, while you are drawn in different ways 
to both. 

Why then are you anxious? why do you lose 
your sleep? Why do you not straightway, after 
considering wherein your good is and your evil, 
say, Both of them are in my power? Neither can 
any man deprive me of the good, nor involve 
me in the bad against my will. Why do I not 
lay me down in peace? For all that I have is 
safe. As to things which belong to others, he 



THE KINGDOM OF THE WILL 6 



will look to them who gets them, as they may be 
given by him who has the power. Who am I who 
wish to have them in this way or in that? is the 
power of selecting them given to me? has any 
person made me the dispenser of them? Those 
things are enough for me over which I have 
power: I ought to manage them as well as I 
can : and all the rest, as the Master of them may 
choose, even God. 1 

iD. IV. x. Long. 



CHAPTER IX 

THE SECRET OF TRANQUILLITY 

LET a man transfer his opinions to things de- 
pendent upon the will, and I will engage for 
him that he will be firm and constant, whatever 
may be the state of things around him. 1 But 
what are the things about which we are busy? 
Externals. And have we any doubt, then, why 
we fear or why we are anxious? What, then, 
happens when we think the things which are com- 
ing on us to be evils ? It is not in our power not 
to be afraid, it is not in our power not to be 
anxious. Then we say, O Lord, how shall I not 
be anxious? Well, then, has He given to you 
nothing in the present case? Has He not given 
to you endurance ? has He not given to you man- 
liness? But we neither study these things nor 
care for them. For if we had feared, not death 



66 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

or banishment, but fear itself, we should have 
studied not to fall into those things which appear 
to us evils. 2 

Now little children, if they cry because their 
nurse has left them for a while, straightway for- 
get their sorrows when they are given a small 
cake. Wilt thou be likened unto a little child? 
Nay ! for I would not be thus affected by a little 
cake, but by right opinions. And what are these ? 
They are such as a man should study all day long 
to observe — that he be not subject to the effects 
of anything that is alien to him, neither of friend, 
nor place, nor exercises; yea, not even of his 
own body, but to remember the Law, and have it 
ever before his eyes. 

And what is the divine Law? To hold fast 
that which is his own, and to claim nothing that 
is another's; to use what is given him, and not 
to covet what is not given ; to yield up easily and 
willingly what is taken away, giving thanks for 
the time that he has had it at his service. 3 These 
are the laws, these the statutes, transmitted from 
God. Of these one ought to be an expositor, and 
to these we ought to be obedient. 4 

1 D. III. iii. Long. 3 D. II. xvi. Rolleston. 

2D. II. xvi. Long. *D. IV. iii. Carter. 



THE KINGDOM OF THE WILL 67 
CHAPTER X 

WHAT EVERY MAN SEEKS 

WHAT is that which every man seeks ? To 
live secure, to be happy, to do everything 
as he wishes, not to be hindered nor compelled. 
What, then, is that which makes a man free from 
hindrance and makes him his own master? For 
wealth does not do it, nor royal power ; but some- 
thing else must be discovered. Have you nothing 
which is in your own power, which depends upon 
yourself only and cannot be taken from you? 
What has God given to you as your own and in 
your own power ? He has given to you the things 
which are in the power of the will: He has put 
them in your power, free from impediment and 
hindrance. 1 For if God had made that part of 
His own nature which He severed from Himself 
and gave to us, liable to be hindered or con- 
strained, He would not have been God, nor would 
He have been taking care of us as He ought. 2 

In our own power He has placed that which is 
the best and the most important, the use of ap- 
pearances. For when this is rightly employed, 
there is freedom, happiness, tranquillity, con- 
stancy : and this is also justice and law, and tem- 
perance, and every virtue. But all other things 
He has not placed in our power. Wherefore 
also we ought to be of one mind with God, and 
making this division of things, to look after those 



68 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

which are in our own power; and of the things 
not in our power, to intrust them to the Uni- 
verse, and whether it should require our chil- 
dren, or our country, or our body, or anything 
else, willingly to give them up. 3 

If, therefore, any be unhappy, let him remem- 
ber that he is unhappy by reason of himself alone. 
For God hath made all men to enjoy felicity and 
constancy of good. 4 If you choose, you are free; 
if you choose, you need blame no man, accuse no 
man. All things will be at once according to 
your mind and according to the mind of God. 2 

i D. IV. i. Long. 3R CLXIX. Long. 

2 D. I. xvii. Crossley. * D. III. xxiv. Crossley. 



CHAPTER XI 

TRUE FREEDOM 

IF thou wouldst be free, if thou hast thine heart 
set upon the matter according to its worth, 
ponder on this, on these convictions, on these 
words. And what marvel if thou purchase so 
great a thing at so great and high a price ? For 
the sake of this that men deem liberty, some 
hang themselves, others cast themselves down 
from the rock; aye, time hath been when whole 
cities came utterly to an end : while for the sake 
of the freedom that is true, and sure, and un- 
assailable, dost thou grudge to God what He 
gaveth, when He claimeth it? Wilt thou not 



THE KINGDOM OF THE WILL 69 

study, as Plato saith, to endure, not death alone, 
but torture, exile, stripes — in a word, to render 
up all that is not thine own? Else thou wilt be 
a slave amid slaves, wert thou ten thousand times 
a consul; aye, not a whit the less, though thou 
climb the Palace steps. And thou shalt know 
how true is the saying of Cleanthes, that though 
the words of philosophy may run counter to the 
opinions of the world, yet have they reason on 
their side. 1 

And that thou mayest know that this is true, 
as thou hast labored for those things, so trans- 
fer thy labor to these ; be vigilant for the purpose 
of acquiring an opinion which will make thee 
free. Purge thine opinions, so that nothing cling 
to thee of the things which are not thine own, 
that nothing grow to thee, that nothing give thee 
pain when it be torn from thee. And while thou 
art exercising thyself thus, say not that thou art 
philosophizing, for this is an arrogant expres- 
sion, but that thou art presenting an asserter of 
freedom: for this is really freedom. 2 

iD. IV. i. Crossley. 2 D. IV. i. Long. 



CHAPTER XII 

FREEDOM AND SERVITUDE 

WHAT ! a man may say, I a slave, I whose 
father was free, whose mother was free, 
I whom no man can purchase? I am also of 



jo THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

senatorial rank, and a friend of Caesar, and I 
have been a consul, and I own many slaves. In 
the first place, perhaps your father also was a 
slave in the same kind of servitude, and your 
mother, and your grandmother and all your an- 
cestors in an ascending series ! But even if they 
were as free as it is possible, what is this to you? 
What if they were of a noble nature, and you of 
a mean nature; if they were fearless, and you 
are a coward; if they had the power of self- 
restraint, and you are not able to exercise it ? 

And what, you may say, has this to do with 
being a slave ? Does it seem to you to be nothing 
to do a thing unwillingly, with complaining, with 
groans? Has this nothing to do with slavery? 
Did you never flatter any person? What else 
is this but slavery? Whomsoever it is in the 
power of another to hinder and compel, declare 
that he is not free. And do not look, I intreat 
you, after his grandfathers and great grand- 
fathers, or inquire about his being bought and 
sold. For he is our master who has in himself 
the power over anything which is desired, either 
to give or to take it away. 

When therefore you see any man subject to 
another or flattering him contrary to his own 
opinion, confidently affirm that this man is not 
free; and not only if he does this for a bit of 
supper, but also if he does it for a government or 
a consulship : and call those men little slaves who 
for the sake of little matters do these things, and 
those who do so for the sake of great things call 



THE KINGDOM OF THE WILL 71 

great slaves, as they deserve to be. 1 For what 
difference does it make by what thing a man is 
subdued, and on what he depends ? 2 

Whoever, then, wishes to be free, let him 
neither wish for anything nor avoid anything 
which depends on others: if he does not observe 
this rule, he must be a slave. 3 To this let all 
your reasoning tend ; and you will know that thus 
only are men made free. 4 

iD. IV. i. Long. 3M. XIV. Long. 

2 D. II. xvi. Long. 4 D. III. xxvi. Long. 



CHAPTER XIII 

THE FREEMAN 

YOU then, a man may say, are you free ? I 
wish, indeed, and pray to be free. But I 
can point out to you a free man, that you may 
no longer seek an example. Diogenes was free. 
How was he free? Not because he was born 
of free parents, but because he was himself free, 
because he had cast off all the handles of slavery, 
and it was not possible for any man to approach 
him, nor had any man the means of laying hold 
of him, to enslave him. He had everything easily 
loosed, everything only hanging to him. For he 
knew from whence he had them, and from whom, 
and on what conditions. His true parents indeed, 
the Gods, and his real Country he would never 
have deserted, nor would he have yielded to any 



?2 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

man in obedience to them and to their orders, 
nor would any man have died for his country 
more readily. For he was not used to inquire 
when he should be considered to have done any- 
thing on behalf of all the world, but he remem- 
bered that everything which is done comes from 
thence and is done on behalf of that country and 
is commanded by Him who administers it. 
Therefore see what Diogenes himself says and 
writes : I do not consider the poor body to be my 
own, I want nothing, law is everything to me, 
and nothing else is. These were the things which 
permitted him to be free. 

And that you may not think that I show you 
the example of a man who is a solitary person, 
take Socrates. And observe that he had a wife 
and children, but he did not consider them as 
his own ; that he had a country, so long as it was 
fit to have one, and in such a manner as was 
fit; friends and kinsmen also, but he held all in 
subjection to law and to the obedience due to it. 
For this reason he was the first to go out as a 
soldier, and in war he exposed himself to dan- 
ger most unsparingly. For he did not choose, 
he said, to save his poor body, but to save that 
which is increased and saved by doing what is 
just, and is impaired and destroyed by doing 
what is unjust. Socrates will not save his life 
by a base act! It is not possible to save such a 
man's life by base acts, but he is saved by dying, 
not by running away. And now Socrates being 
dead, no less useful to men, and even more useful, 



THE KINGDOM OF THE WILL 73 

is the remembrance of that which he did or said 
when he was alive. 1 



1 D. IV. i. Long. 



CHAPTER XIV 

THE ONLY WAY 

WHEN thou shalt see a man honored above 
others, or mighty in power, or otherwise 
esteemed, look to it that thou deem him not 
blessed, being carried away by the appearance. 
For if the essence of the Good be in those things 
that are in our own power, then neither envy nor 
jealousy hath any place, nor shalt thou thyself 
desire to be commander or prince or consul, but 
to be free. And to this there is one road — scorn 
of the things that are not in our own power. 1 

For thou wilt know by experience that there 
is no profit from the things which are valued and 
eagerly sought to those who have obtained them ; 
and to those who have not yet attained them there 
is an imagination that when these things are 
come, all that is good will come with them ; then, 
when they are come, the feverish feeling is the 
same, the tossing to and fro is the same, the 
satiety, the desire of things which are not pres- 
ent ; for freedom is acquired, not by the full pos- 
session of the things which are desired, but by 
removing the desire. 2 

Choosing anything else than this, thou wilt fol- 



74 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

low with groaning and lamentation whatever is 
stronger than thou, ever seeking prosperity in 
things outside thyself, and never able to attain 
it. For thou seekest it where it is not, and neg- 
lectest to seek it where it is. 3 For this law hath 
God established, and saith, If thou wouldst have 
aught of good, have it from thyself. 4 

iM. XIX. Rolleston. 3 D. II. xvi. Rolleston. 

2 D. IV. i. Long. 4 D. I. xxix. Rolleston. 



CHAPTER XV 

PROCLAMATION OF EMANCIPATION 

LIFT up thine head, as one delivered from 
slavery. Dare to look up to God and say: 
Deal with me henceforth as Thou wilt; I am 
of one mind with Thee; I am Thine. I reject 
nothing that seemeth good to Thee; lead me 
whithersoever Thou wilt, clothe me in what dress 
Thou wilt. Wilt thou have me govern or live 
privately, or stay at home, or go into exile, or 
be a poor man, or a rich? For all these con- 
ditions I will be Thine advocate with men. 1 

For God hath set me free: think ye that God 
purposed to allow His own son to be enslaved ? 2 
For I am free, and the friend of God, so as to 
obey Him willingly; but I must not value any- 
thing else, neither body, nor possessions, nor 
fame; in short, nothing. For it is not His will 
that I should value them. For if this had been 



THE KINGDOM OF THE WILL 75 

His pleasure, He would have made them my 
good, which now He hath not done; therefore I 
cannot transgress His commands. 3 

By me all these things have been examined; 
no man hath power on me. I have been set 
free by God, I know His commandments, hence- 
forth no man can lead me captive. I have a 
Liberator such as I need, and judges such as I 
need. For I hold what God wills above what 
I will. I cleave to Him as His servant and 
follower ; my impulses are one with His, my pur- 
suit is one with His; in a word, my will is one 
with His. 4 



iD. II. xvi. Rolleston. 3 D. IV. iii. Carter. 

2 D. I. xix. Long. *D. IV. vii. Rolleston. 



BOOK FOUR 
LEARNING AND DOING 



LEARNING AND DOING 
CHAPTER I 

SIGNS OF PROGRESS 

THE philosophers admonish us not to be sat- 
isfied with learning only, but also to add 
study, and then practice. For it is one thing to 
lay up bread and wine as in a storehouse, and 
another thing to eat. That which has been eaten 
is digested, distributed, and is become sinews, 
flesh, bones, blood, healthy color, healthy breath. 
Whatever is stored up, when you choose you can 
readily take and show it; but you have no other 
advantage from it. If then we shall not put in 
practice right opinions, we shall be nothing more 
than the expositors of the opinions of others. 1 

First, therefore, digest the thing, and show 
us some change in your ruling faculty, as athletes 
show in their shoulders by what they have been 
exercised and what they have eaten. You also 
ought to do something of the kind; eat like a 
man, drink like a man, marry, do the office of a 
citizen, endure abuse, bear with an unreasonable 
brother. Show us these things, that we may see 
that you have in truth learned something from 
the philosophers. 

79 



80 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

You say, No ; but come and hear me read phil- 
osophical commentaries: I will expound to you 
the writings of Chrysippus as no other man can. 
Is it for this that young men shall leave their 
country and their parents, that they may come 
and hear you explain words ? 2 

Where, then, is progress? If any of you 
turns to his own will, to exercise it and to im- 
prove it by labor so as to make it conformable 
to nature, elevated, free, unrestrained, unimpeded, 
faithful, modest; if when he rises in the morning, 
he observes and keeps these rules, bathes as a man 
of fidelity, eats as a modest man; in like manner, 
if in every matter that occurs he works out his 
chief principles as the runner does with reference 
to running, and the trainer of the voice with ref- 
erence to the voice — this is the man who truly 
makes progress, and this is the man who has not 
travelled in vain. 3 



1 D. II. ix. Long. 3 D. I. iv. Long. 

2 D. III. xxi. Long. 



CHAPTER II 

SEEMING AND BEING 

THOU shalt never proclaim thyself a philoso- 
pher, nor speak much among the vulgar of 
the philosophic maxims; but do the things that 
follow from the maxims. For example, do not 
discourse at a feast upon how one ought to eat, 



LEARNING AND DOING 81 

but eat as one ought. And as sheep do not bring 
their food to the shepherds to show how much 
they have eaten, but digesting inwardly their pro- 
vender, they bear outwardly wool and milk ; even 
so do not thou, for the most part, display the 
maxims before the vulgar, but rather the works 
which follow from them. 1 For some, as soon as 
they have assumed a cloak and grown a beard, 
say, I am a philosopher. First strive that it be 
not known what you are: be a philosopher to 
yourself a short time. 

For this reason Euphrates well used to say, A 
long time I strove to be a philosopher without 
people knowing it; and this was useful to me. 
For first, I knew that when I did anything well, 
I did not do it for the sake of the spectators, but 
for the sake of myself: I ate well for the sake 
of myself ; I had my countenance well composed, 
and my walk ; all for myself and for God. Then, 
as I struggled alone, so I alone also was in danger : 
in no respect through me, if I did anything base 
or unbecoming, was philosophy endangered; nor 
did I injure the many by doing anything wrong as 
a philosopher. For this reason those who did 
not know my purpose used to wonder how it was 
that, while I conversed and lived altogether with 
philosophers, I was not a philosopher myself! 
And what was the harm for me to be known to 
be a philosopher by my acts, and not by outward 
marks? For if one is so deaf and blind that he 
cannot conceive even Vulcan to be a good smith 
unless he can see the cap on his head, what is the 



82 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

harm in not being recognized by so foolish a 
judge? 

So Socrates was not known to be a philosopher 
by most persons; and they used to come to him 
and ask to be introduced to philosophers! Was 
he vexed? And did he say, And do you not 
think that I am a philosopher ? No ; but he would 
take them and introduce them, being satisfied with 
one thing, namely, with being a philosopher. 2 

Let it therefore be enough for thee in all things 
to be a philosopher. 3 And if thou wouldst do 
good to men, do not chatter to them, but show 
them in thyself what manner of men philosophy 
can make. 4 



i M. XLVI. Rolleston. 3 m. XXIII. Rolleston. 

2 D. IV. viii. Long. *D. III. xiii. Rolleston. 



CHAPTER III 

THE MARKS OF A PHILOSOPHER 

SUCH a one, you say, is a philosopher. Why? 
Because he wears a cloak and long hair. 
And so, when people see any of these acting inde- 
cently, they presently say, See what the philoso- 
pher doth. But they ought rather, from his act- 
ing indecently, to say that he is no philosopher. 
For if indeed the idea which we have of a phil- 
osopher and his profession were to wear a cloak 
and long hair, they would say right; but, if it 
be rather to keep himself free from faults, since 



LEARNING AND DOING 83 

he doth not fulfil his profession, why do they 
not deprive him of his title? 

For this is the way with regard to other arts. 
When we see anyone handle an axe awkwardly, 
we do not say, Where is the use of this art? See 
how ill carpenters perform. But we say the very 
contrary. This man is no carpenter, for he 
handles an axe awkwardly. So, if we hear any- 
one sing badly, we do not say, Observe how musi- 
cians sing ; but rather, This fellow is no musician. 
It is with regard to philosophy alone that people 
are thus affected. When they see anyone acting 
contrary to the profession of a philosopher, they 
do not take away his title ; but laying it down that 
he is a philosopher, and then assuming from 
the very fact that he behaves indecently, they 
infer that philosophy is of no use. 

What, then, is the reason of this? Because 
we pay some regard to the preconception which 
we have of a carpenter and a musician and so of 
other artists, but not of a philosopher, which being 
thus vague and confused, we judge of it only 
from external appearances. And of what other 
art do we take up our judgment from the dress 
and the hair ? Hath it not theorems too, and ma- 
terials, and an end, to distinguish it? What, 
then, is the subject-matter of a philosopher? Is 
it a cloak? No; but reason. What his end? 
To wear a cloak? No; but to have his reason 
correct. What are his theorems? Are they 
how to get a great beard or long hair ? No ; but 
rather, as Zeno expresses it, to know the elements 



84 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

of reason, what each of them is in particular, 
and how they are adapted to each other, and what 
are their consequences. 

Why, then, will you not first see whether, by 
acting in an unbecoming manner, he answers his 
profession, and so proceed to blame the study? 
Whereas now you say, from what he appears to 
do amiss, Observe the philosopher! As if it 
were decent to call a person who doth such things 
a philosopher ! 1 

i D. IV. viii. Carter. 



CHAPTER IV 

PEDANT OR SCHOLAR 

REMEMBER that not only the desire of 
power and of riches makes us mean and 
subject to others, but even the desire of tranquil- 
lity, and of leisure, and of learning. For to 
speak plainly, whatever the external thing may 
be, the value which we set upon it places us in sub- 
jection to others. What is the difference be- 
tween saying, I am unhappy, I have nothing to 
do, but I am bound to my books as a corpse ; and 
saying, I am unhappy, I have no leisure for read- 
ing ? For as salutations and power are things ex- 
ternal and independent of the will, so is a book. 
For what purpose do you choose to read? Tell 
me. For if you only direct your purpose to being 
amused or learning something, you are a silly 



LEARNING AND DOING 85 

fellow and incapable of enduring labor. But if 
you refer reading to the proper end, what else 
is this than a tranquil and happy life? 

But it does secure this, the man replies, and 
for this reason I am vexed that I am deprived of 
it. And what is this tranquil and happy life, 
which any man can impede, I do not say Caesar 
or Caesar's friend, but a crow, a piper, a fever, 
and thirty thousand other things? But a tran- 
quil and happy life contains nothing so sure as 
continuity and freedom from obstacle. Now I 
am called to do something: I will go then with 
the purpose of observing the rules which I must 
keep, of acting with modesty, steadiness, without 
desire and aversion to things external. 

Come, when you have done these things and 
have attended to them, have you done a worse 
act than when you have read a thousand verses 
or written as many ? For when you eat, are you 
grieved because you are not reading? Are you 
not satisfied with eating according to what you 
have learned by reading, and so with bathing and 
with exercise? Why, then, do you not act con- 
sistently in all things? If you maintain yourself 
free from perturbation, free from alarm, and 
steady; if you do not envy those who are pre- 
ferred before you; if surrounding circumstances 
do not strike you with fear or admiration, what 
do you want? Books? How or for what pur- 
pose ? For is not the reading of books a prepara- 
tion for living? And is not living itself made up 
of certain other things than this? 



86 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

But we have never read for this purpose, we 
have never written for this purpose, so that we 
may in our actions use in a way conformable to 
nature the appearances presented to us; but we 
terminate in this, in learning what is said and in 
being able to expound it to another. But if we 
read what is written about action, not that we 
may see what is said about action, but that we 
may act well; if we read what is said about desire 
and aversion, in order that we may neither fail 
in our desires nor fall into that which we try to 
avoid ; if we read what is said about duty in order 
that we may do nothing irrationally; we should 
not be vexed in being hindered as to our readings, 
but we should be satisfied with doing the acts. 
Then we should be reckoning not what so far we 
have been accustomed to reckon, Today I have 
read so many verses; but we should say, Today 
I have employed my action as it is taught by the 
philosophers; I have exercised my patience, my 
abstinence, my co-operation with others. And 
so we should thank God for what we ought to 
thank Him. 1 



1 D. IV. iv. Long. 

CHAPTER V 

FOR USE IN EMERGENCY 

WE should have all our principles ready to 
make use of on every occasion. At din- 
ner, such as relate to dinner ; in the bath, such as 



LEARNING AND DOING 87 

relate to the bath; and in the bed, such as relate 
to the bed. Again, in a fever, we should have 
such principles ready as relate to a fever; and 
not, as soon as we are taken ill, to lose and forget 
all. We should retain these, so as to apply them 
to our use ; and not merely to repeat them aloud. 1 

For what is philosophizing? Is it not a prep- 
aration against events which may happen? 
What, then, should a man say on the occasion of 
each painful thing? Thus he should speak: It 
was for this that I exercised myself, for this I 
disciplined myself. Then do you show yourself 
weak when the time for action comes? Now is 
the time, let us say, for the fever. Let it be 
borne well. Now is the time for thirst, bear it 
well; now is the time for hunger, bear it well. 
Is it not in your power? who shall hinder you? 
The physician will hinder you from drinking ; but 
he cannot prevent you from bearing thirst well: 
and he will hinder you from eating; but he can- 
not prevent you from bearing hunger well. 

But, you say, I cannot attend to my philosophi- 
cal studies. And for what purpose do you fol- 
low them? Is it not that you may be happy, 
that you may be constant, is it not that you may 
be in a state conformable to nature and live so? 
What hinders you when you have a fever from 
having your ruling faculty conformable to na- 
ture? Here is the proof of the thing, here is 
the test of the philosopher. For this also is a 
part of life, like walking, like sailing, like jour- 
neying by land, so also is fever. Do you read 



88 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

when you are walking ? No. Nor do you when 
you have a fever. But if you walk about well, 
you have all that belongs to a man who walks. 
If you bear a fever well, you have all that belongs 
to a man in a fever. And what is it to bear a 
fever well? Not to blame God or man; not to 
be afflicted at that which happens, to await death 
well and nobly. He who has a fever has an 
opportunity of doing this: and if he does these 
things, he has what belongs to him. 2 

We ought to have these rules in readiness, and 
to do nothing without them; and we ought to 
keep the soul directed to this mark. 3 

iD. III. x. Carter. *D. IV. xii. Long. 

2 D. III. x. Long. 



CHAPTER VI 

THE CITADEL OF THE MIND 

DO you look to others, and hope for nothing 
from yourself? Ought you not to demon- 
strate those things which make men happy, which 
make things go on for them in the way they wish, 
and why we ought to blame no man, accuse no 
man, and acquiesce in the administration of the 
universe? If you choose to have these things, 
you will have them everywhere, and you will live 
in full confidence. Confiding in what? In that 
alone in which a man can confide, in that which 
is secure, in that which is not subject to hindrance, 



LEARNING AND DOING 89 

in that which cannot be taken away, that is, in 
your own will. Relying on what? Not on rep- 
utation nor on wealth, but on your own strength, 
that is, on your opinions about the things which 
are in your power and those which are not. For 
these are the only things which make men free, 
which raise the head of those who are depressed, 
which make them look with steady eyes on the 
rich and on tyrants. 1 

In this way those who occupy a strong city 
mock the besiegers, and say : What trouble these 
men are now taking for nothing! our wall is se- 
cure, we have food for a very long time, and all 
other resources. These are the things which 
make a city strong and impregnable ; but nothing 
else than his opinions makes a man's soul impreg- 
nable. For what wall is so strong, or what body 
is so hard, or what possession is so safe, or what 
honor so free from assault? All other things 
everywhere are perishable, easily taken by as- 
sault, and if any man in any way is attached to 
them, he must be disturbed, expect what is bad, 
he must fear, lament, find his desires disappointed, 
and fall into things which he would avoid. And 
do we not remember that no man either hurts an- 
other or does good to another, but that a man's 
opinion about each thing is that which hurts him, 
and is that which overturns him? Why, then, 
do we not choose to make secure the only means 
of safety which are offered to us, and withdraw 
ourselves from that which is perishable and ser- 
vile, and labor at the things which are imper- 



90 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 



ishable and by nature free? For this power is 
given by God to every man. 2 

1 D. III. xxvi. Long. 2 £>. IV. v. Long. 



CHAPTER VII 

THE POWER OF REASON 

WHEN some person asked Epictetus how it 
happened that since reason has been more 
cultivated by the men of the present age, the prog- 
ress in former times was greater, he answered: 
Do not mix things which are different, and do 
not expect, when you are laboring at one thing, 
to make progress in another. But see if any man 
among us when he is intent upon this, the keeping 
himself in a state conformable to nature and living 
so always, does not make progress. For you will 
not find such a man. 1 

For what is more reasonable than for those 
who have labored about anything to have more in 
that thing in which they have labored? See if 
they have more than you in that about which 
you have labored, and which they neglect. But if 
they exercise power, and you do not, will you 
not choose to tell yourself the truth, that you 
do nothing for the sake of this, and that they 
do all? 

But, you say, since I care about right opin- 
ions, it is more reasonable for me to have power. 
Yes, power in the matter about which you do 



LEARNING AND DOING 91 

care, namely, in opinions. The case is just the 
same as if, because you have right opinions, you 
thought that in using the bow you should hit the 
mark better than an archer. But now you say 
that you are occupied with other things, that you 
are looking after other things; but the many say 
this truly, that one act has no community with 
another. 

But do you, if indeed you have cared about 
nothing except the proper use of appearances, as 
soon as you have risen in the morning, reflect: 
What do I want in order to be free from passion, 
and free from perturbation? What am I? Am 
I a poor body, a piece of property? I am neither 
of these. But what am I ? I am a rational crea- 
ture. What, then, is required of me? Reflect 
on your acts: Where have I omitted the things 
which conduce to happiness ? What have I done 
which is either unfriendly or unsocial ? what have 
I not done as to these things which I ought to 
have done ? 2 Thus you will know what power 
reason has. 3 



1 D. III. vi. Long. 3D. n. xxi. Long. 

2 D. IV. vi. Long. 



CHAPTER VIII 

THE ROD OF HERMES 

IS there any advantage, you ask, to be gained 
from men? From all, even from a reviler. 
What advantage doth a wrestler gain from him 



92 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

with whom he exercises himself before the com- 
bat? The greatest. Just in the same manner 
I exercise myself with this man. He exercises 
me in patience, in gentleness, in meekness. Is my 
neighbor a bad one? He is so to himself; but a 
good one to me. He exercises my good temper, 
my moderation. 

This is the rod of Hermes. Touch with it 
whatever you please, the saying is, and it will 
become gold. Not so; but, Bring whatever you 
please, and I will turn it into good. Bring sick- 
ness, death, want, reproach. All these, by the 
rod of Hermes, shall turn to advantage. 

What will you make of death? What but an 
ornament to you ; what but a means of your show- 
ing, by action, what the man is who knows and 
follows the will of nature ? What will you make 
of sickness? I will show its nature. I will make 
a good figure in it ; I will be composed and happy. 
I will not flatter my physician. I will not wish 
to die. What need you ask further? Whatever 
you give me, I will make it happy, fortunate, 
respectable, and eligible. 1 For whichever of 
these things happens, it is in my power to derive 
advantage from it. 2 

iD. III. xx. Carter. 2 M. XVIII. Carter. 



LEARNING AND DOING 93 



CHAPTER IX 

THE CHAMPION 

DIFFICULTIES are the things that show 
what men are. For the future, on any 
difficulty, remember that God, like a master of 
exercise, has engaged you with a rough antag- 
onist. For what end? That you may be a con- 
queror, like one in the Olympic games. 1 He says 
to you, Come now to the combat. Show us what 
you have learned, how you have wrestled. How 
long would you exercise by yourself? It is now 
the time to show whether you are of the number 
of those champions who merit victory, or of those 
who go about the world, conquered in all the 
games. 2 For no man, in my opinion, has a more 
advantageous difficulty on his hands than you 
have, provided you will but use it as an athletic 
champion does his antagonist. 1 

Then I run over every circumstance of an ath- 
letic champion. He has been victorious in the 
first encounter: what will he do in the second? 
What if the heat should be excessive? What if 
he were to appear at Olympia? So I say in this 
case. What if you throw money in his way? 
He will despise it. What if he be tried by popu- 
lar fame, calumny, praise, death? He is able to 
overcome them all. This is my unconquerable 
athletic champion. 3 

1 D. I. xxiv. Carter. 8 D. I. xviii. Carter. 

2 D. IV. iv. Carter. 



94 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 
CHAPTER X 

THE DISCIPLINE OF THE SENSES 

WHEN thou hast received the appearance 
of some pleasure, then, as in other things, 
guard thyself lest thou be carried away by it. De- 
lay with thyself a little, and let the thing await 
thee for a while. Then bethink thee of the two 
periods of time, one when thou shalt be enjoy- 
ing the pleasure, the other, when, having en- 
joyed it, thou shalt afterwards repent of it and 
reproach thyself. And set on the other side how 
thou shalt rejoice and commend thyself if thou 
abstain. 

But if it seem reasonable to thee to do the 
thing, beware lest thou have been conquered by 
the flattery and the sweetness and the allurement 
of it. But set on the other side how much better 
were the consciousness of having won that vic- 
tory. 1 

By opposing these remedies thou shalt conquer 
the appearance, nor be led captive by it. But 
at the outset, be not swept away by the vehemence 
of it; but say, Await me a little while, thou Ap- 
pearance ; let me see what thou art, and what thou 
hast to do; let me approve thee. And then per- 
mit it not to lead thee forward, and to picture 
to thee what would follow; else it shall take pos- 
session of thee, and carry thee whithersoever it 
will. But rather bring in against it some other 



LEARNING AND DOING 95 

fair and noble appearance, and therewithal cast 
out this vile one. 2 

With respect to this kind of thing chiefly a 
man should exercise himself, and to this end we 
should direct all our efforts. 3 For when dealing 
with these subjects a man must guard himself 
from delusion, so that not even in dreams may 
any appearance that approacheth us pass untested. 4 
If we practised this, and exercised ourselves in it 
daily from morning to night, something indeed 
would be done. 3 



1 M. XXXIV. Rolleston. » D. III. iii. Long. 
2 D. II. xviii. Rolleston. 4 D. III. ii. Rolleston. 



CHAPTER XI 

USE AND DISUSE 

EVERY skill and faculty is maintained and 
increased by the corresponding acts ; as, the 
faculty of walking by walking. Thus, if thou 
hast lain down for ten days, then rise up and en- 
deavor to walk a good distance, and thou shalt 
see how thy legs are enfeebled. In general, then, 
if thou wouldst make thyself skilled in anything, 
then do it; and if thou wouldst refrain from 
anything, then do it not, but use thyself to do 
rather some other thing instead of it. 

And thus it is in spiritual things also. When 
thou art wrathful, know that not this single evil 
hath happened to thee, but that thou hast increased 



96 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

the aptness to it, and, as it were, poured oil upon 
the fire. For it is impossible but that aptitudes 
and faculties should spring up where they were 
not before, or spread and grow mightier, by the 
corresponding acts. 

Wouldst thou, then, be no longer of a wrathful 
temper? Then do not nourish the aptness to it, 
give it nothing that will increase it, be tranquil 
from the outset, and number the days when thou 
hast not been wrathful. I have not been wrath- 
ful now for one, now for two, now for three 
days; but if thou hast saved thirty days, then 
sacrifice to God in thanksgiving. 1 For the habit 
at first begins to be weakened, and then is com- 
pletely destroyed. Over such a victory as this a 
man may justly be proud. 2 

1 D. II. xviii. Rolleston. 2 D. II. xviii. Long. 



CHAPTER XII 

THE BLADE AND THE EAR 

NOTHING great, said Epictetus, is produced 
suddenly, since not even the grape or the 
fig is. If you say to me now that you want a 
fig, I will answer to you that it requires time. 1 
Fruit grows thus: the seed must be buried for 
some time, hid, grow slowly in order that it may 
come to perfection. Let the root grow, then 
acquire the first joint, then the second, and then 
the third ; in this way then the fruit will naturally 



LEARNING AND DOING 97 

force itself out. 2 Is then the fruit of a fig-tree 
not perfected suddenly and in an hour, and would 
you possess the fruit of a man's mind in so short 
a time and so easily ? * 

But what does Socrates say? As one man, he 
says, is pleased with improving his land, another 
with improving his horse, so I am daily pleased in 
observing that I am growing better. Who, then, 
among you has this purpose ? 3 

That which is great and superior perhaps be- 
longs to Socrates and such as are like him. Why 
then, if we are naturally such, are not a very great 
number of us like him? Is it true, then, that all 
horses become swift, that all dogs are skilled in 
tracking footprints? What then, since I am 
naturally dull, shall I for this reason take no 
pains? I hope not. Epictetus is not superior to 
Socrates; but if he is not inferior, this is enough 
for me. I shall never be a Milo, and yet I do 
not neglect my body ; nor shall I be a Crcesus, and 
yet I do not neglect my property ; nor, in a word, 
do we neglect looking after anything because we 
despair of reaching the highest degree. 4 For if 
virtue promises good fortune and tranquillity 
and happiness, certainly also the progress towards 
virtue is progress towards each of these things. 
For it is always true that to whatever point the 
perfecting of anything leads us, progress is an 
approach towards this point. 5 

*D. I. xv. Long. 4 D. I. ii. Long. 

2 D. IV. viii. Long. 5 D. I. iv. Long. 

* D. III. v. Long. 



98 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 



CHAPTER XIII 

THE ACCEPTABLE TIME 

WHEN you let go your attention for a little 
while, do not fancy that you may recover 
it whenever you please; but remember this, that 
by reason of the fault of to-day your affairs 
must necessarily be in a worse condition for the 
future. First, and what is the saddest thing of 
all, a habit arises of not attending; and then a 
habit of deferring the attention, and always driv- 
ing off from time to time, and procrastinating the 
prosperous life, propriety of behavior, and the 
thinking and acting conformably to nature. Do 
you not perceive that when you have let your 
mind loose, it is no longer in your power to call 
it back ? x And you will at last be reduced to so 
weak and wretched a condition, that you will not 
so much as know when you do amiss; but will 
even begin to make defences for your behavior, 
and thus verify the saying of Hesiod: 

With constant ills the dilatory strive. 2 

To what, then, am I to attend ? To those uni- 
versal maxims which you must always have at 
hand, and not sleep, or get up, or drink, or eat, 
or converse without them. These maxims we 
must have ready, and do nothing without them; 
but direct the soul to this mark. 1 

What then ? is it possible to be free from faults ? 



LEARNING AND DOING 99 

It is not possible; but this is possible, to direct 
your efforts incessantly to being faultless. For 
we must be content if by never remitting this at- 
tention we shall escape at least a few errors. But 
now when you have said, To-morrow I will begin 
to attend, you must be told that you are saying 
this, To-day I will be shameless, I will be pas- 
sionate and envious. See how many evils you 
are permitting yourself to do! If it is good to 
use attention to-morrow, how much better it is 
to do so to-day! If to-morrow it is to your 
interest to attend, how much more is it to-day, 
that you may be able to do so to-morrow also, 
and may not defer it again to the third day. 3 

1 D. IV. xii. Carter. 3 D. IV. xii. Long. 

2 D. II. xviii. Carter. 



CHAPTER XIV 

THE WHOLE DUTY OF MAN 

WHAT does it signify to me, says Epictetus, 
whether the universe is composed of 
atoms or uncompounded substances, or of fire and 
earth ? Is it not sufficient to know the essence of 
good and evil, and the proper bounds of the 
desires and aversions; and, besides those, of the 
active powers; and by making use of these as s$ 
many certain rules, to order the conduct of life, 
and bid these things which are above us farewell? 
For they are, perhaps, incomprehensible to human 



ioo THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

understanding; but if one should suppose them 
ever so comprehensible, still what is the benefit 
of them when comprehended? And must it not 
be said that he gives himself trouble to no pur- 
pose, who allots these things as necessary to the 
character of a philosopher? 1 

Favorinus tells us how Epictetus would also 
say that there were two faults far graver and 
fouler than any others — inability to bear, and 
inability to forbear, when we neither patiently 
bear the blows that must be borne, nor abstain 
from the things and the pleasures we ought to 
abstain from. So, he went on, if a man will 
only have at heart these two words, Bear and 
Forbear, and heed them carefully by ruling and 
watching over himself, he will for the most part 
fall into no sin, and his life will be tranquil and 
serene. 2 



i F. CLXXV. Carter. 2 p. CLXXIX. Crossley. 

CHAPTER XV 

THE TRUE STOIC 

SHOW me a Stoic, if you can. You can show 
an endless number who utter small argu- 
ments of the Stoics. For do the same persons 
repeat the Epicurean opinions any worse? And 
the Peripatetic, do they not handle them with 
equal accuracy ? 1 Who then is a Stoic ? — in 
the sense that we call that a statue of Phidias 



LEARNING AND DOING 101 

which is modelled after that master's art? Show 
me a man in this sense modelled after the doc- 
trines that are ever upon his lips. Show me a 
man that is sick — and happy; in danger — and 
happy ; on his death-bed — and happy ; an exile 

— and happy ; in evil report — and happy ! Nay, 
if you cannot show me one fully modelled, let 
me at least see one in whom the process is at work 

— one whose bent is in that direction. Show 
me a human soul, desiring to be of one mind with 
God, no more to lay blame on God or man, to 
suffer nothing to disappoint, nothing to cross him, 
to yield neither to anger, envy, nor jealousy ; one 
that while still imprisoned in this dead body makes 
fellowship with God his aim. 2 

Give me one who stands forth a champion 
of this cause, and says, All else I renounce, con- 
tent if I am but able to pass my life free from 
hindrance and trouble; to raise my head aloft 
and face all things as a free man; to look up to 
heaven as a friend of God, fearing nothing that 
may come to pass! What I desire is to be free 
from passion and from perturbation ; as one who 
grudges no pains in the pursuit of piety and phil- 
osophy, what I desire is to know my duty to the 
Gods, my duty to my parents, to my brothers, 
to my country, to strangers. Point out such a 
one to me, that I may say, Enter thou into posses- 
sion of that which is thine own. For thy lot is 
to adorn Philosophy. 3 

1 D. II. xix. Long. s D. II. xvii. Crossley. 

2 D. II. xix. Crossley. 



BOOK FIVE 
THE PHILOSOPHER IN THE WORLD 



THE PHILOSOPHER IN THE WORLD 
t CHAPTER I 

DUTIES AND THEIR MEASUREMENT 

DUTIES are universally measured by rela- 
tions. Therefore you will find the corre- 
sponding duties, if you accustom yourself to con- 
template the several relations. 1 

Remember that you are a son. What does 
this character promise? To consider that every- 
thing which is the son's belongs to the father, to 
obey him in all things, never to blame him to an- 
other, nor to say or to do anything which does 
him injury, to yield to him in all things and give 
way, co-operating with him as far as you can. 2 
But suppose that he is a bad father. Were you 
then by nature made akin to a good father ? No ; 
but to a father. Maintain, then, your own posi- 
tion towards him, and do not examine what he is 
doing, but what you must do that your will shall 
be conformable to nature. 3 

After this, know that you are a brother also, 
and that to this character it is due to make con- 
cessions; to be easily persuaded, never to claim 
in opposition to him any of the things which are 
independent of the will, but readily to give them 

105 



106 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

up that you may have the larger share in what 
is dependent on the will. 2 Your brother may 
have a greater part of the estate in land ; will he, 
then, have a greater share of modesty, of fidelity, 
of brotherly affection? 4 

Next to this, if you are a senator of any state, 
if you are a youth, if you are an old man, re- 
member this ; for each of such names, if it comes 
to be examined, marks out the proper duties. 2 
We must remember, therefore, who we are, and 
what name we bear, and endeavor to direct the 
several offices of life to the rightful demands of 
its several relations; and then, in complying, to 
preserve our own character. 5 

i M. XXX. Carter. 4 D. III. iii. Long. 

2 D. II. x. Long. s D. IV. xii. Carter. 

3M. XXX. Long. 



CHAPTER II 

THE WORLD CITIZEN 

THOU art a citizen of the world. What, 
then, doth the character of a citizen prom- 
ise? To hold nothing as profitable to himself; 
to deliberate about nothing as if he were detached 
from the community, but to act as the hand or 
foot would do, if they had reason and understood 
the constitution of nature. For they would never 
put themselves in motion nor desire anything 
otherwise than with reference to the whole. 1 
For knowest thou not, that as the foot alone 



PHILOSOPHER IN THE WORLD 107 

is not a foot, so thou alone art not a man? And 
we are not solitary and disunited from others. 
For to the foot I shall say that it is according 
to Nature that it be clean; but if thou take it as 
a foot, and not as a solitary thing, it shall beseem 
it to go into the mud, and to tread on thorns, and 
perchance to be cut off, for the sake of the whole ; 
otherwise it is no longer a foot. 

And some such thing we should suppose about 
ourselves also. What art thou ? A man. Look 
at thyself as a solitary creature, and it is accord- 
ing to Nature to live to old age, to grow rich, to 
keep good health. But if thou look at thyself as 
a man, and as a part of a certain Whole, it may 
become thee now to have sickness, now to sail 
the seas and run into peril, now to suffer need, 
and perchance to die before thy time. For in 
the bounds of such a universe, in such a throng of 
inhabitants, it cannot but be that different things 
of this nature should fall on different persons. 2 

Wherefore the wise and good man, having in- 
vestigated all these things, will submit his own 
mind to Him that governeth the Whole, even as 
good citizens submit to the laws of their State. 3 

1 D. II. x. Long. a D. I. xii. Rolleston. 

2 D. II. v. Rolleston. 



L 



108 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 
CHAPTER III 

THE SACRED VOCATION OF TEACHING 

SUCH a one hath a school, you say, and why 
should not I have one? These things are 
not effected in a careless and fortuitous manner. 
But there must be age and a method of life and 
a guiding God. Is it not so? No one quits the 
port or sets sail till he hath sacrificed to the Gods, 
and implored their assistance; nor do men sow 
without first invoking Ceres. And shall anyone 
who hath undertaken so great a work as teaching 
undertake it safely without the Gods ? And shall 
they who apply to such a one apply to him with 
success ? 

What are you doing else, man, but divulging 
the mysteries? And you say, There is a temple 
at Eleusis, and here is one too. There is a priest, 
and I will make a priest here; there is a herald, 
and I will appoint a herald too; there is a torch- 
bearer, and I will have a torch-bearer : the words 
said, and the things done shall be the same. Most 
impious man, is there no difference? Are these 
things of use out of place and out of time? A 
man should come with sacrifices and prayers, pre- 
viously purified, and his mind affected with a 
sense that he is approaching to sacred and ancient 
rites. Thus the mysteries become useful; thus 
we come to have an idea that all these things 
were appointed by the ancients for the instruction 



PHILOSOPHER IN THE WORLD 109 

and correction of life. But you divulge and pub- 
lish them, without regard to time and place, with- 
out sacrifices, without purity. 

These things are to be approached in another 
manner. It is a great, it is a mystical affair ; not 
given by chance, or to everyone indifferently. 
Nay, mere wisdom, perhaps, is not a sufficient 
qualification for the care of youth. There ought 
to be likewise a certain readiness and aptitude for 
this, and, indeed, a particular constitution of 
body ; and above all a counsel from God to under- 
take this office, as He counselled Socrates to un- 
dertake the office of confutation; Diogenes, that 
of authoritative reproof; Zeno, that of dogmati- 
cal instruction. 

But you set up for a physician, provided with 
nothing but medicines, and without knowing, or 
having studied, where or how they are to be ap- 
plied. Such a one had medicines for the eyes, 
you say, and I have the same. Have you, then, 
a faculty too of making use of them? Do you 
at all know when and how and to whom they will 
be of service? Why, then, do you act at hazard? 
Why are you careless in things of the greatest im- 
portance ? Why do you attempt a matter unsuit- 
able to you ? Leave it to those who can perform 
it, and do it honor. Do not you, too, bring a 
scandal upon philosophy by your means, nor be 
one of those who cause the thing itself to be ca- 
lumniated. 1 

Such is the affair about which you are delib- 
erating. Therefore, if you please, for heaven's 



no THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

sake defer it; and first consider how you are 
prepared for it. But if you imagine it to be what 
it really is, and do not think yourself unworthy of 
it, consider how great a thing you undertake. 2 

1 D. III. xxi. Carter. 2 D. III. xxii. Carter. 



CHAPTER IV 

AFFECTION, COUNTERFEIT AND REAL 

WHEN he was visited by one of the mag- 
istrates, Epictetus inquired of him about 
several particulars, and asked if he had a wife 
and children. The man replied that he had; and 
Epictetus inquired further how he felt under the 
circumstances. Miserable, the man said. Then 
Epictetus asked, In what respect ? for men do not 
marry and rear children in order to be wretched, 
but rather to be happy. But I, the man replied, 
am so wretched about my children that lately, 
when my little daughter was sick and was sup- 
posed to be in danger, that I could not endure to 
stay with her, but I left home until a person sent 
me news that she had recovered. Well then, said 
Epictetus, do you think that you acted right? I 
acted naturally, the man replied. 

And Epictetus said : Does affection to those of 
your family appear to you to be according to na- 
ture? Is then that which is consistent with rea- 
son in contradiction with affection? Well, then, 
to leave your sick child and to go away is not rea- 



PHILOSOPHER IN THE WORLD in 

sonable, and I suppose that you will not say that 
it is ; but it remains for us to inquire if it is con- 
sistent with affection. Did you, then, since you 
had an affectionate disposition to your child, do 
right when you ran off and left her? And has 
the mother no affection for the child? Ought, 
then, the mother also to have left her? And the 
nurse, does she not love her? Ought, then, she 
also to have left her? And the teacher, does he 
not love her? Ought, then, he also to have de- 
serted her? And so should the child have been 
left alone and without help on account of the 
great affection of the parents and of those about 
her? Or should she have died in the hands of 
those who neither loved her nor cared for her? 
Now this is unfair and unreasonable, not to allow 
those who have equal affection with yourself to 
do what you think to be proper for yourself to 
do because you have affection. If you were sick, 
would you wish your relations to be so affection- 
ate as to leave you alone and desterted? And 
would you wish to be so loved by your own that 
through their excessive affection you would al- 
ways be left alone in sickness? Or would you 
rather pray, if it were possible, to be loved by 
your enemies — and deserted by them? But if 
this is so, it results that your behavior was not 
at all an affectionate act. 1 Even a sheep will not 
desert its young, nor a wolf; and shall a man? 2 

1 D. I. xi. Long. 2 D. I. xxiii. Rolleston. 



H2 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 
CHAPTER V 

SOCIETY IN SOLITUDE 

HE who is alone is not therefore solitary; 
even as he who is in a great company is 
not therefore not solitary. When, therefore, we 
have lost a brother or a son or a friend on whom 
we were wont to rest, we say that we are left 
solitary, and oftentimes we say it in Rome, with 
such a crowd meeting us and so many dwelling 
about us. For the solitary man, in his concep- 
tion, meaneth to be thought helpless, and laid open 
to those who wish to harm him. Therefore 
when we are on a journey we then, above all, 
say that we are solitary when we are fallen 
among thieves; for that which taketh away soli- 
tude is not the sight of a man, but of a faithful 
and pious and serviceable man. 

For if to be solitary it sufficeth to be alone, 
then say that Zeus is solitary. And so some say. 
For they comprehend not the life of a man who is 
alone, setting out from a certain natural prin- 
ciple, that we are by nature social, and inclined 
to love each other, and pleased to be in the com- 
pany of other men. But none the less is it need- 
ful that one find the means to this also, to be able 
to suffice to himself, and to be his own com- 
panion. 

For as Zeus is His own companion, and is 
content with Himself, and considereth His own 



PHILOSOPHER IN THE WORLD 113 

government, what it is, and is occupied in designs 
worthy of Himself; thus should we be able to 
converse with ourselves, and feel no need of 
others, nor want means to pass the time; but to 
observe the divine government, and the relation 
of ourselves with other things; to consider how 
we stood formerly towards the events that befall 
us, and how we stand now ; what things they are 
that still afflict us ; how these, too, may be healed, 
how removed; and if aught should need perfect- 
ing, to perfect it according to the reason of the 
case. 

Whoso hath these things to think on, and seeth 
the sun and the moon and the stars, and rejoiceth 
in the earth and the sea, he is no more solitary 
than he is helpless. 1 

1 D. III. xiii. Rolleston. 



CHAPTER VI 

AS IT APPEARS TO OTHERS 

WHOEVER clearly remembers this, that to 
man the measure of every act is his opin- 
ion whether the thing appears good or bad — 
whoever remembers this will not be angry with 
any man, will not be vexed at any man, will not 
revile or blame any man, nor hate nor quarrel with 
any man. 1 

When therefore one may do you an injury, or 
speak ill of you-, remember that he either does 



ii4 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

it or speaks it believing that it is right and meet 
for him to do so. It is not possible, then, that 
he can follow the thing that appears to you, but 
the thing that appears to him. Wherefore, if 
it appear evil to him, it is he that is injured, being 
deceived. Setting out, then, from these opinions, 
you will bear a gentle mind towards any man who 
may revile you. For say on each occasion, So it 
appeared to him. 2 

What need, then, have I to be troubled? No 
one is the master either to procure me any good 
or to involve me in any evil ; but I alone have the 
disposal of myself with regard to these things. I 
have not pleased such a one. Is he my concern, 
then? Is he my conscience? Why, then, do I 
trouble myself any further? But, you say, he is 
thought to be of some consequence. Let him 
look to that, and them who think him so. But I 
have One whom I must please, to whom I must 
submit, whom I must obey. He hath intrusted 
me with myself, and made my choice subject to 
myself alone, having given me rules for the right 
use of it. If I follow the proper rules in syl- 
logisms, I do not regard nor care for anyone who 
says anything contrary to them. Why, then, am 
I vexed at being censured in matters of greater 
consequence ? 3 



1 D. I. xxviii. Long. 3 D. IV. xii. Carter. 

2 M. XLII. Rolleston. 



PHILOSOPHER IN THE WORLD 115 
CHAPTER VII 

SELF-PERSUASION 

1AM grieved, a man says, at being pitied ; and 
these persons do not pity me for the things 
for which it would be proper to pity me, I mean 
for my faults, but they pity me for my poverty, 
for not possessing honorable offices, for diseases 
and deaths, and other such things. 

Are you, then, prepared to convince the many 
that not one of these things is an evil, but that 
it is possible for a man who is poor and has no 
office and enjoys no honor to be happy? But it 
is impracticable to attempt the very thing which 
Zeus has not been able to do, namely, to convince 
all men what things are good and what are bad. 
Is this power given to you? This only is given 
to you, to convince yourself; and you have not 
convinced yourself. 

Then I ask you, Do you attempt to persuade 
other men? and who has lived so long with you 
as you with yourself? and who has so much 
power of convincing you as you have of con- 
vincing yourself? and who is better disposed and 
nearer to you than you are to yourself? How, 
then, have you not convinced yourself in order 
to learn? Is this what you have been earnest 
about doing, to learn to be free from grief and 
free from disturbance, and not to be abject, and 
to be free ? Have you not heard, then, that there 



n6 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

is only one way which leads to this end, to dis- 
miss the things which do not depend on the will, 
to withdraw from them, and to admit that they 
belong to others? For another man to have an 
opinion about you, of what kind is it? A thing 
independent of the will. Then it is nothing to 
you. When, then, you are still vexed at this and 
disturbed, do you think that you are convinced 
about good and evil ? 

Then are you surprised if they pity you, and 
are you vexed? But they are not vexed if you 
pity them. Why? Because they are convinced 
that they have that which is good, and you are 
not convinced. For this reason you are not sat- 
isfied with your own, but you desire that which 
they have : but they are satisfied with their own, 
and do not desire what you have: since if you 
were really convinced that with respect to what 
is good it is you who are the possessor of it and 
that they have missed it, you would not even 
have thought of what they say about you. 

Will you not, then, letting others alone, be to 
yourself both scholar and teacher? Reason thus 
with yourself: The rest of mankind will look 
after this, whether it is to their interest to be 
and to pass their lives in a state contrary to na- 
ture; but to me no man is nearer than myself. 
I am poor, but I have a right opinion about pov- 
erty. Why, then, do I care if they pity me for 
my poverty ? I am not in power, but others are ; 
and I have the opinion which I ought to have 
about having and not having power. Let them 



PHILOSOPHER IN THE WORLD 117 

look to it who pity me. Do I now care about 
what others will say of me, whether I shall ap- 
pear to them worth notice, whether I shall ap- 
pear happy ? * 

iD. IV. vi. Long. 



CHAPTER VIII 

THE ROYAL ROAD 

WHEN a man was consulting him how he 
should persuade his brother to cease be- 
ing angry with him, Epictetus replied : 

Philosophy does not propose to procure for a 
man any external thing. If it did, philosophy 
would be allowing something which is not within 
its province. For as the carpenter's material is 
wood, so the matter of the art of living is each 
man's life. What then, do you say, is my 
brother's? That belongs to his own art; but 
with respect to yours, it is one of the external 
things, like a piece of land. But philosophy 
promises none of these. In every circumstance, 
she says, I will maintain the governing part con- 
formable to nature. Whose governing part? 
His in whom I am, she says. 1 

But my brother ought not to have treated me 
so. Very true; but he must see to that. How- 
ever he treats you, you are to act right with re- 
gard to him, for the one is your concern, the 
other is not. 2 



n8 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

Then the man, who was consulting him, said, 
I seek to know this, How, even if my brother is 
not reconciled to me, shall I maintain myself in 
a state conformable to nature? 1 Why shall I 
direct thee? hath not God directed thee? And 
what direction, what word of command didst 
thou receive from Him when thou earnest thence ? 
Hold fast everything which is thine own — covet 
not that which is alien to thee. And faithful- 
ness is thine, and reverence is thine: who, then, 
can rob thee of these things ? who can hinder thee 
to use them ? With such counsels and commands 
from Zeus, what wilt thou still from me? Am 
I greater than He? am I more worthy of thy 
faith? But if thou hold to these things, of what 
others hast thou need ? Bring forward the things 
thou hast often heard, bring the things that thy- 
self hast spoken, bring what thou hast read, 
bring what thou hast pondered. 3 What then 
saith Antisthenes ? Hast thou not heard ? — 

It is a royal thing to do right 
And to be ill spoken of. 

What, then, hinders the same thing being done 
in this case also ? 4 



iD. I. xv. Long. 3 D. I. xxv. Rolleston. 

2 D. III. x. Carter. *D. IV. vi. Long. 



PHILOSOPHER IN THE WORLD 119 
CHAPTER IX 

THE TWO HANDLES 

EVERY matter hath two handles — by the 
one it may be carried ; by the other, not. If 
thy brother do thee wrong, take not this thing 
by the handle, He wrongs me; for that is the 
handle whereby it may not be carried. But take 
it rather by the handle, He is my brother, nour- 
ished with me ; and thou wilt take it by a handle 
whereby it may be carried. 1 

Wilt thou not bear with thine own brother, 
who hath God for his Father, as being a son from 
the same stock, and of the same high descent? 
Wilt thou set thyself up for a tyrant? Wilt thou 
not remember what thou art, and that these are 
by nature thy relations, thy brothers, that they 
are the offspring of God? 2 

1 M. XLIII. Rolleston. 2 d. I. xiii. Carter. 

CHAPTER X 

THE COMPASSIONATE SOUL 

WIY have we indignation with the multi- 
tude? They are robbers, one saith, and 
thieves. And what is it to be robbers and thieves ? 
It is to err concerning things good and evil. 
Should not, then, this robber, or this adulterer, 



120 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

be destroyed? By no means, but take it rather 
this way: This man who errs and is deceived 
concerning things of greatest moment, who is 
blinded, not in the vision which distinguished 
black and white, but in the judgment which dis- 
tinguished Good and Evil — should we not de- 
stroy him? And thus speaking, thou shalt know 
how inhuman is that which thou sayest, and how 
like as if thou saidst, Shall we not destroy this 
blind man, this deaf man? 

For if it is the greatest injury to be deprived 
of the greatest things, and the greatest thing in 
every man is a Will such as he ought to have, 
and one be deprived of this, why art thou still 
indignant with him ? Pity him rather, be not in- 
clined to offence and hatred. How hast thou 
suddenly become so wise ? * 

A guide, when he hath found one straying 
from the way, leads him into the proper road, 
and does not mock him or revile him, and then 
go away. And do thou show such a man the 
truth, and thou shalt see that he will follow. 
But so long as thou dost not show it, mock him 
not, but be sensible rather of thine own incapac- 
ity. 2 

Which of us will not admire Lycurgus, the 
Lacedaemonian? For having lost an eye at the 
hands of one of the citizens, and having received 
the young man from the people that he should 
punish him as he would, he refrained from this ; 
but having taught him and proved him to be a 
good man, he brought him into the theatre. And 



PHILOSOPHER IN THE WORLD 121 

when the Lacedaemonians marvelled, he said, I 
received this man from you insolent and violent; 
I give him back to you mild and civil. 3 

* D. I. xviii. Rolleston. » F. LXVII. Rolleston. 

2 D. II. xii. Rolleston. 



CHAPTER XI 

THE VALIANT SOUL 

BUT, you say, there are some things disagree- 
able and troublesome in life. And are 
there none at the Olympian games? Are you 
not scorched? Are you not pressed by a crowd? 
Are you not without comfortable means of bath- 
ing? Are you not wet when it rains? Have 
you not abundance of noise, clamor, and other 
disagreeable things? But I suppose that setting 
all these things off against the magnificence of 
the spectacle, you bear and endure. 

Well, then, have you not received faculties by 
which you will be able to bear all that happens 
in life? Have you not received greatness of 
soul ? Have you not received manliness ? Have 
you not received endurance? And why do I 
trouble myself about anything that can happen, 
if I possess greatness of soul? What shall dis- 
tract my mind or disturb me, or appear painful? 
Shall I not use the power for the purposes for 
which I received it, and shall I grieve and lament 
over what happens ? 



122 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

Having observed these things, look to the 
faculties which you have, and when you have 
looked at them, say: Bring now, O Zeus, any 
difficulty that Thou pleasest; for I have means 
given to me by Thee and powers for honoring 
myself through the things which happen. But 
you sit still, trembling for fear that some things 
will happen, and weeping, and lamenting, and 
groaning for what does happen : and then you 
blame the Gods. For what is the consequence of 
such meanness of spirit but impiety? And yet 
God has not only given us these faculties, by 
which we shall be able to bear everything that 
happens without being depressed or broken by it; 
but, like a good King and a true Father, He has 
put them entirely in our own power. 1 

Having these things free and your own, will 
you make no use of them, nor consider what you 
have received, nor from whom? but sit groaning 
and lamenting, some of you, blind to Him who 
gave them, and not acknowledging your Bene- 
factor; and others, basely turning yourselves to 
complaints and accusations of God? Yet I un- 
dertake to show you that you have qualifications 
and occasions for greatness of soul and a manly 
spirit. 2 

1 D. I. vi. Long. 2 D. I. vi. Carter. 



PHILOSOPHER IN THE WORLD 123 
CHAPTER XII 

THE PEACEABLE SOUL 

THE wise and good man never quarrels with 
any person. For he remembers well that 
no man has in his power another man's ruling 
principle. He wishes therefore for nothing else 
than that which is his own. And what is this? 
Not that this or that man may act according to 
nature; for that is a thing which belongs to an- 
other; but that while others are doing their own 
acts as they choose, he may nevertheless be in a 
condition conformable to nature. This is the ob- 
ject always set before him by the wise and good 
man. 

How, then is there left any place for quarrel- 
ling to a man who has this opinion? Is he sur- 
prised at anything which happens ? and does it ap- 
pear new to him ? Does he not expect that which 
comes from the bad to be worse and more grievous 
than what actually befalls him ? And does he not 
reckon as pure gain whatever they may do which 
falls short of extreme wickedness ? 

Such a person has reviled you. What then is 
given you to do in answer to this? When did 
he learn or in what school, that an act of in- 
justice is a great harm to him who does it? 
Since, then, he has not learned this and is not 
convinced of it, why shall he not follow that 
which seems to be for his own interest ? * But 



124 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

shall not I hurt him who has hurt me? Con- 
sider what hurt is, and remember what you have 
heard from the philosophers. For if the good 
consists in the will, and the evil also in the will, 
see if what you say is not this : Since that man 
has hurt himself by doing an unjust act to me, 
shall I not hurt myself by doing some unjust act 
to him? Why do we not imagine to ourselves 
something of this kind? 2 For if I think about 
it as I ought, how shall it then do me any dam- 
age? 3 

What then? would you have me to be de- 
spised? By whom? by those who know you? 
and how shall those who know you despise a man 
who is gentle and modest? Perhaps you mean 
by those who do not know you? What is that 
to you ? For no other artisan cares for the opin- 
ion of those who know not his art. Why, then, 
are you still disturbed? Why do you not come 
forth and proclaim that you are at peace with all 
men, whatever they may do? These opinions 
make love in the family, concord in the state, 
peace among nations, and gratitude to God. 1 

i D. IV. v. Long. s D. III. xx. Long. 

a D. II. x. Long. 



PHILOSOPHER IN THE WORLD 125 
CHAPTER XIII 

THE CONTENTED SOUL 

BUT, thou sayest, when shall I see Athens and 
the Acropolis again ? Wretched man ! doth 
not that satisfy thee which thou seest every day ? 
Hast thou aught better or greater to see than the 
sun, the moon, the stars, the common earth, the 
sea? But if withal thou mark the way of Him 
that governeth the whole, and bear Him about 
with thee, wilt thou still long for cut stones and a 
fine rock? What, then, wert thou doing in the 
school? What didst thou hear, what didst thou 
learn? Why didst thou write thyself down a 
philosopher, when thou mightest have written the 
truth, as thus: I made certain beginnings, and 
read Chrysippus, but did not so much as enter the 
door of a philosopher? 

For how shouldst thou have aught in common 
with Socrates or with Diogenes? Dost thou 
think that these men lamented or were indignant 
because they could not dwell in Athens or in 
Corinth, but, as it might chance, in Susa or Ec- 
batana ? * Thinkest thou that Diogenes would 
have flattered the pirates that they might sell him 
to some Athenian, that sometime he might see 
that beautiful Piraeus, and the Long Walls, and 
the Acropolis? Art thou unwilling to live in 
Rome and desirest to live in Greece? And when 
thou must die, wilt thou then also fill us with thy 



126 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

lamentations because thou wilt not see Athens 
nor walk about in the Lyceum? 2 What harm 
hath philosophy done thee, that thou shouldst 
give a proof by thine actions that philosophy is 
of no value? 

If thou art at Gyaros, do not represent to thy- 
self the manner of living at Rome; how many 
pleasures thou used to find there, and how many 
would attend thy return; but be thou intent on 
this point, how he who liveth at Gyaros may live 
with spirit and comfort at Gyaros. And if thou 
art at Rome, do not represent to thyself the man- 
ner of living at Athens, but consider only how 
thou oughtest to live where thou art. 3 Athens 
is a good place ; but happiness is much better. 4 

1 D. II. xvi. Rolleston. 3 D. III. xxiv. Carter. 

2 D. III. xxiv. Long. ±D. IV. iv. Long. 



CHAPTER XIV 

THE STOIC AND THE STATE 

LET no wise man estrange himself from the 
government of the state; for it is both im- 
pious to withdraw from being useful to those 
that need it, and cowardly to give way to the 
worthless. For it is foolish to choose rather to 
be governed ill than to govern well. 1 

Let such thoughts never afflict thee as, I shall 
not dp mv part in serving my country. For what 



PHILOSOPHER IN THE WORLD 127 

is this service? Thy country shall not have por- 
ticos nor baths from thee, and what then? 
Neither hath she shoes from the smith, nor arms 
from the cobbler; but it is enough if every man 
fulfil his own task. And if thou hast made one 
other pious and faithful citizen for her, art thou, 
then, of no service? Wherefore, neither shalt 
thou be useless to thy country. What place, then, 
can I hold in the state? Whatever place thou 
canst, guarding still thy faith and piety. But if 
in wishing to serve her thou cast away these 
things, what wilt thou profit her then ? 2 

For thou wilt do the greatest services to the 
state, if thou shalt raise, not the roofs of the 
houses, but the souls of the citizens: for it is 
better that great souls should dwell in small 
houses than for mean slaves to lurk in great 
houses. 3 If therefore thou dost propose to adorn 
thy city by the dedication of monuments, first 
dedicate to thyself the noblest offering of gentle- 
ness, and justice, and beneficence. 4 

And not with the stones of Eubcea and 
Sparta let the structure of thy city walls be varie- 
gated; but let discipline and teaching penetrate 
with order the minds of citizens and statesmen. 
For with the thoughts of men are cities well 
established, not with wood and stone. 5 And even 
as the Spartan Lycurgus did not fence the city 
with walls, but fortified the inhabitants with vir- 
tue, and so preserved the city free forever; thus 
do thou confirm the dwellers in the city with good- 



128 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

will, and faith, and friendliness, and no harmful 
thing shall enter in; no, not if the whole army of 
evil were arrayed against it. 6 

iF. CXXXI. Carter. *F. LXXX. Long. 

2 M. XXIV. Rolleston. » p. LXXXII. Rolleston. 

3F. LXXXI. Long. «F. XLV. Rolleston. 



CHAPTER XV 

THE CHIEF END OF MAN 

THE great point in life is to learn what is 
the principal thing, and upon every occa- 
sion to follow that and to make it the chief ob- 
ject of our attention, and to consider other things 
as trifling in comparison with this. 1 The sub- 
stance of the hand is flesh, but the main things 
are the works of the hands. And thus in man, 
too, it is not meet to value the material, this 
flesh, but the main things. What are these ? To 
take part in public affairs, to marry, to fear God, 
to care for parents, and, in general, to pursue, 
to avoid, to desire, to dislike, as each of these 
things should be done, as Nature made us to do. 
And how made she us? To be free, generous, 
pious. And to these things let pleasure be sub- 
ject as a minister, a servant, and that she also 
may aid in works that are according to Nature. 2 
But what is done in the world? As if a man 
journeying to his own country should pass by an 
excellent inn, and the inn being agreeable to him, 
he should stay, and abide in it. Man, thou hast 



PHILOSOPHER IN THE WORLD 129 

forgotten thy purpose; thy journeying was not 
for this, but through this. But, thou sayest, this 
is pleasant. And how many other inns are pleas- 
ant, and how many meadows? yet merely for 
passing through. But thy business is this, to do, 
thyself, the duties of a citizen. For thou art not 
come into this world to choose out its pleasanter 
places, but to dwell in those where thou wast 
born, and whereof thou wast appointed to be a 
citizen. 

And so in some wise it is with this matter. 
Thy business is to make thyself fit to use the 
appearances that encounter thee according to Na- 
ture, not missing what thou pursuest, nor falling 
into what thou wouldst avoid, never failing of 
good fortune, free, unhindered, uncompelled, 
agreeing with the governance of Zeus, obedient 
unto the same, and well-pleased therein; blaming 
none, charging none, able of thine whole soul to 
utter those lines : 

Lead me, O Zeus, and Thou, Destiny ! s 



1 D. II. xxiii. Carter. 3 D. II. xxiii. Rolleston. 

2 D. III. vii. Rolleston. 



BOOK SIX 
REWARDS AND PENALTIES 



REWARDS AND PENALTIES 
CHAPTER I 

THE LAW DIVINE 

THERE are certain penalties fixed as by law 
for those who disobey the divine adminis- 
tration. 1 And the law divine and strong and 
inevitable is this, which exacts the severest pun- 
ishments from those who commit the greatest 
crimes. They who falsely call themselves Roman 
citizens are severely punished; and should those 
who falsely claim so great and reverend a thing 
and name as Stoic get off unpunished? 

And what does this law say? Let him who 
pretends to things which do not belong to him be 
a boaster, a vain-glorious man : let him who dis- 
obeys the divine administration be base, and a 
slave; let him suffer grief, let him be envious, 
let him pity ; and, in a word, let him be unhappy 
and lament. 2 

As Zeus has ordained, so act: if you do not 
act so, you will feel the penalty, you will be pun- 
ished. What, do you ask, will be the punish- 
ment? Nothing less than not having done your 
duty : you will lose the character of fidelity, mod- 
esty, propriety. 3 For thus you will be fighting 

133 



134 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

against God, you will be opposing Zeus and will 
be placing yourself against Him in the adminis- 
tration of the universe; and the punishment of 
this fighting against God and this disobedience 
shall you yourself pay, both by day and by night, 
being startled by dreams, perturbed, trembling at 
every piece of news, and having your tranquillity 
depending on others. 2 Do not look for greater 
penalties than these. 3 

For what other is a greater punishment than 
this to him who disobeys the divine commands, 
to be grieved, to lament, to envy, in a word, to 
be disappointed and unhappy? Would you not 
release yourself from these things? But if you 
do not, consider that you must always be a slave 
to him who has it in his power to effect your re- 
lease, and also to impede you, and you must serve 
him as an evil genius. 4 For wherever you have 
deviated from any of these rules, there is damage 
immediately, not from anything external, but 
from the action itself. 5 



iD. III. xi. Long. *D. IV. iv. Long. 

2 D. III. xxiv. Long. 5 D. IV. xii. Long. 

3 D. III. vii. Long. 



CHAPTER II 

RUIN AND RECOVERY 

NO man is bad without suffering some loss 
and damage. 1 And what, say you, do I 
lose ? Do men lose nothing but money ? Is not 



REWARDS AND PENALTIES 135 

modesty to be lost? Is not decency to be lost? 
Or may he who loses these suffer no damage? 
You, indeed, perhaps no longer think anything of 
this sort to be a damage. But there was once a 
time when you accounted this to be the only dam- 
age and hurt; when you were anxiously afraid 
lest anyone should shake your regard from these 
discourses and actions. See, it is not shaken by 
another, but by yourself. Fight against your- 
self, recover yourself to decency, to modesty, to 
freedom. If you formerly had been told any of 
these things of me, that anyone prevailed on me 
to do such things, would not you have gone and 
laid violent hands on the man who thus abused 
me? And will you not now help yourself? 
For how much easier is that assistance! You 
need not kill or fetter or affront or go to law with 
anyone, but merely to talk with yourself, who 
will most readily be persuaded by you, and with 
whom no one has greater credit than you. 

And, in the first place, condemn your actions; 
but when you have condemned them, do not de- 
spair of yourself, nor be like those poor-spirited 
people who, when once they have given way, 
abandon themselves utterly, and are carried along 
as by a torrent. Take example from the wres- 
tling masters. Has the boy fallen down? Get 
up again, they say; wrestle again till you have 
acquired strength. Be you affected in the same 
manner. For, be assured, there is nothing more 
tractable than the human mind. You need but 
will, and it is done, it is set right ; as, on the con- 



136 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

trary, you need but nod over the work, and it is 
ruined. For both ruin and recovery are from 
within. 2 



1 D. II. x. Long. a D. IV. ix. Carter. 

CHAPTER III 

WHAT MAKES AND UNMAKES A MAN 

AS Epictetus was saying that man is made 
for fidelity, and that whoever subverts this 
subverts the peculiar property of man; one of 
those who pass for men of literature happened 
to come in, who had been found guilty of adul- 
tery. But, continued Epictetus, if, laying aside 
that fidelity for which we were born, we form 
designs against the wife of our neighbor, what 
do we do? What else but destroy and ruin — 
what? Fidelity, honor, and sanctity of manners. 
Only these ? And do we not ruin neighborhood ? 
Friendship? Our country? How am I to con- 
sider you, sir? As a neighbor? A friend? 
What sort of one? As a citizen? How shall I 
trust you? Or suppose you cannot hold the place 
of a friend, can you hold even that of a servant? 
What would you have us do with you ? * 

Surely we should meet together and lament 
over such a man; so great are the evils into 
which he hath fallen. Not, indeed, that we 
should lament for his birth, or for his death, but 
in that while living he hath suffered the loss of 
his own true possessions. I speak not of his pa- 



REWARDS AND PENALTIES 137 

ternal inheritance, not of his land, or his house 
(for not one of these things is the true posses- 
sion of a man) ; but of his human qualities, the 
stamps of his spirit wherewith he came into the 
world. Even such we seek for also on coins, 
and if we find them we approve the coins ; if not, 
we cast them away. What is the stamp of this 
sestertius? The stamp of Trajan. Then give 
it me. The stamp of Nero ? Fling it away — it 
will not pass, it is bad. And so here too. 
What is the stamp of his mind? He is gentle, 
social, forbearing, affectionate. Come, then, I 
receive him, I admit him to citizenship, I receive 
him as a neighbor, a fellow-traveller. See to it 
only that he have not Nero's stamp. Is he 
wrathful, revengeful, complaining? Doth he, 
when it may seem good to him, break the heads 
of all who stand in his way? Why, then, didst 
thou say that he was a man? Shall everything 
be judged by the bare form? But the outward 
shape doth not suffice to make a man, but he is 
a man only if he have a man's mind. 2 

For the peculiar property of man is in social 
disposition, fidelity, honor, sted fastness, judgment. 
If these are preserved and remain well fortified, 
then man himself is preserved likewise; but when 
any of these is lost and demolished, man him- 
self is lost also. This is human undoing; this is 
the siege ; this the overthrow ; when right princi- 
ples are ruined, when these are destroyed. 3 

1 D. II. iv. Carter. *D. I. xxviii. Carter. 

a D. IV. v. Rolleston. 



138 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 
CHAPTER IV 

PROMISE AND FULFILMENT 

O fulfil the promise of a man's nature is it- 
self no common thing. For what is a 
man ? A living creature, say you ; mortal and en- 
dowed with Reason. And from what are we set 
apart by Reason? From the wild beasts. And 
what others? From sheep and the like. Look 
to it, then, that thou do nothing like a wild beast, 
for if thou do, the man in thee perisheth, thou 
hast not fulfilled his promise. Look to it, that 
thou do nothing like a sheep, or thus too the man 
hath perished. What, then, can we do as sheep? 
When we are gluttonous, sensual, reckless, filthy, 
thoughtless, to what are we then sunken? To 
sheep. What have we lost? Our faculty of 
Reason. And when we are contentious, and 
hurtful, and angry and violent, to what are we 
sunken? To wild beasts. 1 Some of us thus in- 
clining become like wolves, faithless and treach- 
erous and mischievous: some become like lions, 
savage and bestial and untamed. And what else 
is a slanderer and a malignant man than a fox 
or some other more wretched and meaner ani- 
mal ? 2 Through all these things the promise of 
the man's nature hath been ruined. 

But each thing is increased and saved by the 
corresponding works — the carpenter by the prac- 
tice of carpentry, the grammarian by the study 



REWARDS AND PENALTIES 139 

of grammar; but if he use to write ungrammati- 
cally, it must needs be that his art shall be cor- 
rupted and destroyed. Thus, too, the works of 
reverence save the reverent man, and those of 
shamelessness destroy him. And works of faith- 
fulness save the faithful man, and the contrary 
destroy him. 1 For when is a flute, a harp, a 
horse, or a dog preserved? When each fulfils 
what its nature promises. Where is the wonder, 
then, that man should be preserved and destroyed 
in the same manner ? 3 



1 D. II. ix. Rolleston. 3 D. II. ix. Carter. 

*D. I. iii. Long. 

CHAPTER V 

THE DECEITFULNESS OF RICHES 

IT is difficult for a rich person to be right- 
minded, or for a right-minded person to be 
rich. For Tightness of mind invites to frugal- 
ity and the acquisition of things that are good; 
but riches invite to prodigality, and seduce from 
Tightness of mind. 1 And thus, surely, do also, as 
the philosophers say, the infirmities of the soul 
grow up. 

For when thou hast once been covetous of 
money, if Reason, which leadeth to a sense of the 
vice, be called to aid, then both the desire is set 
at rest, and our ruling faculty is re-established, 
as it was in the beginning. But if thou bring no 
remedy to aid, then shall the soul return no more 



140 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

to the first estate; but when next excited by the 
corresponding appearance, shall be kindled to de- 
sire even more quickly than before. And when 
this is continually happening, the soul becomes 
callous in the end, and through its infirmity the 
love of money is strengthened. 

For he that hath had a fever, when the illness 
hath left him, is not what he was before his 
fever, unless he have been entirely healed. And 
somewhat on this wise also it happens in the af- 
fections of the soul; certain traces and scars are 
left in it, the which if a man do not wholly 
eradicate, when he hath again been scourged on 
the same place, it shall make no longer scars, but 
sores. 2 

If I can acquire wealth, and lose not piety, and 
faith, and magnanimity withal, show me the way, 
and I will do it. But if ye will have me lose the 
good things I possess to compass things that are 
not good at all, how unjust and unthinking are 
ye ! But which will ye rather have — money, or 
a pious and faithful friend? Then, rather, take 
part with me to this end; and ask me not to do 
aught through which I must cast away those 
things. 3 

For as it is better to lie straitened in a narrow 
bed and be healthy than to be tossed with disease 
on a broad couch; so also it is better to contract 
yourself within a small competence and be happy 
than to have a great fortune and be wretched. 4 

iR XXI. Carter. 3 M. XXIV. Rolleston. 

2D. II. xviii. Rolleston. *F. XXIV. Long. 



REWARDS AND PENALTIES 141 
CHAPTER VI 

THE PURCHASE PRICE 

KEEP this thought in readiness, when you 
lose anything external, what you acquire in 
place of it; and if it be worth more, never say, I 
have had a loss; neither if you have got an ox in 
place of a sheep nor in place of idle talk such tran- 
quillity as befits a man. 1 

Is some one preferred before thee at a feast? 
Then, if this is good, it behoves thee to rejoice 
that he hath gained it; but if evil, be not vexed 
that thou hast not gained it; but remember that 
if thou act not as other men to gain the things 
that are not in our own power, neither canst thou 
be held worthy of a like reward with them. For 
how is it possible for him who will not hang about 
other men's doors to have a like reward with him 
who doeth so? or him who will not attend on 
them with him who doth attend ? or him who will 
not flatter them with the flatterer ? Thou art un- 
just, then, and insatiable, if thou desire to gain 
those things for nothing, without paying the 
price for which they are sold. But how much is 
a lettuce sold for? A penny, perchance. If 
anyone, then, will spend a penny, he shall have 
lettuce; but thou, not spending, shalt not have. 
But think not that thou art worse off than he ; for 
as he has the lettuce, so thou the penny which thou 
wouldst not give. 



142 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

And likewise in this matter. Thou art not 
invited to some man's feast? That is, for thou 
gavest not to the host the price of the supper; 
and it is sold for flattery, it is sold for attend- 
ance. Pay, then, the price, if it will profit thee, 
for which the thing is sold. But if thou wilt not 
give the price, and wilt have the thing, greedy 
art thou and infatuated. Shalt thou have noth- 
ing, then, instead of the supper? Thou shalt 
have this — not to have praised one whom thou 
hadst no mind to praise, and not to have endured 
the insolence of his door-keepers. 2 For nothing 
can be gained without paying for it. Wherefore 
say to thyself, For so much peace is bought, this 
is the price of tranquillity. 3 

i D. IV. iii. Long. 3 m. XII. Rolleston. 

2M. XXV. Rolleston. 



CHAPTER VII 

FOR WHAT WILL YOU SELL THESE ? 

IT is for you who know yourself, and how much 
you are worth to yourself, to say at what 
price you will sell yourself: for men sell them- 
selves at various prices. 1 The other day I had 
an iron lamp placed beside my household gods. 
I heard a noise at the door, and on hastening down 
found my lamp carried off. 2 He paid, however, 
this price for the lamp, that in exchange for it he 
consented to become a thief ; in exchange for it to 
become faithless. 3 



REWARDS AND PENALTIES 143 

Consider at what price you sell your own will. 1 
By continually remembering this, you will pre- 
serve your own character such as it ought to be. 
Otherwise consider that you are spending your 
time in vain; and all that you are now applying 
your mind to, you are going to spill and overset. 
And there needs but little and a small deviation 
from reason to destroy and overset all. A pilot 
doth not need the same apparatus to overset a ship 
as to save it; but if he turns it a little to the wind, 
it is lost: even if he should not do it by design, 
but only for a moment be thinking of something 
else, it is lost. Such is the case here too. If you 
but nod a little, all that you have hitherto collected 
is gone. 

Take heed, then, to the appearances of things. 
Keep yourself awake over them. It is no incon- 
siderable matter that you have to guard, but mod- 
esty, fidelity, constancy, exemption from grief, 
fear, perturbation ; in short, freedom. For what 
will you sell these ? 4 

1 D. I. ii. Long. 8 D. I. xxix. Crossley. 

2 D. I. xviii. Crossley. 4 D. IV. iii. Carter. 

CHAPTER VIII 

THERSITES OR AGAMEMNON 

^ I AO this point you must attend before all 

X others : not to be so attached to any of your 

former acquaintances or friends as to condescend 

to the same behavior with them; otherwise you 



144 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

will undo yourself. But if it comes into your 
head, I shall appear odd to them, and they will 
not treat me as before; remember that there is 
nothing to be had for nothing. 

Choose, then, whether you will be loved by those 
you were formerly, and be like your former self ; 
or be better and not meet with the same treatment. 
For, if this is preferable, immediately incline al- 
together that way, and let no other kinds of rea- 
soning draw you aside; for no one can improve 
while he is wavering. If, then, you prefer this to 
everything, if you would be fixed only on this, 
and employ all your pains about it, give up every- 
thing else. Otherwise this wavering will affect 
you both ways : you will neither make a due im- 
provement, nor preserve the advantages you had 
before. For before, by setting your heart entirely 
on things of no value, you were agreeable to your 
companions. But you cannot excel in both kinds, 
but must necessarily lose as much of the one as 
you partake of the other. If you do not drink 
with those with whom you used to drink, you can- 
not appear equally agreeable to them. Choose 
whether you would be a drunkard and agreeable 
to them, or sober and disagreeable to them. 

Choose which you will. For if it is better to 
be modest and decent than to have it said of you, 
What an agreeable fellow! give up the rest; re- 
nounce it, withdraw yourself, have nothing to 
do with it. But if this doth not please you, in- 
cline with your whole force the contrary way. 
Act all that is consequent to such a character, 



REWARDS AND PENALTIES 145 

and you will obtain what you would have. But 
characters so different are not to be confounded. 
You cannot act both Thersites and Agamemnon. 
If you would be Thersites, you must be hump- 
backed and bald: if Agamemnon, tall and hand- 
some, and a lover of those who are under your 
care. 1 



1 D. IV. ii. Carter. 

CHAPTER IX 

HOLDING ONE'S OWN 

IF a man has frequent intercourse with others, 
he must either become like them, or change 
them to his own fashion. A live coal placed 
next to a dead one will either kindle that or be 
quenched by it. Such being the risk, it is well to 
be cautious in admitting intimacies of this sort, 
remembering that one cannot rub shoulders with 
a soot-stained man without sharing the soot him- 
self. What will you do, supposing the talk turns 
on gladiators, or horses, or prize-fighters, or (what 
is worse) on persons, condemning this and that, 
approving the other? Or suppose a man sneers 
or jeers or shows a malignant temper ? Has any 
among us the skill of the lute-player, who knows 
at the first touch which strings are out of tune and 
sets the instrument right? Has any of you such 
a power as Socrates had, in all his intercourse with 
men, of winning them over to his own convic- 
tions ? 



146 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

Till, then, these sound opinions have taken firm 
root in you, and you have gained a measure of 
strength for your security, be cautious in associ- 
ating with the uninstructed. Else whatever im- 
pressions you receive upon the tablets of your 
mind in the School will day by day melt and dis- 
appear, like wax in the sun. Withdraw, then, 
somewhere far from the sun, while you have 
these waxen sentiments. 1 For you must know 
that it is no easy thing for a principle to become a 
man's own, unless each day he maintain it and 
hear it maintained, as well as work it out in life. 2 

1 D. III. xvi. Crossley. 2 F. LXXII. Crossley. 



CHAPTER X 

THE UNFAILING LAW 

THE law of nature and of God is this: Let 
the better be always superior to the worse. 
In what ? In that wherein it is better. One body 
is stronger than another ; and a thief than one who 
is not a thief. Thus I, too, lost my lamp because 
the thief was better at keeping awake than I. 
But he bought a lamp at the price of being a thief, 
a rogue, and a wild beast. This seemed to him 
a good bargain, and much good may it do him ! 

Hence the most excellent and equitable law of 
God, that the better should always prove superior 
to the worse. Ten are better than one. To what 
purpose? For chaining, killing, dragging where 



REWARDS AND PENALTIES 147 

they please. Thus ten conquer one in the instance 
wherein they are better. In what, then, are they 
worse? When the one hath right principles and 
the others have not. For can they conquer in this 
point? How should they? If we were weighed 
in a scale, must not the heavier outweigh? 

Well ; but one takes me by the coat and draws 
me to the Forum. And then all the rest bawl out, 
Philosopher, what good do your principles do you ? 
See, you are dragging to prison ; see, you are go- 
ing to lose your head ! And, pray, what rule of 
philosophy could I contrive, that when a stronger 
than myself lays hold on my coat I should not be 
dragged ? Or that when ten men pull me at once 
and throw me into prison, I should not be thrown 
there? 1 

But, you say, the unjust man has the advan- 
tage. In what ? Money. Yes, for he is superior 
to you in this, that he flatters, is free from shame, 
and is watchful. What is the wonder? But see 
if he has the advantage over you in being faithful, 
in being modest. You will not find it to be so; 
but wherein you are superior, there you will find 
that you have the advantage. I once said to a 
man who was vexed because another was for- 
tunate, Would you be willing to resort to such 
means as he did? Heaven forbid, he said, that 
that day should ever come ! Why, then, are you 
vexed, if he receives something in return for that 
which he sells? Or how can you consider him 
happy who acquires those things by such means 
as you abominate? Or what wrong does Provi- 



148 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

dence in giving the better things to the better 
men? Is it not better to be modest than to be 
rich ? Why, then, are you vexed, man, when you 
possess the better thing ? 

Always remember, then, and have in readiness 
the truth, that this is a law of nature, that the 
superior has the advantage over the inferior in 
that wherein it is superior ; and you will never be 
vexed. 2 



X D. I. xxix. Carter. 2 jj. III. xvii. Long. 

CHAPTER XI 

THE AMPLE RECOMPENSE 

KNOW you not that a good man does nothing 
for the sake of appearance, but for the sake 
of doing right? What advantage is it to him, do 
you ask, to have done right? And what advan- 
tage is it to a man who writes to write as he ought ? 
The advantage is to have written it. Is there no 
reward then ? Do you seek a reward for a good 
man greater than doing what is good and just? 
At Olympia you wish for nothing more, but it 
seems to you enough to be crowned at the games. 
Does it seem to you so small and worthless a 
thing to be good and happy ? For these purposes 
being introduced by the Gods into the world, and 
it being now your duty to undertake the work 
of a man, do you still want nurses? Know you 
not that he who does the acts of a child, the older 
he is, the more ridiculous he is ? 1 



REWARDS AND PENALTIES 149 

As the sun does not wait for prayers and incan- 
tations to be induced to rise, but immediately 
shines and is saluted by all: so do you also not 
wait for clappings of hands, and shouts and 
praise to be induced to do good, but be a doer of 
good voluntarily. 2 

Then in the place of all other delights substi- 
tute this, that of being conscious that you are 
obeying God, that not in word, but in deed you 
are performing the acts of a wise and good man. 
For what a thing it is for a man to be able to say 
to himself, Now whatever the rest may say, this I 
am doing ; and of this Zeus has willed that I shall 
receive from myself a demonstration, and shall 
myself know if He has a soldier such as He ought 
to have, a citizen such as He ought to have. 
Being appointed to such a service, do I still care 
about what men say about me? and do I not en- 
tirely direct my thoughts to God and to His in- 
structions and commands? 

Having these thoughts always in hand, and 
exercising them by yourself, and keeping them in 
readiness, you will never be in want of one to 
comfort and strengthen you. Only do not make 
a proud display of it, nor boast of it; but show it 
by your acts; and if no man perceives it, be sat- 
isfied that you are yourself in a healthy state and 
happy. 3 

*D. I. xxiv. Long. S D. III. xxiv. Long. 

2 F. LXXXVII. Long. 



150 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 
CHAPTER XII 

STATUTES AND ORDINANCES 

ORDAIN for thyself forthwith a certain form 
and type of conduct, which thou shalt 
maintain both alone and, when it may chance, 
among men. 1 And abide in thy purposes as in 
laws which it were impious to transgress. And 
whatsoever any man may say of thee, regard it 
not; for neither is this anything of thine own. 

How long wilt thou delay to hold thyself worthy 
of the best things, and to transgress in nothing 
the decrees of Reason? Thou hast received the 
maxims by which it behoves thee to live; and 
dost thou live by them? What teacher dost thou 
still look for to whom to hand over the task of 
thy correction? Thou art no longer a boy, but 
already a man full grown. If, then, thou art neg- 
lectful and sluggish, and ever making resolve 
after resolve, and fixing one day after another 
on which thou wilt begin to attend to thyself, 
thou wilt forget that thou art making no advance, 
but wilt go on as one of the vulgar sort, both 
living and dying. 

Now, at last, therefore, hold thyself worthy 
to live as a man of full age and as one who is 
pressing forward ; and let everything that appear- 
eth the best be to thee as an inviolable law. And 
if any toil or pleasure or reputation or the loss 
of it be laid upon thee, remember that now is the 



REWARDS AND PENALTIES 151 

contest, here already are the Olympian games, and 
there is no deferring them any longer, and that 
in a single day and in a single trial ground is to 
be lost or gained. 

It was thus that Socrates made himself what 
he was, in all things that befell him having regard 
to no other thing than Reason. 2 When, there- 
fore, thou art about to meet anyone, especially one 
of those that are thought high in rank, set before 
thy mind what Socrates or Zeno had done in 
such a case. And so thou wilt not fail to deal 
as it behoves thee with the occasion. 1 For thou, 
albeit thou be yet no Socrates, yet as one that 
would be a Socrates, so it behoveth thee to live. 2 



1 M. XXXIII. Rolleston. * M. L. Rolleston. 



BOOK SEVEN 
THE GREAT CHANGE 



THE GREAT CHANGE 
CHAPTER I 

DEATH AND THE ORDER OF NATURE 

WILT thou say that any word is of ill-omen 
that betokeneth some natural thing ? Say 
that it is of ill-omen to speak of the reaping of 
ears of corn, for it betokeneth the destruction of 
the ears — but not of the universe. 1 For why 
are ears of corn produced? Is it not that they 
may become dry? And do they not become dry 
that they may be reaped ? But this is a curse upon 
ears of corn, never to be reaped. So we must 
know that in the case of men, too, it is a curse 
not to die, just the same as not to be ripened and 
not to be reaped. 2 

For all these things are changes from the for- 
mer estate to another; no destruction, but a cer- 
tain appointed order and disposition. Here is 
parting for foreign lands, and a little change. 
Here is death — a greater change, not from that 
which now is to that which is not, but to that 
which is not now. 1 To nought that thou needest 
fear, wilt thou go. There is no Hades, no fabled 
rivers of Sighs, of Lamentations, or of fire: but 
all things are full of Beings spiritual and divine. 3 

• D. III. xxiv. Rolleston. 3 D. III. xiii. Crossley. 

• D. II. i. Long. 

155 



156 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 
CHAPTER II 

DELIVERANCE FROM THE FEAR OF DEATH 

WHENEVER death may appear to be an 
evil, have ready the thought that it is 
right to avoid evils, and that death is unavoid- 
able. For what shall I do? whither shall I flee 
from it ? Declare to me the place ; declare to me 
the men among whom I shall go, to whom death 
comes never near; declare to me the charms 
against it. If I have none, what would ye have 
me do ? I cannot escape death — shall I not then 
escape the fear of death? shall I die lamenting and 
trembling ? * 

For death is nothing terrible; if it were so, it 
would have appeared so to Socrates. But the 
opinion we have about death, that it is terrible, 
that is wherein the terror lieth. 2 Do you not 
know that the origin of all human evils and of 
mean-spiritedness and cowardice is not death, but 
rather the fear of death? 3 For take away the 
fear of death, and you will know what calm and 
serenity there is. 4 

It is right, then, that we should turn our bold- 
ness against death, and our fear fulness against 
the fear of death. But now we do the contrary : 
death we flee from, but as to the state of our opin- 
ion about death we are negligent, heedless, indif- 
ferent. These things Socrates did well to cill 
bugbears. For as to children, through their inex- 



THE GREAT CHANGE 157 

perience, ugly masks appear terrible and fearful; 
so we are somewhat moved for no other cause 
than as children are affected by these bugbears. 
What is death? A bugbear. Turn it round; 
examine it: see, it does not bite. Now or later 
that which is body must be parted from that which 
is spirit, as formerly it was parted. And where- 
fore? That the cycle of the world may be ful- 
filled ; for it hath need of a present and of a future 
and of a past. 5 

What, then, is the fruit of these opinions? It 
is that which ought to be the most noble and the 
most becoming, release from perturbation, release 
from fear, freedom. For whoever is delivered 
from sorrows, and fears, and perturbations, he is 
at the same time also delivered from servitude. 6 



1 D. I. xxvii. Rolleston. 4 D. II. xxvii. Long. 

2 M. V. Rolleston. 5 D. II. i. Rolleston. 

3 D. III. xxvi. Carter. 6 D. II. i. Long. 



CHAPTER III 

THE ORDINANCE OF DEATH 

ALAS, you say, that ever Socrates should suf- 
fer such things from the Athenians ! What 
do you mean by Socrates? Express the fact as 
it is. That ever the poor paltry body of Socrates 
should be carried away and dragged to prison; 
that ever anyone should give hemlock to the body 
of Socrates, and that it should expire ! * If the 
corpse is I, I shall be cast out; but if I am dif- 



158 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

ferent from the corpse, speak more properly ac- 
cording as the fact is, and do not think of fright- 
ening me. These things are formidable to chil- 
dren. But if any man has once entered a phil- 
osopher's school and knows not what he is, he 
deserves to be full of fear; and if he has not yet 
learned that man is not flesh nor bones nor sinews, 
but he is that which makes use of these parts of 
the body and governs them. 

Why, then, do you say to die? Make no 
tragedy show of the thing, but speak of it as it is : 
it is now time for the matter of the body to be 
resolved into the things out of which it was com- 
posed. And what is the formidable thing here? 
What is going to perish of the things which are 
in the universe ? What new thing or wondrous is 
going to happen ? 2 Can any one cast me out of 
the universe? He cannot; but whithersoever I 
m ay go, there will be the sun, and the moon, 
and there the stars, and visions, and omens, and 
communion with the Gods. 3 



iD. I. xxix. Carter. 3 D. III. xxii. Rolleston. 

2 D. IV. yii. Long. 

CHAPTER IV 
ACT WELL THY PART 

REMEMBER that thou art an actor in a play, 
of such a part as it may please the Director 
to assign thee; of a short part, if He choose a 
short part; of a long one, if He choose a long one. 



THE GREAT CHANGE 159 

And if He will have thee take the part of a poor 
man or of a cripple, or of a governor, or a private 
person, mayest thou act that part with grace! 
For thine it is to act well the allotted part, but 
to choose it is Another's. 1 

Or let us do as setting out on a voyage. What 
is it possible for me to do? This — to choose 
the captain, the crew, the day, the opportunity. 
Then a tempest has burst upon us ; but what doth 
it concern me? I have left nothing undone that 
was mine to do; the problem is now another's, to 
wit, the captain's. But now the ship is sinking! 
and what have I to do? I do only what I am able 
— drown without terror and accusing of God, but 
knowing that that which has come into being must 
also perish. For I am no Immortal, but a man, 
a part of the sum of things as an hour is of the 
day. Like the hour I must arrive, and, like the 
hour, pass away. 2 

For as whom did God introduce thee here? 
Did He not introduce thee as subject to death, 
and as one to live on the earth with a little flesh, 
and to observe His administration, and to join 
with Him in the spectacle and the festival for a 
short time? Wilt thou not, then, after seeing 
the spectacle and the solemnity, when He leadeth 
thee out, go with adoration of Him and with 
thanks for what thou hast heard and seen ? 3 



1 M. XVII. Rolleston. 3 D. IV. i. Long. 

2 D. II. v. Rolleston. 



i6o THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 
CHAPTER V 

UNDER ORDERS 

EVEN as in a sea voyage, when the ship is 
brought to anchor, and you go out to fetch 
in water, you make a by-work of gathering a few 
roots and shells by the way, but have need ever 
to keep your mind fixed on the ship, and con- 
stantly to look round, lest at any time the master 
of the ship call, and you must, if he call, cast 
away all those things, lest you be treated like 
the sheep that are bound and thrown into the 
hold : so it is with human life also. And if there 
be given wife and children instead of shells and 
roots, nothing shall hinder us to take them. But 
if the Master call, run to the ship, forsaking all 
those things, and looking not behind. And if 
thou be in old age, go not far from the ship at any 
time, lest the Master should call, and thou be not 
ready. 1 

My friends, wait upon God. When He him- 
self shall give the signal and release you from this 
service, then are ye released unto Him. But for 
the present, bear to dwell in this place, wherein 
He has set you. Short, indeed, is this time of 
your sojourn, and easy to bear for those that are 
so minded. For what is there terrible to one who 
thus makes nothing of the body and the possessions 
of it? 2 

To the good soldier there fails not one who gives 



THE GREAT CHANGE 161 

him pay, nor to the laborer ; and shall such a one 
fail to the good man? Is God, then, careless of 
His servants, His witnesses, whom alone He useth 
to show forth what He is, and that He governeth 
all things well, and is not careless of human 
things? and that to a good man there is no evil, 
neither in life nor in death? How else is this 
than as when a good general gives me the signal 
for retreat? I obey, I follow, praising my 
Leader and hymning His works. For I came 
when it pleased Him, and when it pleaseth Him I 
will go. 3 

1 M. VII. Rolleston. * d. III. xxvi. Rolleston. 

2 D. I. ix. Rolleston. 



CHAPTER VI 

SAFE PASSAGE 

THUS do the more cautious of travellers act. 
The road is said to be beset by robbers. 
The traveller will not venture alone, but awaits 
the companionship on the road of an ambassador, 
or a proconsul. To him he attaches himself and 
thus passes by in safety. So doth the wise man 
in the world. Many are the companies of robbers 
and tyrants, many the storms, the straits, the 
losses of all a man holds dearest. Whither shall 
he fly for refuge — how shall he pass by unas- 
sailed? What companion on the road shall he 
await for protection? Such and such a wealthy 



162 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

man, of consular rank? And how shall I be 
profited, if he is stripped and falls to lamentation 
and weeping? And how if my fellow-traveller 
himself turns upon me and robs me? What am 
I to do? I will become a friend of Caesar's! in 
his train none will do me wrong! In the first 
place — O the indignities I must endure to win 
distinction ! O the multitude of hands there will 
be to rob me! And if I succeed, Caesar too is 
but a mortal. While should it come to pass that 
I offend him, whither shall I flee from his pres- 
ence? To the wilderness? And may not fever 
await me there ? What then is to be done ? Can- 
not a fellow-traveller be found that is honest and 
loyal, strong and secure against surprise? Thus 
doth the wise man reason, considering that if he 
would pass through in safety, he must attach 
himself unto God. 

How under standest thou attach himself to God? 
That what God wills, a man should will also ; that 
what God wills not, neither should he will. 1 
When thou hast such a Guide, and thy wishes 
and desires are the same as His, why dost thou 
still fear? 2 



1 D. IV. i. Crossley. 2 D. II. xvii. Long. 



THE GREAT CHANGE 165 

CHAPTER VII 

THE GOOD WARFARE 

DO you not know that human life is a war- 
fare ? One man's duty is to mount guard, 
another must go out to reconnoitre, a third to bat- 
tle; all cannot be in one place, nor would it be 
even expedient. But you, instead of executing 
your Commander's orders, complain if aught 
harsher than usual is enjoined; not understand- 
ing to what condition you are bringing the army, 
so far as in you lies. If all were to follow your 
example, none would dig a trench, none would 
cast a rampart around the camp, none would keep 
watch, or expose himself to danger; but all turn 
out useless for the service of war. Thus it is 
here also. Every life is a warfare, and that long 
and various. You must fulfil a soldier's duty, 
and obey each order at your commander's nod: 
aye, if it be possible, divine what he would have 
done; for between that Commander and this, 
there is no comparison, either in might or in ex- 
cellence. 

Wherefore a good man and true cares only how 
he may fill his post with due discipline and obedi- 
ence to God. Wilt Thou that I continue to live ? 
Then will I live, as one that is free and noble, as 
Thou wouldst have me. But hast Thou no fur- 
ther need of me ? I thank Thee ! Up to this hour 
have I stayed for Thy sake and none other's : and 



164 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

in obedience to Thee I depart, as Thy servant, as 
one whose ear is open unto what Thou dost en- 
join, what Thou dost forbid. 1 I obey, I follow, 
assenting to the words of the Commander. 2 
Whatsoever place or post Thou assignest me, 
Sooner will I die a thousand deaths, as Socrates 
said, than desert it. 1 For, being appointed to 
such a service, do I still care about the place ? and 
do I not entirely direct my thoughts to God and 
to His instructions and commands ? 3 



1 D. III. xxiv. Crossley. 3 D. III. xxiv. Long. 
2 D. III. xxvi. Long. 



CHAPTER VIII 

NUNC DIMITTIS 

DOST thou that hast received all from an- 
other's hands, repine and blame the Giver, 
if He takes anything from thee? Why, who art 
thou, and to what end earnest thou here? Was 
it not He that brought thee into the world ; was it 
not He that made the Light manifest unto thee, 
that gave thee fellow-workers, and senses, and the 
power to reason ? 

And how brought He thee into the world? 
Was it not as one born to die ; as one bound to live 
out his earthly life in some small tabernacle of 
flesh ; to behold His administration, and for a little 
while to share with Him in the mighty march of 
this great Festival Procession? Now therefore 



THE GREAT CHANGE 165 

that thou hast beheld, while it was permitted thee, 
the Solemn Feast and Assembly, wilt thou not 
cheerfully depart, when He summons thee forth, 
with adoration and thanksgiving for what thou 
hast seen and heard? 

Nay, but why did He bring one into the world 
on these conditions ? He hath no need of a spec- 
tator who finds fault with his lot! Them that 
will take part in the Feast He needeth — that 
will lift their voice with the rest, that men may 
applaud the more, and exalt the Great Assembly 
in hymns and songs of praise. But the wretched 
and the fearful He will not be displeased to see ab- 
sent from it : for when they were present, they did 
not behave as at a Feast, nor fulfil their proper 
office; but moaned though as in pain, and found 
fault with their fate, their fortune and their com- 
panions ; insensible to what had fallen to their lot, 
insensible to the powers they had received for a 
very different purpose — the powers of Magnani- 
mity, Nobility of Heart, of Fortitude, of Free- 
dom! 

Nay, but I would fain have stayed longer at the 
Festival. Ah, so would the mystics fain have the 
rites prolonged; so perchance would the crowd 
at the Great Games fain behold more wrestlers 
still. But the Solemn Assembly is over! Come 
forth, depart with thanksgiving and modesty. 1 

a D. IV. i. Crossley. 



166 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 
CHAPTER IX 

VALEDICTORY 

SINCE we must by all means die, a man can- 
not be found but he will be doing somewhat, 
either tilling or digging or trading or governing. 1 
What, then, wouldst thou be found doing when 
overtaken by death? If I might choose, I would 
be found doing some deed of true humanity, of 
wide import, beneficent and noble. But if I may 
not be found engaged in aught so lofty, let me 
hope at least for this — what none may hinder, 
what is surely in my power — that I may be found 
raising up in myself that which had fallen ; learn- 
ing to deal more wisely with the things of sense ; 
working out mine own tranquillity. 2 I would 
fain be found engaged in the task of liberating 
mine own will from the assaults of passion, from 
hindrance, from resentment, from slavery. 3 If 
death surprises me thus employed, it is enough if 
I can stretch forth my hands to God and say : 2 

Have I in aught transgressed Thy commands? 
Have I in aught perverted the faculties, the senses, 
the natural principles that Thou didst give me? 
Have I ever blamed Thee or found fault with 
Thine administration? When it was Thy good 
pleasure, I fell sick — and so did other men : but 
my will consented. Because it was Thy pleasure, 
I became poor — but mine heart rejoiced. No 
power in the State was mine, because Thou 



THE GREAT CHANGE 167 

wouldst not: such power I never desired! Hast 
thou ever seen me of more doleful countenance 
on that account? Have I not ever drawn nigh 
unto Thee with cheerful look, waiting upon Thy 
commands, attentive to Thy signals ? Wilt Thou 
that I now depart from the great assembly of 
men? I go: I give Thee all thanks that Thou 
hast deemed me worthy to take part with Thee 
in this assembly: to behold Thy works, to com- 
prehend this Thine administration. 3 For that 
Thou didst beget me, I thank Thee for that Thou 
hast given : for the time during which I have used 
the things that were Thine, it sufficeth me. Take 
them back and place them wherever Thou wilt! 
They were all Thine, and Thou gavest them me. 2 
Such I would were the subject of my thoughts, 
my pen, my study, when death overtakes me. 3 
For what life is better and more becoming than 
that of a man who is in this state of mind? And 
what end is more happy ? 4 

iD. IV. x. Rolleston. sd. III. v. Crossley. 

a D. IV. x. Crossley. *D. IV. x. Long. 



PART TWO — THE CYNIC 



BOOK ONE 
THE WAY OF THE CYNIC 



THE WAY OF THE CYNIC 
CHAPTER I 

THE CHARACTER OF THE CYNIC 

ONE of his pupils, who seemed to be drawn 
towards the way of Cynicism, inquired of 
Epictetus what manner of man the Cynic* ought 
to be. And Epictetus said, Let us look into it 
at leisure ; for it is not such as it seemeth to thee. 

First, in things that concern thyself, thou must 
appear in nothing like unto what thou now doest. 
Thou must not accuse God nor man; thou must 
utterly give over pursuit, and avoid only those 
things that are in the power of thy will ; anger is 
not meet for thee, nor resentment, nor envy, nor 
pity ; nor must a girl appear to thee fair, nor must 
reputation. 

For it must be understood that other men shelter 
themselves by walls and houses and by darkness 
when they do such things, and many means of 
concealment have they. One shutteth the door, 
placeth someone before the chamber; if anyone 
should come, say, He is out, he is busy. But in 
place of all these things it behoves the Cynic to 
shelter himself behind his own piety and rever- 

* See Introduction, pp. xxiv-xxvii. 
173 



174 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

ence; but if he doth not, he shall be put to shame, 
naked under the sky. This is his house, this his 
door, this the guards of his chamber, this his dark- 
ness. For he must not seek to hide aught that he 
doeth, else he is gone, the Cynic hath perished, 
the man who lived under the open sky, the free- 
man. He hath begun to fear somewhat from 
without, he hath begun to need concealment ; nor 
can he find it when he would, for where shall he 
hide himself, and how? And if by chance this 
tutor, this public teacher, should be found in guilt, 
what things must he not suffer! And fearing 
these things, can he yet take heart with his whole 
soul to guide the rest of mankind? That can 
he never: it is impossible! 

Dut before all things must his ruling faculty 
be purer than the sun, else he must needs be a 
gambler and cheater, who, being himself entangled 
in some iniquity, will reprove others. For see 
how the matter stands : to these kings and tyrants, 
their spearmen and their arms give the office of re- 
proving men, and the power to punish transgres- 
sors, yea, though they themselves be evil; but to 
the Cynic, instead of arms and spearmen, his con- 
science giveth this power. 1 Why, then, should 
he not dare to speak boldly to his own brethren, 
to his children, in a word, to his kindred ? 

This is the character, this the undertaking of 
a Cynic. 2 Dost thou see how thou art about to 
take in hand so great a matter ? 1 

1 D. III. xxii. Rolleston. 2 D. III. xxii. Carter. 



THE WAY OF THE CYNIC 175 
CHAPTER II 

THE CALL OF THE CYNIC 

CONSIDER .more closely, know thyself, 
question thy genius, attempt nothing with- 
out God. For whosoever shall without God at- 
tempt so great a matter desireth only to behave 
himself unseemly before the people. For in no 
well-ordered house doth one come in and say to 
himself, I should be the steward of the house; else, 
when the lord of the house shall have observed 
it, and seeth him insolently giving orders, he will 
drag him forth and chastise him. So it is also 
in this great city of the universe; for here too 
there is a Master of the house who ordereth each 
and all. Thou art the Sun, saith He; thy power 
is to travel round and make the year and the sea- 
sons, and to increase and nourish fruits, and to 
stir the winds and still them, and temperately to 
warm the bodies of men. Thou art able to lead 
the army against Ilion; be Agamemnon. Thou 
canst fight in single combat with Hector; be 
Achilles. But if Thersites came forth and pre- 
tended to the authority, then either he would not 
gain it, or, gaining it, he would have been shamed 
before many witnesses. 

And about this affair, do thou take thought 
upon it earnestly, for it is not such as it seemeth 
to thee. I will take to myself, thou say est, a 
wallet and staff, and I will begin to go about and 



176 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

beg, and to reprove everyone I meet with. If 
thou conceivest the matter on this wise, far be it 
from thee — go not near it, it is not for thee. 
But if thou conceivest of it as it is, and holdest 
thyself not unworthy of it, then behold to how 
great an enterprise thou art putting forth thine 
hand. 1 

1 D. III. xxii. Rolleston. 



CHAPTER III 

THE CYNIC AND HIS BODY 

IT is not given to every man to become a Cynic. 
Wisdom alone, it may be, will not suffice : a 
man needs also a certain measure of readiness — 
an aptitude for the office : aye, and certain bodily 
qualities. 1 For if the Cynic shall appear con- 
sumptive, meagre, and pale, his witness hath not 
the same emphasis. Not only by showing forth 
the things of the spirit must he convince foolish 
men that it is possible, without the things that are 
admired of them, to be good and wise; but also 
in body must he show that plain and simple and 
open-air living are not mischievous even to the 
body. Behold, it behoveth him to say, even of 
this I am a witness, I and my body. So Diogenes 
was wont to do, for he went about radiant with 
health ; and with his very body he turned many to 
good. But a Cynic that men pity seems to be a 
beggar — all men turn away from him, all stumble 



THE WAY OF THE CYNIC 177 

at him. For he must not appear squalid ; so that 
neither in this respect shall he scare men away; 
but his very austerity should be cleanly and 
pleasing. 2 

Such is the Cynic who is honored with the 
sceptre and the diadem by Zeus. But see whose 
work it is, the work of Zeus, or of him whom 
He may judge worthy of this service ; that he may 
never exhibit anything to the many, by which 
he shall make of no effect his own testimony, 
whereby he gives testimony to virtue : 

His beauteous face pales not, nor from his cheeks 
He wipes a tear. 3 



1 D. III. xxi. Crossley. 3 D. IV. viii. Long. 

2 D. III. xxii. Rolleston. 



CHAPTER IV 

THE LONG-SUFFERING OF THE CYNIC 

TtULY the Cynic must be so long-suffer- 
ing as that he shall seem to the multitude 
insensate and a stone. For this very agreeable 
circumstance is linked with the calling of a Cynic; 
he must be flogged like an ass, and, being flogged, 
must love those who flog him, as though he were 
the father or brother of all mankind. Not so, 
but if one shall flog thee, stand in the midst and 
shriek out, O Caesar, what things do I suffer in the 
Emperor's peace! Let us take him before the 
pro-consul. But what is Caesar to the Cynic? 



178 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

or what is a pro-consul ? or what is any other than 
He that hath sent him hither, and whom he 
serveth, which is Zeus? Doth he call upon any- 
other than God? Is he not persuaded, whatso- 
ever things he may suffer, that he is being trained 
and exercised by God? Hercules, when he was 
exercised by Eurystheus, never deemed himself 
wretched; but fulfilled courageously all that was 
laid upon him. But he who shall cry out and 
bear it hard when he is being trained and exer- 
cised by Zeus, is he worthy to bear the sceptre of 
Diogenes ? And will such an one presently accuse 
God who hath sent him, as having used him ill? 
For of what shall he accuse Him : that his life is 
seemly, that he manifests God's will, that he 
showeth forth His virtue more brightly? 

For the Cynic remembers that the worse must 
needs be vanquished by the better, whereinso- 
ever it is the worse; and the body is worse than 
the multitude — the weaker than the stronger. 
Never, then, doth the Cynic go down to any con- 
test where it is possible for him to be vanquished, 
but he yields up all that is not his own, and con- 
tends for nothing that is subject to others. Is 
his assent ever hasty; or his desire idle; or his 
pursuit in vain; or his avoidance unsuccessful; 
or his aim unfulfilled? Doth he ever blame, or 
cringe, or envy? This is his great study and de- 
sign ; but as regards all other things, he lies on his 
back and snores, for all is peace. There is no 
thief of his will, nor tyrant; but of his body ? yea; 
and of his chattels ? yea, and also of his authority 



THE WAY OF THE CYNIC 179 

and his honors. What, then, are these things to 
him ? But where there is question of the will and 
the use of appearances, then you shall see how 
many eyes the Cynic hath, so that you may say 
that compared with him Argus was blind. 1 

1 D. III. xxii. Rolleston. 



CHAPTER V 

THE OFFICE OF THE CYNIC 

THE Cynic is, in truth, a spy of the things 
that are friendly to men, and that are hos- 
tile ; and having closely spied out all, he must come 
back and declare the truth. And he must neither 
be stricken with terror and report of enemies 
where none are; nor be in any otherwise con- 
founded or troubled by the appearances. 1 

But no one ever sends a timorous spy, who, 
when he only hears a noise or sees a shadow, runs 
back, frighted out of his wits, and says, The 
enemy is just at hand! So now if he should 
come and tell us, Things are in a fearful way, 
death is terrible; banishment, terrible; calumny, 
terrible; poverty, terrible; run, good people, the 
enemy is at hand! — we will answer, Get you 
gone, and prophesy for yourself; our only fault 
is that we have sent such a spy. 

Diogenes, who was sent as a spy, told us other 
tidings. He says that death is no evil, for it is 
nothing base; that defamation is only the noise 



180 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

of madmen. And what account did this spy give 
us of pain? Of pleasure? Of poverty? He 
says that to be naked is better than a purple robe, 
to sleep upon the bare ground is the softest bed, 
and gives a proof of all he says by his own cour- 
age, tranquillity, and freedom; and, moreover, 
by a healthy and robust body. There is no enemy 
near, says he. All is profound peace. Look upon 
me, says he. Am I hurt? Am I wounded? 
Have I run away from any one ? 2 Take notice 
of me, that I am without a country, without a 
house, without an estate, without a servant; I 
lie on the ground; no wife, no children, no coat, 
but only earth and heaven and one sorry cloak. 
And what do I want ? Am not I without sorrow, 
without fear? Am not I free? Did any of you 
ever see me disappointed ? Did I ever blame God 
or man ? Did I ever accuse any one ? Have any 
of you seen me look discontented? How do 
I treat those whom you fear, and of whom you 
are struck with awe ? Is it not like sorry slaves ? 
Who that sees me doth not think that he sees 
his own king and master? 3 This is such a spy 
as he ought to be. 2 . 

1 D. III. xxii. Rolleston. 3 D. III. xxii. Carter. 
2 D. I. xxiv. Carter. 



THE WAY OF THE CYNIC 181 
CHAPTER VI 

THE COMMISSION OF THE CYNIC 

THE Cynic is an herald from God to men, 
declaring to them the truth about good and 
evil things ; that they have erred, and are seeking 
the reality of good and evil where it is not; and 
where it is, they do not consider. He must then 
be able, if so it chance, to go up impassioned, as 
on the tragic stage, and speak: 

O men, whither are ye borne away ? What do 
ye ? Miserable as ye are ! like blind men ye wan- 
der up and down. Ye have left the true road, and 
are going by a false ; ye are seeking peace and hap- 
piness where they are not, and if another shall 
show you where they are, ye believe him not. 
Wherefore will ye seek it in outward things ? It 
is not there! It is there where ye deem it not, 
and where ye have no desire to seek it. For did 
ye desire, ye would have found it in yourselves, 
nor would ye wander to things without, nor pur- 
sue things alien, as if they were your own con- 
cerns. Turn to your own selves. See that there 
is in you something that is by nature free. This, 
miserable men, must ye perfect; this have a care 
to, in this seek for the Good. 

Thinkest thou he is a mere meddler and busy- 
body in rebuking those whom he meets? As a 
father he doth it, as a brother, and as a servant 
of the Universal Father, which is God. When 



182 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 

he knows that he hath watched and labored for 
men, and lain down to sleep in purity, and sleep 
hath left him yet purer; and that his thoughts have 
been the thoughts of one dear to the Gods, of a 
servant, and a sharer in the rule of Zeus — where- 
fore, then, shall he not take heart to speak boldly 
to his brothers, to his children, in a word, to all 
his kin ? * 

1 D. III. xxii. Rolleston. 



CHAPTER VII 

THE BURDEN OF THE CYNIC 

WIEREFORE will ye seek the Good in out- 
ward things? It is not there. In pos- 
sessions? It is not there, and if ye believe me 
not, lo, Croesus ! lo, the wealthy of our own day, 
how full of mourning is their life! In author- 
ity? It is not there, else should those be happy 
who have been twice or thrice consul; yet they 
are not. Whom shall we believe in this matter? 
You, who but look on these men from without, 
and are dazzled by the appearance, or the men 
themselves? And what say they? Hearken to 
them when they lament, when they groan, when 
by reason of those consulships, and their glory 
and renown, they hold their state the more full of 
misery and danger ! In royalty ? It is not there ; 
else were Nero happy, and Sardanapalus ; but not 
Agamemnon himself was happy, more splendid 



THE WAY OF THE CYNIC 183 

though he was than Nero or Sardanapalus. And 
what saith himself? I am distraught, he saith, 
and I am in anguish; my heart leaps forth from 
my bosom. Miserable man! which of thy con- 
cerns hath gone wrong with thee? Thy wealth? 
Nay ; but thou art rich in gold and bronze. What 
aileth thee then ? That part, whatever it be, with 
which we pursue, with which we avoid, with which 
we desire and dislike, thou hast neglected and 
corrupted. How hath it been neglected? He 
hath been ignorant of the true Good for which 
it was born, and of the Evil; and of what is his 
own, and what is alien to him. O unhappy mind 
of thee! of all things alone neglected and un- 
tended. 

In what, then, is the Good, seeing that in these 
things it is not ? Come, then, do ye not naturally 
conceive it as great, as precious, and that cannot 
be harmed? What kind of material, then, will ye 
take to shape peace and freedom? Turn to your 
own selves, and see that there is in you something 
that is by nature free. This, miserable men, must 
ye perfect; this have a care to, in this seek for 
the Good. 1 For this law hath God established, 
and saith, If thou wouldst have aught of good, 
have it from thyself. 2 

1 D. III. xxii. Rolleston. 2 D. I. xxix. Rolleston. 



184 THE CREED OF EPICTETUS 
CHAPTER VIII 

THE CYNIC AND THE WORLD 

GIVE me, said Epictetus, a city of wise men, 
and perhaps no one will easily come to the 
Cynic way: for whose sake should he embrace 
it? However, if we do suppose such a thing, 
there is nothing to hinder his marrying and be- 
getting children; for his wife will be even such 
another, and his father-in-law such another, and 
thus will his children be brought up. 

But things being as they now are, as it were 
in order of battle, must not the Cynic be given 
wholly and undistracted to the service of God, 
being able to go about among men, and not bound 
to private duties, nor entangled in ties which, if 
he trangress, he can no longer preserve the aspect 
of honesty and goodness; and if he obey them, 
he hath lost that of the missionary, the spy, the 
herald of the Gods? Where shall I thenceforth 
find that king, whose whole business is the com- 
mon weal? And thus inquiring, we do not find 
it, in this condition of the world, a purpose of 
chief concern for the Cynic. 

How, then, shall the Cynic be preserving the 
community? Shall the command of an army 
withdraw a man from marriage and fatherhood, 
and he shall not be thought to have gained noth- 
ing for his childlessness, but the kingship of a 
Cynic shall not be worth what it costs? It may 



THE WAY OF THE CYNIC 185 

be we do not perceive his greatness, else these 
things would not have moved us, nor should we 
have marvelled if a Cynic will not marry nor 
beget children. Man! the Cynic hath begotten 
all mankind, he hath all men for his sons, all 
women for his daughters; so doth he visit all 
and care for all. 

If it please thee, ask of me also whether the 
Cynic shall have to do with affairs of public polity. 
Dost thou seek a greater polity than that in whose 
affairs he is already concerned? Will it be 
greater if he come forward among the Athenians 
to say something about ways and means — he, 
whose part it is to discourse with all men, Atheni- 
ans, Corinthians, Romans alike, not concerning 
ways or means, nor concerning peace or war, 
but about happiness and unhappiness, about good- 
fortune and ill- fortune, about slavery and free- 
dom ? And of a man that hath his part in so great 
a polity will you ask me if he shall attend to 
public affairs? Ask me also if he shall be a 
ruler; and again I shall say, What rule can be 
greater than his ? * 

1 D. III. xxii. Rolleston. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Arnold, E. Vernon. Roman Stoicism. Cambridge Uni- 
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ography. Article Epictetus in Hastings' Encyclopedia 
of Religion and Ethics. 

Asmus, R. Quaestiones Epicteteae. Freiburg, 1888. 

Bernard, Edward Russell. Great Moral Teachers. 
(Confucius, Gotama, Socrates, Epictetus). London, 
1906. 

Boileau. Epictetus: His Morals, with Simplicius, his^ 
Commentary and Life. London, 1700. 

Bonhoffer, Adolf. Epictet und die Stoa. Stuttgart, 
1890. Die Ethik des Sto'ikers Epictet. Stuttgart, 
1894. 

Brace, C. Loring. The Unknown God. New York, 1890. 

Brandis, Christian August. Article Epictetus in Dic- 
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Braune, A. Epictet und das Christenthum, 1889. 

Bruns, Ivo. De Schola Epicteti. Kiel, 1897. 

Bussell, F. W. Marcus Aurelius and the Later Stoics. 
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Carter, Elizabeth. Moral Discourses of Epictetus.^ 
London, 1758. 

Caspari, E. De Cynicis qui fuerunt aetate imperatorum 
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Chedieu, P. J. Emile. Le Manuel, traduit du grec. 
Paris, 1847. 

Crossley, Hastings. Golden Sayings of Epictetus. Lon- 
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Davidson, William Leslie. The Stoic Creed. Edin- 
burgh, 1907. 

Davis, Charles H. Stanley. Greek and Roman Stoicism^ 
and Some of its Disciples. Boston, 1903. 

Estes, Dana. Noble Thoughts of Epictetus. Boston/'" 
1909. 

Farrar, Frederic William. Seekers after God. London/ 
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189 



i 9 o BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Grosch, G. Die Sittenlehre des Epictetus. Wernigerode, 

1867. 
Herford, C. H. The Stoics as Teachers. London, 1889. 
Heumann, Christoph August. De Philosophia Epicteti. 

Iena, 1703. 
Hicks, Robert Drew. Stoic and Epicurean. New York, 

1910. 
Higginson, Thomas Wentworth. Works of Epictetus. 

Boston, 1865. 
Holland, Frederic May. The Reign of the Stoics. New 

York, 1879. 
Hyde, William De Witt. From Epicurus to Christ. 

New York, 1905. 
Long, George. The Discourses of Epictetus with the 

Encheiridion and Fragments. London, 1848. 
Matheson, Percy Ewing. The Discourses of Epictetus. 

Oxford University Press, 1916. 
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Sanford, J. The Manual of Epictetus. Translated from 

the French. London, 1567. 
Schenkl, H. Die epiktetischen Fragmente. Wien, 1888. 

Epicteti Dissertationes. Teubner, 1898. 
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Philosophic Frankfurt, 1885. 
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Smith, B. E. Selections from the Discourses, Manual, 

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Spalding, J. L. Glimpses of Truth, with Essays on Epic- * 

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Stanhope, G. Dissertationes, Fragmenta, et Enchiridion, 

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Enchiridion. Graece et Latine. Paris, 1842. 
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Upton, Joannis. Enchiridion. Ex editione Joannis Up- 
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Wallace, William. Article Epktetus in Encyclopedia 
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Zahn, Theodor. Der Stoiker Epiktet und sein Verhaltniss 
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Zeller, Edward. Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics. Trans- 
lated by Reichel. London, 1892. 



INDEX 



INDEX 



Abuse, bearing, 29-30, 
1 17-8; Cynic, 177-9. 

Achilles, 175. 

Acropolis, 125. 

Action, contemplation and, 
xlv-xlvi ; and reaction, 
134; purpose of study, 86. 

Actor, man an, 158-9. 

Acts, philosopher known 
by, 80-4; make the man, 
138-9; not words, 44. 

Administrator, God as, 
22-z. 

Adornment, civic, 127; per- 
sonal, 31-2; of philoso- 
phy, 101 ; of the will, 53-4. 

Adultery, condemned, lviii- 
lix, 136-7. 

Advantage, gaining, 91-3. 

^Eolus, 57. 

iEsculapius, 14, 58. 

Affection, natural, 110-11. 

Agamemnon, 145, 175, 182. 

Alcibiades, Socrates' ad- 
vice to, 54. 

Alexander, xix, 14, 58. 

Ancestry, see Man. 

Animals, man and, see 
Man. 

Antisthenes, 118. 

Anxiety, cure for, 56-8, 
61-8, 73-4. 

Apollo, xx. 

Appearance, character more 
than, 82-4, 137; personal, 
29-32, 53-4, 176-7. 



Appearances, use of, xliii- 
xliv, 20, 36, 43, 45-6, 60, 
67, 86, 91, 129, 179; test- 
ing, 94-5, 143. 

Appetites, disciplining, 94-5, 
143-5. 

Argos, 18. 

Argus, 179. 

Aristotle, lxv. 

Arnold, E. V., quoted, lxv. 

Arnold, Matthew, quoted, 
xxii, xlv, lxvii. 

Arrianus, Flavius, xix, xx, 
xxi, xxiii, xxv. 

Associates, evil, to be 
avoided, 143-6. 

Athena, 9. 

Athens, xxxvi, 16, 18, 125; 
contentment better than, 
126. 

Attention, habit of, 98-99. 

Attica, 18. 

Aurelius, Marcus Anto- 
ninus, Matthew Arnold 
on, lxvii; quoted, xxxvi, 
xl, xliii, xlvi, xlix, lvi. 

Austerity, lvii-lix, 29- 
30, 46-8; Cynic, 176- 
80. 

Avarice, 139-40. 



Bacon, Francis, quoted, 

xxix-xxx, xlii. 
Balaam, lx. 
Bear and Forbear, 100. 



195 



196 



INDEX 



Beauty, to be cultivated, 
176-7; where it dwells, 
31-2, 53-4- 

Beginner, steps of 29-32, 
35-8, 46-8. 

Bernard, E. R., quoted, li. 

Boasting, forbidden, 30, 

43-4, 149. 

Body, soul and, 10-11; man 
more than, 54-6, 91, 158; 
care of, 30-2 ; of the Cyn- 
ic, 176-7; of Diogenes, 
180; to be separated from 
spirit, 157. 

Books, see Reading. 

Brotherhood of man, 
xxxvii-xxxix, 119. See 
Man. 

Bugbear, death a, 156-7. 

Bussell, F. W., quoted, 
xxxv, xli, xlv, lx. 

Butler, Bishop, quoted, xxx. 



Caesar, xxxvii, 10, 17, 27, 42, 
45, 85, 162, 177; what he 
cannot do, 48. 

Catechism, Stoic, 32-3, 62-3. 

Celibacy, of the Cynic, 
184-5 ; condemned, xvii- 
xlviii. See Marriage. 

Ceres, 108. 

Champion, the moral, 93. 

Character, maintaining 
one's, 9, 44-6, 105-6, 117- 

8, 133-4; peaceable, 123-4; 
how lost, 134-9, 143-6; 
test of, 46-8, 80, 82-8, 91; 
essence of, 93, 99-101, 128- 

9. See Conduct and 
Duties. 

Chastity, lviii-lix, 136-7. 
Cheerfulness, lix-lx, 32, 167. 



Children, acting as, 38-9, 
42, 66, 148, 150, 156-7; 
care for, 110-11. See 
Cynic and Duties. 

Choice, moral, 143-5. 

Chrysippus, 43-4, 125. 

Cicero, quoted, xxx, xliii. 

Citizen, duties of, 106, 124, 
126-7; of the world, 
xxxvi-xxxvii, 16-17. 

City, adornment of, 127; 
defense of, 127-8. 

Cleanthes, xxxix, xlviii, 

69. 
Cnossus, 41. 
Communion, see God. 
Companions, low, 143-6 ; 

true, 59-60; no need of, 

1 12-3. 
Compassion, 119-121. 
Conceit, laying aside, 27-9, 

37-8, 43-4. 
Concord, what makes, 124. 
Conduct, philosopher known 

by, 82-4. See Character, 

Duties, Opinion, Rules. 
Conscience, xxxii, xlii-xliv, 

lv, 114, 174. 
Contemplation, 20, 112-3; 

and action, xlv-xlvi. 
Contentment, 39-43, 48-9, 

125-6, 180. 
Convictions, need of, 115- 

17, 143-6. See Opinion. 
Corinth, xxxvi, 16, 125. 
Correction, self, 90-1, 113-4, 

121-2, 134-9, 150. 
Cost, counting the, 29-30, 

46-7, 64. See Price. 
Covetousness, 42-3. See 

Wealth. 
Cowper, William, quoted, 

lvii. 



INDEX 



197 



Crises, meeting, 86-8, 93. 

Croesus, 97, 182. 

Culture, see Education. 

Cynic, xxiv-xxv; call of, 
xxv-xxvi, 175-6; mission 
of, xxvii, 179-82; char- 
acter of, 173-4; his body, 
176-7, 180; his message, 
181-3 ; not to marry or en- 
gage in public business, 
xxvi, xlvi-xlvii, 184-5. 



Daphne, xx. 

Davidson, W. L., quoted, 
xx. 

Death, xlix-li; a natural 
change, 155; separation of 
body and spirit, 157-8; 
universal and unavoidable, 
FearedLi56 ; 
tflanMurly, 
92, 159, 165, 167; how em- 
ployed at death, 166-7. 

Deception, guarding against, 

95, 143. 

Decision, moral, 143-5. 

Deeds, not words, 44. See 
Acts. 

Deferring, habit of, 98-9, 
150-1. 

Demeter, xxviii. 

Desires, restraining, 39-43, 
63-75, 139-40. 

Difficulties, conquering, 46- 
8, 86-8, 91-3, 121-2. 

Diogenes, 109, 125, 178; his 
radiant health, 176; his 
testimony, 179, his free- 
dom, 71-2. 

Diogenes Laertius, xliv, 
xlviii. 

Dion, 40. 



156; not to be feared i j56; 
to be received tnanTcfurly, 



Discipline, aim of, 27-8, 86- 
8; secret, liii-liv, 29-30, 
80-2, 148-9; of the 
senses, 94-5; method of, 
lii-lvii, 95-99; test of, 79- 
80, 83-88, 91-3. 

Discontent, 39-43, 57, 125--6. 

Diseases, how to be borne, 
86-8 ; of the soul, 28, 139- 
40. 

Disobedience, penalty for, 
J33-4. 

Display, forbidden, 30, 43- 
4, 149. 

Diviner, the internal, xliii, 
15-16. 

Dollinger, J., lxv. 

Domitian, xvii, xviii, 15. 

Door, The Open, xxxix- 
xli. 

Dreams, disturbed by, 134. 

Dress, finery in, 31-2, 53-4; 
philosopher's, 82-4. 

Duties, how measured, 105- 
6; family, 110-11; civic, 
126-8 ; religious, 13-14 ; 
chief, lxiii-lxiv, 35, 79-80, 
99-101, 1 17-18, 128-9. 

Ecbatana, 125. 

Education, need of, 32-3 ; 
its aim, 35-6, 39-41 ; 
method, 27-30, 37-8; test 
of, lxiii-lxiv, 43-6, 79-80, 
84-8, 125 ; by exercise, 95- 
6; slow process, 96-7; 
helps, xxxiii-xxxiv, li-lvi; 
of youth, 108-10. 

Eleusis, 108. 

Emancipation, the soul's, 
74-5. See Freedom. 

Emergencies, preparation 
for, 86-88, 93. 



198 



INDEX 



Emerson, R. W., xlix. 

Envy, forbidden, 73, 173. 

Epaphroditus, xvii, xviii. 

Epictetus, life, xvii-xviii ; 
tribute to Rufus, xviii; 
death, xviii, xli; Dis- 
courses, xix-xxiv ; Man- 
ual, xxi-xxii; style, lxi- 
lxii; method of teaching, 
27-8; his faith, xxiv-lvii; 
ethical severity, lvii-lix ; 
optimism, lix-lx; religious 
fervor, lx-lxi ; simplicity, 
lxi-lxii ; practical spirit, 
lxiii-lxiv; and St. Paul, 
lxv; his influence, lxiv- 
lxvii. 

Epicurus, 33-4, 59, 100. 

Equivalents, law of, xlviii-1, 
141-2. 

Eubcea, 127. 

Euphrates, 81. 

Eurystheus, 178. 

Evil, overcoming with 
good, 94-5, 1 17-8. 

Example, desired, 44 ; better 
than precept, 80-2, 100-1. 

Exchange, law of, 141-2. 

Excuses, not to be made, 
29-30, 38-9, 9^-9, 150-1- 

Exercise, see Education. 

Externals, anxiety about, 
63-6; not to be valued, 
56-8, 65-6, 73-5, 84. 

Faculty, best, 55-6. See 

Ruling Faculty. 
Failure, blaming others for, 

29-30, 38-9. 
Family, 110-11, 124; Cynic, 

184-5. See Marriage. 
Faults, two, 100; of others, 

1 1 3-12 1 ; guarding against, 



29-30, 94-99 ; freedom 
from, 98-99. 

Favorinus, 100. 

Fellowship, natural, 33-4, 
112. 

Fever, bearing a, 86-88. 

Fighting against God, 133- 
4- 

Finery in dress, 31-2, 53-4. 

Flattery, caution against, 
29-30, 94. 

Forbear, Bear and, 100. 

Forum, 147. 

Freedom, true, 68-9; and 
servitude, 69-71 ; way to, 
47, 67-8, 73-5, 89; illus- 
trated, lvii, 71-2. 

Friendship, basis of, 59-60; 
perils of, 143-6. 

Frugality, not to boast of, 30. 

Gain, 133-6, 141-3* 146-8. 
Games, Olympian, 46, 121, 

151. 
God, being of, xxvii-xxxii, 
7-8, 20-1 ; Father of all 
men, 17-8, 119; provi- 
dence, xxxii-xxxiv ; son 
of, xxxvii, 10,^7, 74 ; Her- 
cules, 18; worship of, 
xxxv-xxxvi, 23-4, 165 ; 
attaching oneself to, 162; 
dishonoring, xxxiii- 
xxxiv, 9; in man, xxxii, 
8-9, 16-17; works of, 11- 
12, 20-1, 23-4; fighting 
against, 133-4; word of, 
48; one mind with, 10-11, 
67-8, 74-5, ioi r 166-7; 
submission to, 13, 41, 74- 
5, 107, 129, 158, 164; obey- 
ing, 114, 149; communion 
with, 158, xli-xliv. 



INDEX 



199 



Good, overcoming evil with, 
94-5, 117-8; essence of, 
13, 57, 63-5, 73-4, 181-3. 

Gospels, xxii. 

Gossip, forbidden, 145. 

Government, taking part in, 
126-8; Cynic, 185. 

Greece, 125. 

Growth, see Education. 

Guardian, internal, 12. 

Gyaros, 126. 

Habits, conquering, liv-lv, 
29-30, 04-9. See Faults. 

Hades, no, 155. 

Handles, two, 119. 

Happiness, way to, 41-3, 
46-9, 67-8, 73-4, 9i-2. 

Health, of body, 31-2, 176- 
7; of soul, 28, 139-40. 

Hector, 175. 

Hercules, 18, 178. 

Hermes, rod of, 91-2. 

Hesiod, 98. 

Hicks, R. D., quoted, lx. 

Hierapolis, xvii. 

Holiness, profit and, 58-9. 

Homer, xxxiii, 44. 

Hymn to God, 23-4. 

Ideas, innate, xxxii. 
Ignorant, tolerance with 

1 13-21 ; associating with, 

143-6. 
Ilion, 175. 
Imagination, training, 94- 

5- 
Imitating, dangers of, 143- 

6. 
Immortality, xlix-li. See 

Death. 
Improvement, how shown, 

79-80. See Education. 



Indifferent, things, 56-8, 

62-3. 
Indulgence, of self, 47. 
Injury, what is, 120, 124. 
Instruction, see Education. 
Intemperance, 47, 144. 
Intimacy, perils of, 143-6. 

James, Epistle of, xxii. 
Job, xxxii. 

Know thyself, 175. 

Lacedaemonians, 120-1. 
Lamentations, rivers of, 

155'. 
Lamp, stolen, 142, 146. 
Law, the divine, 66. 
Learning, excessive desire 

for, 84-6. See Education. 
Life, preparation for, 80, 

82-6, 85-88, 121-2, 128-9. 

See Philosophy. 
Lightfoot, Bishop, quoted, 

lxv. 
Loneliness, contentment in, 

48-9, 1 12-3. 
Loss, gain and, 133-6, 141- 

3, 146-8. 
Love, family, 110-11, 124. 
Lowell, J. R., xxxvi. 
Lyceum, 126. 
Lycurgus, 120, 127. 

Man, beast and, xli-xlii, 10, 
19-20, 22-3, 53-4, 138, 157- 
8; what is, 91, 138; what 
makes and unmakes, 136- 
8; his nature, xxxi, 10-n, 
18-20, 61, 68, 128; social 
nature, xxxvi-xxxvii, 

xlvi-xlviii, 33-4, 106-7, 
112, 137; best thing in, 55- 



200 



INDEX 



6, 120; vocation, 44-6; 
God in, xxxii, xli-xliv, 8- 
13, 16-17; son of God, 10, 
17, 74; chief duties, 123, 
128-9, 163 ; citizen of uni- 
verse, xxvi-xxxvii, 106-7; 
nobility and worth, 
xxxvii-xxxix, 8-9; capac- 
ity for correction, 135-6; 
subject to death, 159; free, 
lvii, 71-3, 89. 

Marriage, commended, xlvi- 
xlviii, 128; Cynic excused 
from, 184-5. See Du- 
ties. 

Martineau, James, quoted, 
xxxii. 

Mask, death a, 156-7. 

Master, who is our, 70. 

Merivale, Charles, quoted, 
xl. 

Milo, 97. 

Milton, John, quoted, xliii. 

Mind, tractable, 135-6. 

Misfortunes, meeting, 91-3, 
121-2. 

Money, see Wealth. 

Mysteries, divulging the 
108-9. 

Names, significance of, 105- 
6. 

Nature, living according to, 
xliv-xlviii, 20, 41, 43, 45- 
6, 64, 80, 86-7, 90-1, 98, 
105, 107, 1 17-8, 123. 

Neglect, perils of, 27-8, 32- 
3, 45-6, 98-9, 150, 183. 

Nero, xvii, 137, 182-3. 

Nicopolis, xviii. 

Nothing for nothing, xlix, 
64, 142. 



Odysseus, 7. 

Offense, taking, 27-9, 113- 
21, 123-4. 

Olympia, 21, 93, 148. 

Opinions, examining, 41-3 ; 
right, 66, 1 16-17; conduct 
dependent upon, 10, 49, 
1 13-17, 1 19-21, 123-4; 
about death, 156; to be 
practised, 79-80, 89. 

Orphan, no man an, 18. 

Ostentation, forbidden, 30, 
149. 

Own, what is our, 117-8, 

123-4. 

Pain, bearing, 86-8. 
Parents, care of, 128; duties 

of, IIO-II. 

Patriotism, 126-7. 

Paul, Epictetus and, lxv. 

Peace, living in, 48-9, 124; 
price of, 142. 

Perfection, approach to- 
wards, 97, 99. 

Peripatetics, 100. 

Persuading oneself, 1 15-17. 

Phidias, 9, 21, 100. 

Philosopher, character of, 
29-30; being not seeming, 
29-30, 80-4; personal ap- 
pearance of, 31-2, 82-4; 
in secret, 80-2, 148-9; 
ideal, lvi-lvii, 100-1. 

Philosophy, nature of, 27-8, 
35-6; aim of, 28, 35-42, 
87-8; what it promises, 
35-6, 48-9, 117; first steps 
in, 29-30, 37-8, 41, 47 ; dis- 
cipline in, 79-82, 148-9; 
field of, 44-6; test of, 44, 
80, 82-88, 91; adorning, 
101 ; bringing reproach 



INDEX 



201 



upon, 109, 126; teacher of, 

108-10; in a nutshell, 99- 

100. 
Piraeus, 125. 
Pleasure, not a good, 34, 38 ; 

servant, 128-9 ; yielding 

to, 46-8; resisting, 94-5. 
Politics, taking part in, 126- 

7; Cynic excused from, 

185. See Duties. 
Possessions, not a good, 

182-3. See Wealth. 
Poverty, bearing, n 5-7; 

Diogenes, 180. 
Practice, theory and, 79- 

80. 
Praise, hymn of, 23-4. 
Preparation, for life, 85, 

121-2, 128-9; for emer- 
gencies, 86-88. 
Preserved, how man is, 

137-9. 
Price, paying the, 46-7, 73- 

4, 141-2; of oneself, 142- 

3- 

Principles, examining, 41-3; 

to be worked out in life, 

146. 
Procrastination, dangers of, 

98-9, 1 50-1. 
Procrustes, 18. 
Profit, holiness and, 58-9. 
Progress, see Education. 
Providence, see God. 
Psalm, xciv. 9, xxxiii. 
Pursuing and avoiding, 11, 

14, 100, 128-9, i§3- 
Punishment, law of, 133-4. 
Purity, inner, 54, 173-4. 
Pythagoras, lv. 



Quarrelling, 
123-4. 



condemned, 



Reading, see Study. 
Reason, separates man from 

brutes, 10, 17, 138; source 

of beauty, 31, 54; decrees 

of, 150-1. 
Recovery, moral, 135-9. 
Relations, duties measured 

by, 105-6. 
Religion, essence ^13-14; 

in Epictetus, lx-lxi. See 

Philosophy. 
Renunciation, 40-1, 64, 66, 

68, 73, 105-7, 1 15-16. 
Resolve, need of, 150-1. 
Revelation, see God. 
Revenge, forbidden, 1 17-21, 

123-4. 
Reward, virtue its own, 

xlviii-xlix, 123-4, 148-9. 
Riches, see Wealth. 
Rolleston, T. W., quoted, 

xxxviii. 
Rome, xvii, xviii, 17, 27, 

41. 
Rufus, C. Musonius, xviii. 
Ruin, man's, 136-9. 
Rule, Golden, xxxix. 
Rules, to be observed, 37-S, 

45-6, 66, 84-8, 91, 94-5, 

98-9. 
Ruling Faculty, xlii-xliv, 

xlix, 42, 44-6; cultivated, 

33, 64, 79-80; neglected, 

183; restored, 139-40; 

Cynic's, 174. 

Sardanapalus, 182-3. 
Satisfaction, the good man's, 

148-9. 
Sciron, 18. 
Secret, doing good in, liii— 

liv, 80-2, 149. 
Security, the mind's, 88-90. 



202 



INDEX 



Self-commiseration, 1 15-17. 
Self-correction, 90-1, ii3~4» 

121-2, 134-9, 1 50-1. 

Self-deception, 92-3, 95-6. 
Self-denial, 46-8. 
Self-examination, lv, 23, 41- 

3, 91, 113, 1 16-7. 
Self-reliance, 30, 43-4, 88- 

90, 148-9. 
Selling oneself, 142-3. 
Senses, disciplining the, 94- 

5. 

Sickness, bearing, 86-8; the 
soul's, 28. 

Sighs, rivers of, 155. 

Simplicity, commended, 176- 
7, 179-80. 

Slave, who is a, 68-75. 

Slavery, condemned, 
xxxviii-ix ; deliverance 
from, 74. 

Socrates, xix, 7; citizen of 
the universe, xxvi, 16 ; not 
known as philosopher, liii- 
liv, 82; living as a, lvi, 
151; courage, 72, 164; 
skill in conversation, 145 ; 
obeyed dictates of reason, 
151; his growth, 97; ad- 
vice to Alcibiades, 54; 
kinsman of God, 17; ex- 
ample, 47, 125; view of 
death, 156; death of, 157; 
influence, 72-3. 

Solitude, contentment in, 48- 
9, 1 12-13. 

Son of God, xxxvii, 10, 17, 
18; Hercules, 18, 178. 

Soul, nature of, 10-13, 45; 
diseases of, 139-40; neg- 
lect of, 32-3; immortality, 
xlix-li. 

Sparta, 127. 



State, duties to, 126-7; how 
fortified, 127; Cynic and, 
185. See Duties. 

Stoic, Cynic and, xxiv-xxv, 
portrait of, lvi-lvii; ideal, 

IOO-I. 

Study, purpose of, 35-6, 43- 

5, 79-80, 84-8. 
Suggestion, power of, lv, 

151. 
Suicide, xxix-xli. 
Susa, 125. 

Teaching, manner of, 27-8; 
Rufus, xviii; aim of, 
35-6; vocation of, 108-10. 
See Education. 

Temptation, resisting, 94-5. 

Thebes, 18. 

Theory, practice and, 79-^a 

Thersites, 145, 175. 

Theseus, 18. 

Things, indifferent, 56-7, 
62-3. 

Thought, see Opinions. 

Tolerance, 113-121. 

Trajan, 137. 

Tranquillity, price of, 142; 
essence of, 85; way to, 
17, 41, 48-9, 65-8, 84-6. 

Trouble, borrowing, 56-8. 

Tyrants, facing, 62-3, 89. 

Universe, citizen of, xxxvi- 
xxxvii, 16-17; one com- 
munity, 16-18 ; trusting, 68. 

Virtue its own reward, 

xviii-xlix, 148-9. 
Vulcan, 81. 
Vulgar, associating with, 

80-2, 143-6. 



INDEX 



203 



Warfare, life a, 163. 

Watchfulness, 30, 47, 100. 

Wealth, perils of, 139-40, 
147-8 ; contentment bet- 
ter than, 140; not a good, 
182-3; true, 42, 136-7. 

Will, gift of God, xliii, 67- 
8 ; best thing in man, 55-6, 
120 ; measure of worth, 58- 
9, 80; things beyond, 13- 
14, 61-3, 65-6; power of, 
56-65, 67-8, 135-6; disci- 
pline of, 80 ; not to be sold, 
143; submission to God's, 
xxxiii-xxxiv ; good, 127- 
8; according to nature, 
80, 105; Cynic's 173, 179. 



Word of God, 48. 

Wordsworth, Matthew Ar- 
nold on, xxii. 

World, use and abuse of, 
56-7, 63-5; leaving, 164- 

7. See Universe. 
Worry, cure for, 56-8, 61- 

8, 73 7 4- 

Worship of God, xxxv- 
xxxvi, 23-4. 



Zeller, R, xxiv, xxxv, 
xxxviii, xxxix, xlvi, xlvii, 
lviii. 

Zeno, xxxix, xliv, lvi, 83, 
109, 151. 



